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“The Sacred Cause of State Rights” examines the problem of federalism as the 
central issue in U.S. constitutional history before the Civil War.  Drawing on Keith 
Whittington’s insight into the political construction of the Constitution, the argument 
focuses on the role of state legislatures and courts, particularly in the North, relative to 
their claims of co-equal authority to the national government in the struggle to determine 
constitutional meaning.  The project seeks to rescue the political history of federalism 
from the post-Civil War view that the Union had been polarized into patriotic nationalists 
and traitorous defenders of state rights.  In fact, most Northerners occupied a middle 
ground between the arch-nationalism of Daniel Webster and John C. Calhoun’s 
exposition of nullification.  Martin Van Buren appealed to Northern moderates when he 
fought to defend “the sacred cause of state rights” against the heresy of nullification in 
1833. 
  
Analytically, the dissertation strives to establish the core theoretical components 
of representative debates.  It begins with the formulation of the first national Union under 
the Articles of Association (1774) and then moves to the constitutional compromise of 
1787 and the debate over its meaning in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions (1798).  
These chapters analyze the revolutionary political grammar of association and its 
importance to American constitutional deliberation.  Subsequent chapters treat the issue 
of sovereignty through a study of the Olmsted Crisis in Philadelphia and the issue of 
concurrent state powers in New York by examining the Steamboat Cases.  Then, the 
dissertation explains how Northern states’ claim to interpret the Constitution for 
themselves was sorely discredited by the national attention given to Calhoun’s radical 
theory of nullification in 1833.  Finally, it examines the North’s turn away from state 
rights and social contract theory and toward the organic nationalist theories of the Union 
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Even at this critical emergency in our public affairs, when so much 
discredit is apprehended to the sacred cause of State rights from the 
excesses of South Carolina, the confidence of the Committee in the 
correctness of that cause is strengthened by the exemplary conduct of her 
sister States. 
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Chapter 1:  “A Virtuous and Spirited Union”: (1774-1777) 
 
The origin of society then is to be sought, not in any natural right 
which one man has to exercise authority over another, but in the united 
consent of those who associate.1  
-Brutus.   
 
 British America is divided into many provinces, forming a large 
association...2 
-Hector St. John de Crevecouer 
 
 Ever since Americans have been conscious of their union, they have argued over 
its character, terms, participants, limits, ends, means, and obligations.  Disagreement over 
union remains a fundamental part of the American political system, yet the history of 
“union” remains ill-understood.3  In particular, scholars have neglected the way that 
revolutionary ideas of association shaped the events leading to 1776.  As Americans 
converted the British constitution and colonial charters into an American fundamental 
law, they drew upon the political grammar of consent, association, social and civil 
compacts to form a nation embodied in a voluntary federal union.   
American political actors prior to the Civil War understood that the questions 
about the nature and character of the Union—who were the legal parties of the Union? 
When was it formed? How was it constituted?—informed the basic questions about the 
                                                 
1 Brutus, second essay, November 1, 1787. 
 
2 J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, “What is an American?” (1782) Letters from an American Farmer 
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968), 50. 
 
3 As evidence that the division of sovereignty between the states and general government is still unresolved, 
see  U.S. v. Lopez, 115 U.S. 1624 (1995), U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 US 779 (1995), and U.S. v. 
Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000).   
 The best current scholarship on union can be found in Rogan Kersh, Dreams of a More Perfect Union 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Peter S. Onuf and Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, Federal Union, 
Modern World: the Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776-1814, 1st ed. (Madison: Madison 
House, 1993); J. R. Pole, The Idea of Union (Alexandria, Va.: Bicentennial Council of the Thirteen 
Original States Fund, 1977). For an insightful treatment of the character of the Union before the 
Constitution, see Daniel Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 




power of the state and national governments in American society.  Antebellum 
constitutional theory drew upon two distinctly different ideas of union, the “national 
principle” and the “federal principle.”  In essence, the federal principle contains the idea 
that the states are the sovereign constituents of the Union while the national principle 
represents the idea that one people delegated sovereignty to a central government.  
Abraham Lincoln articulated the national principle at Gettysburg that government was 
“of the people, by the people, and for the people.”  In his First Inaugural Address, 
Lincoln expressed his understanding that the Union had been formed by the Articles of 
Association in 1774.  He espoused a strong organic national union that pre-dated the 
states and was superior to them. 4  The strength of union grew in 1776 (independence), 
1781 (confederation), and again in 1787 (Constitution).  By the outbreak of Civil War, 
the Constitution had become the perpetual guarantor of the Union, binding upon all of the 
parties.5   
Lincoln’s political opponents in both the North and the South posed diametrically 
different views of union.  The seceding “fire-eaters” of the South contended that the 
                                                 
4 I am particularly indebted to Andrew McLaughlin for his use of the term “organic.”  He described the 
organic philosophy with three principles.  First, the state is the natural condition of society.  The “state of 
nature” never existed. Thus the United States has formed an organic state from its separation from England, 
not since the ratification of the Constitution.  The Union is a natural, fraternal association, not an artifice of 
the Revolutionary generation. Second, law is a function of the ruler's will, rather than an agreement that 
requires popular consent.  Finally, sovereignty resides in the organic state; it cannot be divided. (Andrew C. 
McLaughlin, “Social Compact and Constitutional Construction,” American Historical Review 5 (1900): 
467-490).   McLaughlin correctly apprehends that not all political thought fits into neat contractarian 
categories.  But he exaggerates the importance of the nation-state to political thinking before Hegelian 
romanticism. The Founders would have considered Union or even a social compact to be organic; they did 
not believe that the state was organic.  Law really was the command of the sovereign, but because the 
people were ultimately sovereign, fundamental law rested on popular consent.  The work of Trisha Posey 
has also been particularly helpful to me in framing the ideas of organic social and political thought.  (Trisha 
Posey, "Poverty Encounters: Unitarians, the Poor, and Poor Relief in Antebellum Boston and Philadelphia" 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, College Park, forthcoming). 
 
5 Abraham Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings, ed. Roy Basler (Cleveland: Word Pub., 




Union was not permanent.  Because the sovereign states had contracted with one another 
to form a federal union, they could secede.  Secessionists insisted that the North had 
violated the contract by refusing to satisfy the South’s constitutional rights concerning 
slavery, so no legal impediment kept the slave states in the Union.  Northern Democrats 
held a different view.  James Buchanan declared that people acting in their states 
constituted the Union, and that the Union remained a creature of the states.  However, the 
Union was designed to be perpetual and “sovereign over the special subjects to which its 
authority extends.”  Although secession was a legal impossibility, the states still 
possessed considerable rights within the Union.  This moderate position insisted that the 
powers of government had been divided between the federal and state governments, 
granting some to the national head while reserving most power to the states or to the 
people.6  In 1861, the contest between the federal and national ideas of union had proved 
to be irreconcilable, despite three generations best efforts to reconcile them.  And the war 
came.   
This brief history demonstrates the importance that ideas of union play in 
American history.  The three parties (Republicans, Northern Democrats, and 
Secessionists) drew upon distinctly different ideas of association that were each rooted in 
the way the Union was formed in the American Revolution.  Lincoln focused on the 
national aspects of colonial associations, while Southerners reasoned from revolutionary 
                                                 
6 James Buchanan, Journal of the Senate, 1860, 36th Congress, 2nd sess. 4 December. (Washington: George 
W. Bowman, 1861), 7-19.  
 Northern Democrats tried to distance what they believed to be the true Northern position from the 
innovations of the Republicans.   “State Sovereignty is to be the issue between the two parties, not as 
understood in the South, absolute and independent, covering the rights of secession, but the moderate 
conditional sovereignty of the old Northern Democracy.” (Regarding the 1864 election, James Bowen to 
John Bigelow, November 8, 1864, quoted in John Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life (New York, 
Baker and Taylor, 1909), 227-229).  That Bowen and others like George Washington Woodward of 





contract theory.  Buchanan drew upon the Articles of Confederation to contend that the 
sovereign states had formed an indissoluble Union.  The questions about the nature of 
union would only be settled by war because each side could draw upon valid historical 
arguments to prove their points. 
What was the character of the nation when it was formed?  I argue that the 
national principle and the federal principle were not mutually exclusive during the 
Revolution.  Lincoln was correct.  American national union originated in the Articles of 
Association (1774).  Northern Democrats were likewise correct in their assessment that 
the institutional structure of the Union was federal.  Between 1774 and 1777, American 
political actors created a nation embodied in a voluntary federal union.  A union of one 
people could be governed by multi- layered political institutions.  Each level of 
government was instituted for fundamentally different ends.  When the colonists realized 
the need for a united commercial and diplomatic policy vis-à-vis the British Empire, they 
formed a national union organized as a confederation.  Because the states remained the 
basic unit of governance, the Union was organized on the federal principle.  In the 
Articles of Association, these principles informed the first American Constitution.   
Given its embryonic character, the Revolutionary Union should be understood 
broadly as an unwritten ordering of American political institutions and principles.  
Between 1774 and 1777 Americans first created a new union and began to construct its 
political institutions.  Union developed from the united commercial policy of 1774 
organized on principles of voluntary association.  It incorporated both the formal 
Declaration of Independence and the extended process of drafting the Articles of 




the Congress exercised in pursuit of American liberty up until its formal ratification in 
1781.  This unwritten, informal constitution provided for Americans their first organic 
law.   
Keith Whittington persuasively argues that “not all constitutional activity in the 
United States deals … explicitly and obsessively with the document itself.”  Most 
attention to constitutions in American history focuses on the problem of interpretation, 
usually focused on the text and performed by the judicial branch.  Whittington challenges 
scholars to pay careful attention to the often political process of constructing 
constitutional meaning in areas where the text itself does not provide clear guidance.  
According the Whittington, there are distinct levels of constitutional deliberation: 
interpretation, construction, creation, and revolution.  Interpretation offers a largely 
familiar judicial model for revealing the meaning of constitutional texts.  Constitutional 
construction mandates working beyond the text to “mak[e] constitutional meaning more 
explicit without altering the terms of the text itself.”  Beyond interpretation and 
construction lie the more radical acts of creation and revolution.  Revolution leaves old 
constitutional models behind to create wholly new systems.  Creation retains the 
influences and models of the old system, but founds a new system on new documents.7   
The history of the Union during the Revolution should be understood as a history 
of constitutional creation and construction.   Revolutionary statesmen did not have 
recourse to a judiciary.  Their decisions were deeply political.  The constitution they 
                                                 
7 Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction, Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1-7.  Americans were principally engaged in the task of 
creating a new constitution from British models.  To the extent that they drew upon the intellectual currents 
of natural right, they engaged in constitutional revolution as well.  Whittington’s major contribution is to 
demonstrate the extent to which constitutions require constructions from the political branches of 




created was not written, and hence lacked the formal legitimacy of ratification.  Yet it 
was a constitution nevertheless—a kind of fundamental law in the making, based on 
English Common Law traditions, federal theories of association, and Lockean natural 
right.  Normative constitutional theorists insist that real constitutions must provide more 
than set procedural rules; constitutions should secure the liberty of the citizen.  In the 
“Declaration and Resolves” and the Declaration of Independence, Congress focused the 
objects of union on precisely those ends.  The Constitution of federal association was 
designed to defend traditional and natural rights against both Imperial and American 
government.8  In treating the voluntary federal union of the Articles as a constitution of 
purpose, this analysis meets the criteria of normative theorists that constitutions should 
secure liberty as well as describe institutional arrangements. 
This chapter traces the national and federal elements in the Revolutionary 
American Constitution.  First, it examines the political grammar of union, treating in 
detail compact theory, the federal language of association, the ends of union, and the 
appropriate means for achieving the ends.  Next, the Articles of Association are presented 
as a moderate solution to the crisis of Imperial Union.  Upon the decisive break with 
Britain, Congress decidedly established the national principle with the Declaration of 
Independence.  Finally, when the delegates tried to establish a formal constitution, the 
tensions between the federal and national ideas precipitated a contentious debate.  By 
analyzing this debate on the nature on the Union, this chapter will demonstrate how the 
                                                 
8 Giovanni Sartori, "Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion," American Political Science Review 56 
(Dec. 1962): 853-64.  Revolutionary constitutionalism, while partly unwritten, meets Sartori’s criteria of a 
garantisme feature: that the telos or end of constitutionalism is not the preservation of the state.  A true 




political grammar of union was articulated in a federal structure through the Articles of 
Confederation. 
The Political Grammar of Union (1774-1776) 
It is difficult for the twenty-first century mind to understand the revolutionary 
idea of association because so many of its core principles appear alien to it.  The 
statesmen of the Revolutionary period believed they could authoritatively know 
principles of government and society through rational science.  Words like justice, nature, 
virtue, compact, liberty, happiness, and association dominated their lexicon.  They 
believed that constitutional government ought to be expressed in a normative framework 
that tried to mold people and society into the form they ought to assume.9  As the 
colonists formed the American Union, their constitutional grammar drew heavily upon 
the Lockean description of the social contract, confederal ideas in international law, 
natural and customary right, and the colonial experience of an imperial union. 
 
Compact theory 
Of these components, social contract theory provided the most common 
metaphors for the Revolutionary idea of union.  Constitutional historians have long 
recognized that political actors of the Revolution employed an “American expression of 
the old social contract theory.”10  This doctrine included the component parts of 1) a state 
of nature 2) a social compact, 3) the subsequent formulation of natural rights, 4) a 
                                                 
9 I am indebted to Graham Walker for his acute analysis of normative constitutional thought.  Graham 
Walker, Moral Foundations of Constitutional Thought: Current Problems, Augustinian Prospects 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
 
10 Elizabeth Kelley Bauer, Commentaries on the Constitution, 1790-1860 (New York: Columbia University 




documentary basis for the compact, and 5) government by consent.  Finally, contract 
theory included an escape clause.  6) If any party violated the contract, society returned to 
its original, natural state.  Every major American thinker was familiar with these ideas, 
but most could not agree on how these principles should be implemented.  Few 
Americans even came to these ideas through the same source.  Citations to Locke are 
rare, although the adaptation of his language is unmistakable.  Instead, the ideas of social 
contract were just as frequently mediated through the treatises of Johannes Althusius, 
Emmerich de Vattel, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, Hugo Grotius, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
and Samuel Pufendorf. 
While the language of a social contract was widely disseminated, it did not 
provide a common set of axioms for political reasoning.  Few thinkers could be said to 
utilize all six parts with any consistency.  Andrew McLaughlin supports the claim that 
social contract thinking could be remarkably fragmented.  “The important fact is not so 
much that men thought of the Constitution as a social compact as that they thought of 
society and the state in general as artificial and based on intellectual consent.”11  
McLaughlin’s comment captures the extent to which early Americans understood that 
their communities were the product of popular agreement.  Consent implied that society 
was based upon agreements to associate, voluntarily entered into.  Political associations, 
in particular, were formed by the people to protect their natural rights.  The founding 
documents of state and federal constitutions are suffused with this language of consent 
and contract.  In 1768, Massachusetts referred to the “original contract between the King 
                                                 





and the first planters” as the surety for their rights as Englishmen.12  The preamble to 
their constitution affirmed the principle that “the body politic is formed by a voluntary 
association of individuals: it is a social compact.”13  Participants in the convention at 
Philadelphia in 1787 with views as diffuse as Luther Martin, James Madison, and James 
Wilson shared this basic idea.  Agreement about the meaning of consent within social 
compact theory did not mean that they universally accepted the other principles.  In fact, 
very few Revolutionary thinkers embraced all six components of social compact theory.  
These ideas provided a common intellectual grammar for early American theorists.   
When Americans argued from these principles, they frequently reached starkly 
different conclusions.  Many theorists even employed concepts that contradicted core 
principles of compact theory.  For instance, Nathaniel Chipman and “Americanus” shared 
the classical conviction that man was a political animal.  Like Aristotle, they asserted that 
social organization was a natural phenomenon, not an artificial agreement.14  Chipman 
successfully reconciled Lockean contract theory to Aristotle by borrowing Althusius’ 
distinction between a civil and a social contract. The civil contract could be artificial, 
even if rights and society were entirely natural.  Chipman could theorize that Americans 
were members of one organic society, while using Locke to argue that political union was 
                                                 
12 The Massachusetts House to the Agent of the Province in England, January 12, 1768, in Alden Bradford 
et al., Speeches of the Governors of Massachusetts, 1765-1775 … (New York: Da Capo Press, 1971), 138. 
 
13 Massachusetts Constitution, 1780, Preamble.  
 
14 Nathaniel Chipman, Sketches of the Principles of Government (Rutland, Vermont: J. Lyon, printed for 
the author, 1793), 55; and “Americanus” [Timothy Ford], “The Constitutionalist,”  (Charleston, 1794) in 
Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz eds., American Political Writing during the Founding Era, 1760-
1805 (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983), 904.  “Americanus” argued “Now, it is manifest, that such a state 
as is called a state of nature never in fact existed since the creation of Adam and Eve.  Man was no sooner 
born, than he was associated under some common tie, which bound the human race together.  The first 
knowledge he had of himself was this.  Nature implanted the ties, habit confirmed them, and experience 





rooted in an artificial constitutional agreement.  The idea of a civil compact allowed 
American thinkers a basis for establishing civil government without getting bogged down 
in debates about a hypothetical state of nature.  They could theorize an organic society, 
while insisting on a liberal, Lockean state.   
Americans appealed to ideas of national union that were fraternal, ascriptive, and 
organic at the same time they espoused explicitly contractarian ideas.  They adopted this 
language because simple compact theory was insufficient for their needs.  The political 
grammar of Lockean liberalism offered ready justifications for revolution or resistance to 
tyranny, but provided a weaker basis for inspiring individual sacrifice for the common 
good.15  In many cases, the nascent national identity provided more workable metaphors 
for political community than an artificial liberal community.  Eminent contract theorists 
like James Wilson frequently appealed to fraternal myths.  “We are now one nation of 
Brethren,” he pleaded.  “We must bury all local interests and distinctions.”16   
Although compact theory was pervasive and readily understood by political 
actors, it was not uniformly applied.  Religion, in particular, offered an alternative source 
of governmental authority.  In England, traditional religious authority was used to defend 
                                                 
15 Fraternal ties are ascriptive because they include people in the community based on birth and 
membership in a common struggle against the crown.  They are organic because they reject ties based on 
artificially created communities of liberty.  Rogers M. Smith suggests that these ascriptive myths are 
necessary because liberal and republican myths are so weak at binding a nation together.  I will prefer the 
terms fraternal and organic, because the colonists used the national idea to unite colonials based on 
common experience and culture, far more than they were intended to exclude “others.” Rogers M. Smith, 
Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History, The Yale ISPS series (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997).   
 Liberal theory, as articulated by Locke, wrestles heavily with the problem of the individual and the 
state.  Smith correctly identifies the tensions between liberal theory and nationalism.  However, Republican 
theory provides a better justification for individual sacrifice for the common good, because it draws upon 
the ancient and medieval political philosophy of the polis (Aristotle) or the heavenly city (Augustine and 
Aquinas).  Because Smith misses the strong fraternal ties that this brand of republicanism creates, I believe 
he overestimates the extent to which ascriptive ties are necessary for sustaining strong modern nations.   
 
16 United States, Constitutional Convention, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Max 




Tory power and paternalist theory.  Yet American theorists frequently cited traditional 
ideas of government, even though the core of their argument remained government by 
consent. Associations were forms of civic life either “self-created, or sanctioned by 
government, or by the God of nature.”17  John Leland accepted the revolutionary 
definition of government as “the mutual compact of a certain body of people, for the 
general safety of their lives, liberty, and property.” Yet he offered a detailed description 
of Biblical patriarchy as the first form of government and the prototype of monarchical 
government.18  An election sermon by John Tucker (1771) advanced the Calvinist 
position that ultimate sovereignty rested in God.  For both Leland and Tucker, social 
contract republicanism triumphed over paternalism.  The election sermon in particular 
reveals the extent to which pre-Lockean theory was assimilated into modern political 
theory.  Even though Tucker’s text emphasized obedience to authority as obedience to 
God (I Peter 2:13-16), he reasoned from the condition of natural man.  Fundamental law, 
property rights, and government by consent, all key elements in the Revolutionary 
thought, were deftly connected to the state of nature while avoiding a contradiction with 
his scriptural text.  He taught that subjection to authority in a free state “is a medium 
between slavish subjection to arbitrary claims of rulers, on one hand, and lawless license 
on the other.”19  Tucker evidences the easy compatibility of traditional religion and 
revolutionary ideas that one scholar has identified as “Christian Republicanism.”20  His 
sermon demonstrates that the language of social contract was so widespread that it was 
                                                 
17 Peres Forbes, “Election Sermon” (Boston, 1795), in American Political Writing, 990-1013. 
 
18 “Jack Nips” [John Leland], “The Yankee Spy” (Boston, 1794), in American Political Writing, 971-972. 
 
19 John Tucker, “An Election Sermon, (Boston 1771), in American Political Writing, 158-171. 
 
20 Mark A. Noll, America's God : from Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (New York: Oxford 




used to discuss politics, even by those who had traditionally used scripture as the final 
authority.   
 
The Federal Theory of Association 
 While the political actors of the Revolution repudiated paternalism and divine 
right, they drew deeply from their own colonial traditions of corporate charters, 
covenants, and associations.  The language of covenanted association continued into the 
early Republic and provided a basis for political action close in style but different in 
theory from the Lockean idea of contract.21  It focused on the natural ties that bound 
society, preferring Aristotle’s teaching that man is a political animal over a modern belief 
in the autonomous self-contracting individual.  Existing social and political institutions 
were more important than abstract ones.  Covenantal theory did not necessarily rely upon 
a state of nature, but rather upon a real association between men in the present.   
Society itself was the principle form of association.  Early modern language of 
association emphasized membership in a social body.   Grotius and Pufendorf had labeled 
this community the Pactum Unionis to distinguish it from the civil compact.22  The social 
compact was the form of association that made up a society, while the civil compact 
formed a polity.23  In England, social union had required membership in the polity.  In 
contrast, immigrants to the colonies had left their old associations to form corresponding 
new political compacts.  As participants in new associations, Americans believed that no 
                                                 
21 As Donald Lutz has demonstrated, political theory in colonial New England rested upon federal, 
covenant theology as much as upon the idea of social contract.  (Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American 
Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988)). 
 
22 Winton U. Solberg ed., The Constitutional Convention and the Formation of the Union, 2nd. ed. 
(Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1990), xxx. (Hereafter referred to as CCFU). 
 




one compelled people to enter a civil compact.  It was a voluntary covenant.  Once in a 
union, a member was expected to take into account the good of the community. This 
theory presumed that the participants would act virtuously, and not selfishly; they would 
have access to the right course of action through “natural reason and unbiased justice.”  
Members could determine not only what is in their own interest, but also the interest of 
their community.  Although an individual could expect the union to preserve his or her 
liberty, that individual was duty bound to use his or her liberty to improve both his or her 
rights and the rights of others.24  
Membership in one union did not prevent a person from having other associations 
to which he or she was bound.  The increasingly powerful British state was only the most 
powerful among many forms of association.  This understanding of union had much in 
keeping with the multi- layered medieval institutions that Althusius described. One could 
simultaneously be the member of a church, a citizen of England, a member of a trade 
guild, and the subject of a feudal lord.  Membership in one union was not mutually 
exclusive with other associations.  
By the 1770s, the traditional federal associations came into conflict with the 
developing English doctrine of sovereignty, culminating in revolution.  As Parliament 
began to govern the colonies actively, it consolidated sovereignty on behalf of the nation 
state.  Blackstone explained, “There is, and must be in every state a supreme, irresistible, 
absolute, uncontroulled authority in which the jura summi imperii or the rights of 
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sovereignty lie.”25  Within the existing empire, Parliament provided the only locus of that 
sovereignty.  In contrast, the long experience under a colonial policy of “salutary neglect” 
accustomed Revolutionary thinkers to the problem of imperium in imperio (divided 
sovereignty).  Civic union had a variety of connotations: the British Empire, the Union of 
Scotland with England, their own colonial corporations or commonwealths, and even 
fabled the New England town.  James Wilson explained, “All the different members of 
the British Empire are distinct states, independent of each other, but connected together 
in the same sovereign in right of the same crown.”26  To the English, who by the late 
eighteenth century were consolidating political power in Parliament, there could be only 
one state: the British Empire.  Wilson’s theory of union was political heresy because 
dividing sovereignty was a political absurdity.27   
In 1776, however, the American experience of autonomous colonial associations 
trumped the theoretical critique of divided sovereignty.  Sovereignty, for the colonists, 
was a fundamentally relational idea.  The Massachusetts House wrote in 1768, “The 
original contract between the king and the first planters here, was a royal promise on 
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behalf of the nation.”28  The Stamp Act Congress declared the personal loyalty of every 
member of the Congress to the Crown.  As individuals, they owed allegiance to the 
Crown.  As the representatives of “these colonies,” they owed it to God, the Crown, and 
country to refuse consent to unconstitutional measures.  The delegates acted both as men 
and as representatives of the colonies.29  When the colonies declared their independence 
from the Crown, the king ceased to be a party to the contract.  Loyalty in society then 
assumed the character of an ordinary civic association.  The people contracted with each 
other within the several states to form state constitutions, and as “one people” they broke 
the bonds with England and consented to recognize themselves as “free and independent 
states.”  Immediately their corporate assembly—the Continental Congress—began the 
trying task of constituting their government upon a fundamental legal agreement, but 
found that they could not agree as to whom would be the best parties of government.  
Some, including Benjamin Franklin, acted on the national principle, that only a political 
union of the whole people could only protect the liberty of the people.  Others, like 
Edward Rutledge, assumed that Union would preserve the existing federal arrangement.  
This disagreement reflected the fact that for nearly two centuries they had grown 
accustomed to union with Britain while preserving the integrity and autonomy of their 
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Ends of Union 
Early modern political language stressed the purposeful character of association.30  
Revolutionary thinkers believed that the political associations were intended to promote 
certain basically liberal ends.  The first legal commentator of the Revolution, James 
Wilson, argued that “the happiness of society is the first law of government.”31  
“Happiness” itself is a widely used term in political theory, featuring prominently in 
Aristotle’s Politics as well as the utilitarian writings of Jeremy Bentham.  Wilson had 
neither of these concepts in mind.  He advocated the liberal contractarian idea that the 
people enter society to protect their natural rights of life, liberty, and property.  
Government exists not for the classical end of justice and virtue, but to protect the 
freedom people need to pursue the ends they desire.  This is the idea enshrined in the 
Declaration of Independence: 
That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain 
inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to 
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed.  That when ever any form of government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute 
a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in 
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to affect their safety and happiness. 
 
The pursuit of happiness became the end of society, for which purpose governments are 
created.  Civil compacts can be overthrown when this purpose is abrogated by 
government.  These rights existed in nature, and through consent, citizens create 
government to protect them. Everything else is usurpation and tyranny. 
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 The revolutionary focus on natural rights (life, liberty, and happiness) did not 
repudiate virtue or justice as important characteristics of a good society.  Rather they 
dethroned the classical natural rights and assigned them to a secondary role.  Virtue and 
justice are necessary tools for promoting the happiness of society, rather than qualities 
that every person must be made to acquire for his or her own sake.  Revolutionary 
thinkers insisted upon virtue because their citizens were the ultimate sovereigns and must 
make wise decisions when choosing representatives.  All citizens must practice justice to 
protect the rights of the entire community.  The voluntary, non-coercive politics of the 
time required that citizens possess the capacity to sacrifice their interests to protect the 
liberty of all.32 
 Because the exposition of natural rights in the Declaration of Independence has 
become, in a sense, our national creed, it is easy to miss the prominent place of English 
liberty in the Revolutionary analysis.  For many Americans, these rights were grounded 
in their own traditions as well as in nature.  In fact, until 1776, complaints against the 
crown were usually against the imperial repudiation of colonists’ claims to traditional 
rights.33  This was the main argument in over a decade of petitions to the Crown and 
Parliament.  It had become so frequently recited by 1775 that petitioners referred to the 
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ancient rights of Englishmen without elaborating them.  Everyone knew what they 
included.  Congress simply defined them as “the freedom that is our birthright.”34   
The most fundamental of the customary rights was consent.  Starting in the 
seventeenth century, Locke had provided republicans a way to justify consent as a natural 
right.  The English, however, traditionally possessed the right to participate in the law 
making process.  Colonists frequently justified claims to consent with an appeal to 
tradition instead of an appeal to the social contract.  They believed that upon 
immigration, they carried with them the right of consent.  Because actual representation 
in Parliament was impractical, they were given provincial legislatures to express their 
consent to British sovereignty.35   
Colonists complained most frequently about their loss of representative consent.  
The Boston Town Meeting of 1772 listed as their first three grievances the right of 
legislative consent to internal legislation, internal taxation, and the appointment of local 
officials.  They did not dispute the authority of Parliament to pass general laws for the 
whole empire, but they expected they would have a chance to consent to taxation.  
Colonists also defended traditional rights of trial by jury, freedom from standing armies, 
and the inviolability of their colonial charters.  When these rights were stripped away by 
the Coercive Acts, none of them had been given the chance to consent.36  Imperial 
coercion violated the colonists deeply held sensibility that they had both a natural right 
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and a customary right within the English constitution to consent to the law. The First 
Continental Congress espoused both natural rights and customary English liberties as the 
ends of a good government.  They acted by the authority of “the immutable laws of 
nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the several charters or compacts.”37  
When the colonists formed new governments, in response to the abuse of their liberty, it 
is not surprising that the forms of association they adopted were structured to promote 
these ends.  As they constituted a new union, they drew upon both traditions to safeguard 
their rights of association. 
The Constitutional Means of Union 
 The colonists increasingly believed that their union provided only way to force 
constitutional concessions from Britain.  Coordinated economic pressure had worked 
well against the Stamp Act in the 1760s.  Given their complaint against English colonial 
government, colonists expected that a Continental Congress would be able to protect their 
customary liberties through unified action.  “The grand object of the Union of the 
Colonies,” Wilson wrote in 1776 is “the re-establishment and security of their 
constitutional rights.”38 When re-established, Wilson expected them to be protected by 
the rule of law.39  Indeed, when colonists later formed new constitutions, they usually 
prefaced them with elaborate bills of rights, enumerating each of the natural and 
customary rights they expected their new governments to uphold.  The bill of rights was 
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also a powerful tool of the Continental Congress.  They frequently petitioned the Crown 
with lists of grievances against liberty in hopes that persistent pressure would induce a 
change in imperial policy.  Colonists also took great care that associations they created 
protected their rights of representation.  Their treasured rights of consent were defended 
by constitutions that mandated frequent elections.40  They would expect their 
governments to allow a broad and free enjoyment of the natural rights of life, liberty, and 
property, as many believed these natural rights were retained by people in civil society.  
Above all, governments must be structured with such safeguards and limitations as to 
prevent sources of tyranny or corruption from creeping in.   
 The initial governmental bodies produced by the revolution lacked legal standing.  
They were neither drafted by a constitutional convention nor ratified by the people.  
Instead, they were informal coalitions of influential citizens who could use their oratory 
and influence for moral suasion.  The committees of correspondence lacked any legal 
coercive power.  Their authority rested on the voluntary consent of the participants and 
on the assumption that they would virtuously sacrifice their private interests (i.e. 
commercial gain) for the good of the commonwealth.  Because so much Parliamentary 
legislation concerning the colonies was believed to be unconstitutional, the Continental 
Congress felt it was their duty to inform the colonists that no obedience was due to 
Parliament for an act that violated their ancient liberties.  The Coercive Acts, in 
particular, were disregarded; Parliament lacked the authority to dissolve a colonial charter 
or appoint colonial officials.  Although the Congress lacked the formal jurisdiction, they 
acted on their own authority to declare Parliament’s actions null and void.  In the legal 
parlance of their descendents, Congress interposed themselves between the national 
                                                 




(British) authorities and the citizen to prevent violations of the English constitutional law.  
When the Crown withdrew the colonies from its protection, Congress desired that 
existing associations might continue under the rule of law.  They recommended that the 
colonies form their own assemblies until the Crown sent a governor who would rule 
within their fundamental colonial laws. 41 Congress was instrumental to the creation of 
the very states that would later dominate it. 
New revolutionary governments cited the Crown’s abandonment of its 
constitutional authority and the Congress’ assumption of it, to justify their own revision 
of organic law.  New Hampshire, for instance, claimed that “the preservation of peace 
and good order, and … the security of the lives and properties of the inhabitants of this 
colony” required a new constitution.  The flight of Governor Benning and his counselors 
left them “destitute of legislation” or judicial authority.  Their constitution of January 5, 
1776 complained that they were forced to this step by the Crown, claiming to be loyal 
subjects, “happy under her protection while we could enjoy our constitutional rights and 
privileges.”  Even six months before the Declaration of Independence, they hoped that 
Congress could negotiate reconciliation with Britain.42  When Vermont drafted their 
constitution the following year, they likewise appealed to Congress for direction as they 
formed a government.43  Many of the other states also referred to the authority of 
Congress to guide them and act on their behalf.  Recognizing that they needed to buttress 
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their claims to govern on behalf of the people, they appealed to the de facto authority of 
Congress. 
This authority came into existence only gradually.   In 1774, colonists still 
believed that liberty could be secured within the empire by voluntary association against 
the unjust acts of Parliament.  The Stamp Act had been brought to ruin by the united 
policy of non- importation of British goods.  Perhaps united action against the Coercive 
Acts could preserve both colonial liberty and union with England.  In response to calls for 
another embargo from Boston, the New York Committee of Correspondence understood 
that colonial union was the only security for their common liberty.  The cause of liberty, 
they wrote, “concerns the whole continent.” The appropriate colonial response was a 
congress of delegates who could act in concert.  Previous efforts at an embargo had 
collapsed dramatically in 1770.  “No remedy,” they were assured,  
could be of effect unless it proceeds from the joint act an approbation of all; from a 
virtuous and spirited union which may be expected while the feeble efforts of a few will 
only be attended with Mischief and disappointment to themselves and triumph to the 
adversaries of our liberty.44   
 
Very early, the colonies understood that their individual liberty depended on their ability 
to maintain a spirit of disinterested cooperation. 
In response to appeals for union, twelve colonies sent representatives to a 
Continental Congress in September of 1774.  This Congress rejected a moderate plan of 
Union by Joseph Galloway by a 6-5 vote.  Though narrowly defeated, the plan 
demonstrated the depth of desire for a multi- layered political union, “not only among 
themselves, but with the mother states, upon those principles of safety and freedom 
which are essentials in the constitution of all free governments.”  In its federal character 
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the plan foreshadowed what would become one of the hallmarks of the American system.  
It reserved to the colonies their present constitutions and the traditional police powers “in 
all cases whatsoever.”  To the Crown, it gave control over the executive, but defended the 
“rights, liberties, and privileges” as synonymous with those that the House of Commons 
exercises.45  It is not surprising that Galloway’s plan would fail.  Parliament would never 
have surrendered this much of its authority to the colonies, or allowed them to unite in 
such a way that would make them so difficult to govern.  Neither did the advocates of 
independence, led by Samuel Adams, support such a moderate solution.   
In place of Imperial constitutional reform, Congress adopted two documents.  
First, they submitted a “Declaration and Resolves” that listed their grievances against 
Parliament, and the causes for which they had united.  Union with England entitled them 
to possess rights which they believed Parliament had denied them.  They claimed the 
Lockean rights of life, liberty, and property.  Americans had never surrendered “to any 
sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of either without their consent.”  They also 
claimed these rights by virtue of their English ancestors in the likely event that 
Parliament would not recognize a claim rooted in natural right.  Hence, colonists 
possessed all of the traditional rights of Englishmen, the rights of their charters, and the 
protections of the English Constitution.46   
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Second, they formed their own union for the sole purpose of securing both their 
English and natural rights.  The Articles of Association provided the only de jure 
constitution for an American Government until the Articles of Confederation were finally 
ratified seven years later.  The Articles embodied the revolutionary idea of a voluntary 
compact.   
And we do bind ourselves and our constituents, under the ties aforesaid, to adhere till this 
association … and we recommend it to the provincial conventions, and to the committees 
in the respective colonies, to establish such further regulations they may think proper, for 
carrying into execution this association.47 
 
It formed a union for a limited purpose, which relied heavily upon the co-operation of 
colonial and town governments.  Although the association was formally an agreement 
between the colonies, the delegates assumed that they were pledging on behalf of the 
people who sent them.  The agreement pledged the individual colonists to a voluntary 
course of economic boycott and frugality designed to convince the Parliament of their 
resolve and secure their liberties.  It stipulated that local committees be chosen to enforce 
the boycott and granted them the right to seize goods purchased in violation of it.  
Remarkably, the provisions for enforcement lacked further coercive authority:  The 
offenders’ names would be published in the regional papers, “to the end, that all such 
foes to the rights of British-America may be publicly known and universally contemned 
as the enemies of American liberty.”  Because they believed that government was rooted 
in consent, they created a wholly voluntary union which depended on every person’s 
consent and participation.  The coercive power of the early union depended largely on the 
power of moral persuasion.48  In this way, the association would lack the power to 
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threaten the liberty of the colonists.  The association did not claim to be perpetual.  Once 
“the repressive acts of Parliament [were] repealed,” the association would come to a 
successful end.49  At the same time union between the colonies was proclaimed, they 
believed themselves to be part of another, imperial union which they were reluctant to 
destroy.50  The purpose of the Articles of Association was not to form a new nation but to 
preserve their existing union with the Crown on a footing that protected their natural and 
customary liberties.  Association was a practical measure designed to secure each 
person’s membership in the broader imperial union.  So long as that union supported the 
ends of colonial liberty, while remaining a loyal part of Imperial union, they would also 
support it. 
 In a way, Lincoln’s analysis of the Articles of Association as the genesis of 
American union was correct.  A de facto union could be said to exist in 1774 even though 
it could not yet be considered a formally constituted nation.  The First Continental 
Congress, acting on the joint authority of the colonies, brought into being a union (the 
Association) that bore several marks of sovereignty. It raised armies, levied war, 
managed national finances, negotiated alliances, and directed the constitution making 
process in the colonies.  Congress formulated first the commercial posture, then the 
foreign affairs, and eventually the military policy of the Union.  Although the body 
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lacked constitutional status, the colonists believed that they possessed the sovereignty to 
consent to an intermediate union between themselves and the crown that could act on 
their behalf.  This union would finally claim to act on behalf of the nation when it 
assumed independence in 1776.  
   Until the states belatedly ratified the Articles of Confederation (1781), Congress 
lacked de jure authority. The colonies were ever suspicious of tyranny, so they did not 
grant many powers to the Union.  They did expect it to direct general affairs. The Articles 
of Association only granted the authority for a joint non- importation agreement. 
However, Congress grew to exercise real governmental power.  By 1780, they had so 
long exercised this authority that English pamphleteers sympathetic to the revolutionary 
pushed for the recognition of the de facto authority of Congress as the government.51 The 
Union was swiftly recognized as a legislative body, bearing the joint power of the people 
to act on their behalf.  Structurally, Congress operated as a federal body.  Initially, the 
delegates believed they represented both their colony and its inhabitants.  Although the 
members were selected by and acted on the instruction of the colonial assemblies, they 
exercised authority on behalf of the citizenry. By the end of the war members 
increasingly spoke of their state as their constituent.   
The Articles of Association contained the seeds of the national principle.  A few 
recognized the nationalist possibilities of union; one editor wished that he could witness 
the “jubilee in the year of 1774” when people would memorialize the foundation of 
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Congress.  “We are now laying the foundation of an American constitution.”52  This 
editor was far ahead of his fellow colonists.  Most merely recognized that “the cause is 
general and concerns a whole continent.”53   
This common cause was the cause of liberty.  Americans hoped to secure the 
common good of all British subjects: to those in England as well as those in the colonies. 
Wilson made this comparison explicit.  “We saw a breach made in those barriers, which 
our ancestors, British and American, with so much care, with so much danger, which so 
much treasure, and with so much blood, had erected, cemented, and established for the 
security of their liberties and –with filial piety let us mention it-of ours.”  No less a 
defender of traditional liberty than the English Whig Edmund Burke defended the 
American cause in Parliament.54  Most, like John Jay, recognized that their common 
ancestral ties lay in England and simply sought their birthright.  If colonists would be 
permitted to exercise their liberties freely, Jay promised, “We shall ever esteem a union 
with you to be our greatest glory and our greatest happiness.”55  The Articles of 
Association provided a way for Americans to protect their own liberty. Before 1775, they 
hoped that their union with the Crown would secure their natural and customary rights.  
But if they were faced with a choice, they were determined not to give up their liberty as 
the price of that union. 
The Loyalist Persuasion 
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 Not all Americans accepted the Revolutionary ideas of union.  For loyalists, 
Parliament was the only possible guarantor of individual rights.  What distinguished the 
loyalists’ idea of consent was their own belief that the colonies had no way to justify 
independence.  They rejected the radical natural rights of consent and social compact to 
which the revolutionaries had recourse.  Loyalists preferred to fight for their liberties 
from within the existing inter-colonial Union.  John Dickinson devoted considerable 
energy to petitions to the crown and moderate plans of union; he considered 
parliamentary policy to be abusive of American liberty.  Yet when the question of 
independence what put before him, he offered principled opposition to independence.56   
Loyalist objections tended to fall into two categories.  First they challenged the 
constitutional arrangements that the revolutionaries created, believing that traditional 
English institutions were based on sounder principles.  Some, like “Massachusettensis”, 
opposed colonial federal structures asserting, “two supreme or independent authorities 
cannot exist in the same state.  It would be what is called imperium in imperio and the 
height of political absurdity.”57  How could a colony claim to exercise local sovereignty 
by electing delegates to Congress, and at the same time recognize the sovereignty to 
Britain?  The loyalist critique also disputed colonial assertions that the Crown and not 
Parliament was their sovereign.  Dominion theories of the empire frightened loyalist 
Whigs, because sovereignty was traditionally vested in the corporate authority of Crown 
in Parliament, not in person of George III.  The constitutional settlement of 1688 had 
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secured for Parliament the power to defend English liberty against the usurpations of the 
crown.  The idea of being outside Parliamentary authority “destroy[ed] the idea of very 
idea of having a British Constitution.”58  Liberty, for loyalists and Britons, rested on the 
authority of Parliament.  The Revolutionary appeal to English customary rights was not 
compatible with any attempt to sever themselves from Parliament. 
 Second, Loyalists were deeply suspicious of attempts to make government more 
“republican.”  While the term has lost most of its controversy in contemporary 
scholarship, in the 1770s the term still evoked the Cromwellian interregnum and the 
martyrdom of Charles I.  Many, especially in the English clergy, regarded republican 
ideas with outright hostility.59  Bishop Samuel Seabury challenged a colonial appeal for 
representation as “republican in its very nature, and tend[ing] to the utter subversion of 
the English monarchy.”60  Republicanism was suspect because it seemed outside the 
British tradition of mixed government.  Dickinson challenged the whole idea of 
independence on these grounds.  “It is not as independent, but as subject; not as a 
republic, but as a monarchy we have arrived at this degree of power and greatness.”61  
Union with England invested many colonists with strong ties of patriotic nationalism.  
One pamphleteer appealed to common ties of “religion, kindred, and country” to end the 
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spilling of British blood.  Another opposed an alliance with France as the treacherous, 
ancient enemy of England.  Union with Britain was the natural association.  “Our 
language, our laws, and manners being the same with those of the nation with which we 
are again to be connected, that connection will be natural.”62  Many theorists of the 
loyalist persuasion supported the armed struggle against the Crown and even participated 
in plans for an American union, but could not make the final break because it would 
undermine the source of their rights.  They trusted for the security of their liberties in 
their “natural” connection with Great Britain.   
 Many loyalists could support a limited, inter-colonial union organized on the 
federal principle to lobby Parliament for fidelity to the constitution.  Yet they starkly 
opposed forming an American union on the national principle, whether as a confederation 
of states or an organic American state.  After 1776, independence rendered irrelevant 
their principled defense of English liberty under an Imperial union. 
“This Confederate Country”: (1776-77)63 
The Idea of Independence 
As the dissent of the loyalists demonstrated, the contest of 1776 was as much 
about what sort of union that would best protect liberty, as about the growth of nationalist 
sentiment.  It was a constitutional as well as a political debate.  Even moderates were 
gradually pushed toward separation by the impassioned rhetoric of 1776.  Mounting 
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sentiment for independence shifted the idea of union toward the federal principle, and 
rooted it in the logic and arguments of natural right.  As the revolutionaries faced the 
loyalists theory of union, they rallied to the defense of the federal idea against the critique 
of imperium in imperio.  In forming a civil government, they modeled the Union closely 
on the existing constitutional form of Congress in the Articles of Association.  At the 
same time, revolutionaries defended the idea that they were “one people,” who by “the 
Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” could dissolve pre-existing political connections 
and aspire to independence.  In organizing the American polity, they recognized that the 
social union of all Americans.  They incorporated the “good people of these colonies” 
into a nation.  To protect the liberty of people, they created a voluntary federal union. 
Pamphleteers provided the immediate impetus toward a formal breach with the 
Crown.  The strongest blow for independence came from Thomas Paine’s bestselling 
pamphlet Common Sense.  His repudiation of monarchy sensationalized the colonies and 
challenged them to take the Revolution in a boldly republican direction.  Upon reading it, 
Abigail Adams urgently wrote to her husband John,  
Tis highly prized here and carries conviction wherever it is read.  I have spread it as much 
as it lay in my power, every one assents to the weighty truths it contains.  I wish it could 
gain credit enough in your assembly [Congress] to be carried speedily into execution.64  
 
In reply John Adams criticized Paine’s plan for continental government (which was not 
English enough for his liking), and his emotional demagoguery.  But he admitted, “all 
agree there is a good deal of sense, delivered in a clear, simple, concise, and nervous 
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style. … His sentiments of the abilities of America, and of the difficulty of a 
reconciliation with Great Britain are generally approved.”65   
As John Adams suggested, Paine challenged the foundation of union with Britain.  
He argued from reason and contract theory that the basis of all government was the will 
of the people.  When society was formed, the people initially made laws for themselves.  
As the extent of society grew too large, they delegated this power to their representatives, 
who legislated on their behalf.  Paine believed that elements of republican representation 
still existed in England, but that infrequent elections and the presence of hereditary 
privilege had corrupted them.  Paine turned his harshest critique against George III.  
Revolutionary theorists had been emphasizing that they owed loyalty only to the Crown 
in under the dominion theory of empire.  Paine argued that there was no natural or 
rational basis for monarchy.  It was rooted in tyranny and centuries of usurpation.66   
To replace the imperial union, Paine proposed what Congress was already 
practicing: government centered in a continental union.  By founding the Union on purely 
republican principles, Paine believed the colonies could operate in harmony and peace.67  
Congress ignored his proposal for a national assembly, but they implemented three of his 
other suggestions.  First a “Continental Charter” would be approved in the form of the 
Articles of Confederation.  Next, the Declaration of Independence was adopted along 
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lines very similar to those he suggested on a basis of natural right, not English custom.  
Finally, just as Paine assured his readers that foreign alliances could easily be secured, 
foreign aid became the military catalyst for a successful revolution.68   
The terms of union also shifted for practical reasons, independent of Paine’s 
influence.  When George III declared the colonies to be no longer under his protection, 
many royal governors took this as an excuse to flee.  In Massachusetts, the assembly 
assumed control and asserted its authority through local committees of correspondence.  
In several colonies, however, the assemblies felt uncomfortable governing without the 
guidance of a fundamental law.  New Hampshire and South Carolina wrote new 
constitutions in January and March, and Virginia and New Jersey produced theirs weeks 
before the Declaration of Independence.  The states defended their action with social 
contract theory: they possessed the right to frame a new government since the Crown had 
broken its contract with them.   New Jersey explained,  
… whereas George the Third, king of Great Britain, has refused protection to the good 
people of these colonies; and, by assenting to sundry acts of the British parliament, 
attempted to subject them to the absolute dominion of that body; and has also made war 
upon them, in the most cruel and unnatural manner, for no other cause, than asserting 
their just rights-all civil authority under him is necessarily at an end, and a dissolution of 
government in each colony has consequently taken place.69 
 
All of the states cited the resolution passed by Congress encouraging them to 
frame their own governments.70  Although some, like Virginia, referred to the colony as 
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their “country”; all acknowledged the binding authority of Congressional resolutions and 
Congress’ sole authority to negotiate with foreign powers on their behalf.  Despite 
Paine’s predilection for entirely new governmental structures, the states largely tried to 
preserve English legal and personal freedoms.  However, they significantly altered the 
structure of government.  An emphasis was placed on frequent elections, accountable 
executives, and an independent judiciary with judges accountable to good behavior 
standards.  The customary rights of the English constitution and colonial charters were 
largely preserved.   
 Concurrent with the process of framing constitutions, both colony-wide and local 
assemblies urged the Continental Congress to take immediate steps toward independence.  
As early as May of 1775, Mecklenburg County had resolved that North Carolina “of right 
ought to be a free and independent state.” Their resolves anticipated a federal structure of 
sorts.  North Carolina would enjoy the power to legislate in internal matters, but would 
have to accept vetoes from a “continental senate” regarding its “external connections and 
foreign commerce.”  The Mecklenburg Resolves also grounded the independence of the 
state in natural right, just like Common Sense.71  Other local resolutions employed the 
grammar of natural rights to justify independence, while assuming that the resulting 
states would continue to protect their customary and charter rights.  A Boston town 
meeting defended independence as “necessary to the very existence of the state.”72  In 
Malden, Massachusetts, citizens echoed Tom Paine’s denunciation of royalty, asserting 
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that Congress would be neglecting their duty if they failed to establish “an American 
Republic.”73   
 By May of 1776, several dramatic changes in the revolutionary idea of association 
had brought pressure to bear on Congress to form an independent union. Virginia’s 
request was not for the republican government that Malden desired, but for a 
“confederation of the colonies.”  Initial demands for a national government eroded in 
favor of confederal designs.74   As the colonies became states, the states became more 
assertive of their sovereignty.  Most were willing to let Congress direct military and 
foreign policy, but assumed that they would be left to themselves in most other matters.  
In its 1776 constitution, Virginia avoided potential territorial disputes by renouncing its 
right to territory also claimed by Maryland, the Carolinas, and Pennsylvania.  Most states 
assumed that future disputes would be settled by the logic of association.  Each state 
believed it could make the virtuous sacrifices necessary for the common good.  Finally, 
the new governments resorted to the right of revolution found in Lockean contract theory 
and natural law.  The people acting through their state and local governments began to 
increasingly demand that Congress employ these ideas to secure their joint independence 
from the British Empire.   
Securing Independence 
 The debate at Independence Hall in the summer of 1776 remains one of the most 
intensely studied moments in American political history.  But few scholars have 
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appreciated the importance of the constitutional debate that surrounded the Declaration.75  
Independence itself is analyzed as a moment, rather than the culmination of long effort to 
formally constitute the Union.  Even historians of the Confederation explain the 
constitutional debate in terms of the immediate political context.  Merrill Jensen analyzes 
the Confederation as the product of the same radical moment that produced independence 
and the fiercely democratic state constitutions (i.e. Pennsylvania).76  Jack Rakove 
correctly recognized the “halting, and at times haphazard” progress of confederation, but 
missed the connection between the idea of union and revolutionary philosophy.77  Rakove 
incorrectly identified the essence of union before confederation as an agreement about 
political tactics, not as a purposeful colonial project designed to secure liberty.  Robert 
Hoffert’s analysis takes ideas more seriously, but he misapprehends the close connection 
between the Declaration of Independence and the broader revolutionary constitution. 
The Declaration of Independence is constitutional vis-à-vis the American nation 
– it expresses the constituting of the American people.  This is especially 
important for revolutionary America, even if it did not constitute any formal 
government or “state.”  The state was to be established within a well-formed 
community.  Political society had to be constituted before proper political 
authority in government could be established.78   
 
The Declaration did, in fact, “express the constituting of the American people.”  But so 
did the process of state constitution formation and the extended debates over the Articles 
of Confederation.  Americans understood themselves to be a people, initially as Britons.  
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Then gradually, one by one, they came to see that they had more in common with one 
another than they did with their “mother country.”  Prominent intellectuals, like Paine, 
were the first to call for a decisive break.  He was followed by local and state petitions to 
break decisively with the crown.  Finally, Congress acted as “the Representatives of the 
united States of America in General Congress, Assembled” on behalf of the people of the 
colonies.  In this realization, the desire for formal association preceded the desire for 
independence.   
 Early in 1775, Franklin had submitted a plan for union to the Congress.  Leaving 
the states with only those powers that Congress chose not to surrender, it would have 
created a more centralized government than the Confederation.  It suggested that the 
assembly should represent the people, rather than the states, and gave Congress too much 
coercive power for the sentiments of the time.  Franklin’s plan was neglected because 
moderates hoped they could achieve reconciliation with Britain, and they believed that 
the existing association was sufficient for that end.   
 When independence appeared to be gaining momentum, Richard Henry Lee 
introduced a resolution on behalf of Virginia that would provide the means to secure 
liberty through a de jure government.  The resolution of June 7 called for independence 
from the crown, confederation between the colonies, and assistance from European 
powers as part of a comprehensive plan to secure the union.79  Independence received the 
most attention, because delegates had already debated that issue with some passion.80  
The proposals for confederation and alliance passed quietly, as if they were assumed.  
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They were delegated to committees to compose the preliminary documents.  The 
proposal for independence was postponed until the beginning of July at the pleading of 
delegates from the middle states.81  It was referred to a committee for drafting and 
debated in the meantime by the committee of the whole.  These debates were just as 
heated and difficult as those that took place eleven years later.  Some delegates from 
Pennsylvania threatened secession from the Union if independence were agreed to before 
their instructions permitted them to join.  Advocates of independence, in turn, threatened 
to pursue their plans anyway.  They suggested that wayward states might rejoin the 
Union when their legislatures sent new instructions.  At this point, John Adams and 
Richard Henry Lee discerned that their opponents had stopped debating the right of 
independence, but only challenged the question of timing.  Adams suggested that the 
Union was already independent from the crown.  “The question was not whether, by a 
declaration of independence, we should make ourselves what we are not, but whether we 
should declare a fact which already exists.”82  This debate reveals that both parties 
believed they already possessed a union.  Pennsylvania could not secede if it was not part 
of a real and voluntary union.  Fortunately, by July 2, new instructions reached the 
delegates.  The states unanimously approved independence.83  
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 The Declaration of Independence set the foundation of the Revolution primarily 
on natural rights.  It justified separation not only with the customary complaint that the 
Crown had abandoned them, but also with the new claim that it was their “duty, to throw 
off such Government.”  When the Crown ceased to secure their happiness and showed no 
sign of giving up its despotic rule, the people resumed their natural sovereignty, and 
began the process of instituting a new government.  These deliberations continued this 
task in the committee on the confederation which met concurrently with the committee to 
draft the Declaration.  The claims of natural right obscured the long arduous labor of 
constituting a government that Congress had been engaged in since 1774.  Both 
revolutionary and antebellum writers would argue from the language of the social 
compact that independence had returned the people to a condition of original sovereignty.  
In a practical sense however, the people did not begin from a state of nature.  They shared 
customary colonial governments, new state constitutions, and as a community of “united 
States” who met in Congress.  This union was already powerful before independence; 
Americans hoped it would become the source of victory and security for the new states.   
It is significant that the Declaration was produced as a joint act of the states’ 
union, rather than as separate acts of individual colonies.  Although some states, 
particularly Virginia and Vermont, vocally asserted their rights of revolution in their 
constitutions, they still deferred to the instruction and guidance of Congress.  The federal 
idea of union was secure and entirely compatible with the idea of “nation,” even as the 
nation was being created.  Significantly, the Declaration made the states “free and 
independent.”  It claimed for them the power to wage war, negotiate peace, form 




most of these marks of sovereignty were aspects that the states bore collectively in their 
union, not as individual nations.  War, peace and alliance were only properly wielded by 
the collective sovereignty, while commerce was regulated by both the states and 
Congress.  States were only free and independent to the extent that the national union 
could provide collective security.  Practically speaking, rebellion by a lone state would be 
crushed by the British army without the support of union.  Consensus on the need for 
collective independence did not resolve the difficult questions of how far the powers of 
sovereignty would be exercised collectively, and how far the states themselves would 
exercise sovereignty. That the Congress did not have to decide these issues to declare 
independence made political agreement much easier.84 
The Belated Confederation 
 The committee assigned to “prepare and digest a form of a confederation” did not 
have this luxury. 85  The idea of a confederation had universal assent earlier than 
independence (as early as June 17) but the practical application proved much more 
difficult.   Facing the constitutional questions of sovereignty and representation, the 
delegates engaged in “warm disputes” particularly on the question of whether Congress 
should vote by states or by population as the earlier Franklin plan had suggested.86  The 
delegates were completely occupied by their duties, frequently meeting until after seven 
p.m.  In mid-June, they began forgoing debate on Saturdays, just so that the delegates 
would have more time to complete their committee work.  John Dickinson, a moderate 
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with loyalist sympathies, had been made chair of the committee and dominated its 
proceedings.  The draft he presented to the Congress on July 12 has been criticized by 
scholars as too centralized for the sympathies of his fellow delegates.87   In fact, the plan 
simply followed the general thrust of the Franklin plan in reserving to the states the 
powers of internal sovereignty and granting to the Congress as much power as needed to 
win the war.  The plan was entirely consistent with the prevailing idea of union, which 
emphasized granting Congress the means necessary to secure the ends of union while 
trusting in voluntary co-operation and non-coercive power.  In theory, the states would 
consent to union out of republican virtue, and give whatever was necessary for the 
success of the revolutionary cause.   
This is not what transpired.  As the colonies became states, they contended for 
their newly acquired state liberties with all the vigor and jealously with which they had 
opposed the crown.  As state governments gained the experience of sovereignty, they 
began deferring to Congress less and asserting their power more. The power that 
Congress had initially enjoyed while the states struggled to find a legitimate basis for 
government had diminished.88  When the Dickinson draft was first proposed, it 
represented an attempt to secure to Congress the power that it was already exercising.89  
By the end of June 1776, Edward Rutledge charged that the Dickinson plan was in favor 
of “destroying all provincial distinctions … making every thing of the most minute kind 
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bend to what they call the good of the whole.”90  Subsequent drafts were able to retain 
Dickinson’s idea of a perpetual union, but many of his ideas, particularly the questions of 
voting in Congress, the question of sovereignty, and the disposition of Western 
territories, were not easily accepted.  The unity exhibited in June would, by August, turn 
into suspicion and acrimony.  Delegates began to lament not having settled the question 
before they started on independence, when the spirit of unity was greater.91 Their failure 
to achieve unity was interpreted as a failure of the ideal of a “virtuous and spirited 
union.”   
 “Three great difficulties occur,” Samuel Chase wrote on July 30th,  
representation, the mode of voting, and the claims to the South Sea.  The whole might, in 
my opinion, be settled if candour, justice, and the interests of America were attended to.  
We do not see the importance, nay the necessity of a confederacy.  We shall remain 
weak, distracted, and divided in our councils; our strength will decrease…”92 
 
The first two difficulties closely mirror the debates of the Constitutional Convention of 
1787, with the same delegates and states frequently making identical arguments.  On the 
question of whether the states should vote as equals or by another rule, Benjamin Rush 
made the nationalist argument:  “We are now a new nation... the more a man aims at 
serving America, the more he serves his colony….  If we vote by number [or population], 
liberty will always be safe.”  Rhode Island replied for the small states that this would 
allow four states to dominate the other nine.  How would this protect their liberty?93  On 
the question of representation, James Wilson and Benjamin Franklin attempted to frame 
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the Confederation as a union of people, not states.  In response, John Witherspoon argued 
that their union was to be a federal union, not an incorporating union.  The states should 
be represented and vote as states, but in the spirit of equity he proposed they could vote 
by the requisitions they paid.94  Roger Sherman flatly defended the state’s existing power, 
“We are representatives of the states, not individuals.”  But in a compromising vein, he 
suggested that “the vote could be taken two ways; call the colonies and call the 
individuals, and have a majority of both.”  This plan could have limited both the power of 
the states and the people and satisfied everyone.  But it was neglected.95  Sherman’s plan 
was similar in design to the compromise that Connecticut brokered at the 1787 
convention:  to count representation by both population and states.  Ultimately, Congress 
would be forced to reconcile the competing demands of national and federal 
representation.  In 1776, however, they lacked the sense of urgency necessary to force a 
compromise. 
 The bitterest debate erupted over the claims granted in many charters extending 
colonial boundaries “to the South Sea.” Given the revolutionary settlement patterns and 
the ambiguities of the original charters, many states had conflicting claims.  Virginia, in 
particular, possessed strong claims extending to the Mississippi River that included much 
of the old northwest.  Benjamin Harrison (Virginia) insisted that Congress had no power 
to limit territory that belonged to them.  Wilson, who had taken a strong position in favor 
of a national jurisdiction and representation, conceded that “Pensilvania [sic] has no right 
to interfere in those claims.  But she has a right to say, that she will not confederate 
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unless those claims are cut off.”96  Jefferson quickly stepped in to suggest that Virginia 
could voluntarily cede its claims.  The specter of disunion over territorial disputes proved 
potent.  Small states feared that the states with extensive claims would become so 
populated and strong as to dominate over the confederacy. Maryland even withheld 
ratification of the Articles until it had been satisfied that Virginia would cede most of its 
western claims to Congress.97  As the delegates considered their state’s interests within 
the union, they became increasingly competitive and could not come to agreement.  By 
August 19, Edward Rutledge would write, “We have done nothing with the confederation 
for some days and it is of little consequence if we never see it again.  We have made such 
a devil of it already that the colonies can never agree to it.”98  Consideration of formal 
union was postponed until the next year.   
 Over the next year, several delegates realized that the union urgently needed a 
formal constitutional structure.  The delegates gradually recognized, with Abraham Clark 
that “We must apply for pardons if we don’t confederate!”99  Rutledge, one of the 
defenders of state autonomy, went with Adams and Franklin in September to meet with 
Lord Howe to discuss terms of peace.  Howe offered to re-constitute the terms of the 
imperial union if they would resume allegiance to the crown.  The delegates, of course, 
refused.  The experience seems to have had a transforming impact on Rutledge.  He 
returned with a sense of the urgency of union.  The Congress faced great difficulty 
supplying or organizing the military effort in 1777.  General Washington fought a futile 
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campaign in late summer to stave off a British advance on Philadelphia.  Faced with 
certain capture, Congress fled to the countryside.  By October of 1777, the delegates 
resumed deliberation in York. 100   
When they resumed negotiations on a plan of confederation, they proved to be in 
a compromising mood.  Within two weeks they had solved most of the critical questions. 
With only Virginia dissenting, Congress accepted that the delegates represented states 
and would vote by states.  They narrowly agreed to share the burdens of union according 
to the value of their land and improvements.  (New England voted in the negative, 
presumably because slaves were not counted).  By November 15th, the finished 
document was approved and recorded in the journal. 
 The Articles of Confederation embodied the revolutionary idea that the best 
means to protect liberty was a government founded on voluntary consent and virtuous 
participation.  Deeply suspicious of tyranny, the colonists had placed strong limitations 
on their governments.  Franklin’s attempt to create a union bounded only by powers 
necessary to achieve the ends of union and the powers the states reserved to themselves 
proved too expansive.  Instead they created what the Virginia resolution of June 7 had 
requested: a system of perpetual union that was more a “firm league of friendship” than a 
national government.  In this, the Articles also embodied new developments in 
Revolutionary politics.  The states had grown jealous of their rights as states, not merely 
of their citizens’ individual rights.   Article II secured the rights of the states far more 
deliberately than either the Franklin or Dickinson plans.  Each state retained its 
“sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right which 
is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress 
                                                 




assembled.”  They retained the existing voting structure of the Continental Congress, 
where each state was equally represented.  In many ways, their promises to respect each 
other’s citizens, laws, and territory had more in common with the principles of 
international law, than of government.  The states, which in the first years of the war had 
deferred to Congress, had now acquired considerable formal sovereignty which they were 
loathe to surrender.101   
Despite the strongly federal character of the new constitution, the Confederation 
retained all of the important governmental powers that Congress had acquired during the 
early Revolution.  It had exclusive treaty making power.  States were prohibited from 
making private wars.  Congress would manage the navy, weights and standards, the post 
office, public finance, and would be held accountable for its debts.  Article XIII declared 
that the states shall adhere to the decision of Congress and stated “the union shall be 
perpetual.”  If the Congress lacked real coercive power, it was because no coercion was 
believed to be really necessary.  Just Virginia expressed a willingness to surrender the 
Northwest Territories for the common good:  other states would make the necessary 
sacrifices for union. If the Confederation required unanimous consent for amendment, 
then this indicates that the states had formed a new civil compact between themselves.  
Any change in the compact—an amendment—must be approved by each of the 
contracting states.102   
Notwithstanding the informal ties of union and patriotism that had provided a de 
facto union for the colonists, in a constitutional or contractarian sense, the Articles of 
Confederation formally established the new American polity.  The nation, once embodied 
                                                 






by a voluntary association of colonies, was now established as confederal union.  The 
formal constitution superseded the largely de facto—although, to some extent, de jure—
constitutional union based on the Articles of Association and the Declaration of 
Independence.  
 The Revolutionary union was transitory.  The idealistic vision of a voluntary non-
coercive union of virtuous citizens failed to meet the harsh economic and political strife 
of the 1780s.  New forms of union would prove necessary.  Once the specter of British 
conquest was removed, Americans found they could not agree on how to balance the 





Chapter 2:  Association Transformed: (1777-1800) 
 
 
The Revolutionary hope that the voluntary association of the virtuous would be 
able to sustain the union proved a utopian dream.  While the revolutionary grammar of 
association, compact, and liberty remained persuasive, the statesmen of the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 realized that new institutional mechanisms were necessary to secure 
both liberty and the national union against the failures of state governments.  Despite a 
widely shared consensus on the need for national union, statesmen held opposing 
viewpoints on the nature of that union.  Afterward, Americans lacked consensus on what 
the Constitution had accomplished.  Nationalists believed that they had created a union of 
one people and thus enacted constitutional mechanisms to protect the liberty of the whole 
people.  In contrast, the Anti-Federalists aimed to preserve the principles of voluntary 
association in the new compact by expecting the states to play a continuing role as 
bulwarks of liberty.  Their disagreement culminated in the heightened political tumult of 
1798.  Jefferson turned to the Anti-Federalist reliance upon the voluntary association of 
the states as a way to defend the rights of political dissent and of liberty itself.  With 
Jefferson’s victory in 1800, the role of the states as vital and important participants in the 
constitutional defense of liberty was secured. 
“A Cask without Hoops” (1777-1787) 
 One of the primary strengths of the Revolutionary union had always been the faith 
that states and citizens had placed in its importance, but participation in formal union 




confederal government faced was the lack of a secure stream of income with which to 
fight the war and pay off its debts. The states were, in fact, paying the requisitions from 
Congress in direct proportion to the benefits they received.  States that stood to gain 
Congressional protection from British armies contributed heartily.  Georgia, which 
benefited little after the cessation of hostilities and the end of the British military threat, 
stopped sending contributions.1 “The crisis calls for exertion,” the Congress wrote to the 
states in April of 1780.  “The whole of the moneys due on the quotas of taxes to the first 
of March last, are become of immediate and indispensable necessity.”2  The following 
November they sent out another requisition, hoping that, this time, it would be met. Not 
convinced that the states would reply, it reminded them of the ends of union. “Our object 
is of the greatest magnitude – the security, and freedom, and independence of the United 
States; and experience evinces that no nation can promise itself a safe and honorable 
peace which is not in a condition to maintain a war with vigour.”3 By 1786, the lack of 
funds threatened a loss of public credit with European powers.  When insurrection swept 
western Massachusetts, Congress unanimously agreed that they should send troops to 
prevent the threat of civil war.  However, once it was discovered that they lacked the 
money to pay the army, it was decided not to arm them.  Congress feared they would turn 
their guns on Congress in an attempt to receive their pay!4 
                                                 
1 Keith L. Dougherty, Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation (Cambridge University Press: 
New York, 2001). 
 
2 April 24, 1780, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, ed. Worthington C. Ford et. al. 
(Washington, D.C., 1904-1937), 16: 385-86. 
 
3 JCC, Nov. 9, 1780, 18:1039. 
 
4 United States, Constitutional Convention, October, 21, 1786, Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceedings 




When George Washington retired from military office in 1783, he sent a circular 
letter to the governors urging them to secure the ends of their union.  Americans were 
faced with a choice: they could “give such a tone to our federal government as to enable 
it to answer the ends of its institution” or to weaken it, “annihilating the cement of the 
confederation, and exposing us to become the sport of European politics. … [I]t is not yet 
decided whether the Revolution will be a blessing or a curse.”  To secure the American 
experiment in federal association, it was necessary that states both cease their petty 
jealousies and allow the Congress to exercise the powers granted to them by the 
Constitution.  The Union, Washington argued, was not a threat but a necessity.  It 
possessed no power to coerce.  He praised the noble design of the confederacy as “a form 
of government so free and uncorrupted, so happily guarded against the danger of 
oppression.”  Any action, he gently chided, that tended to “dissolve the union, or 
contribute to violate or lessen the sovereign authority, ought to be considered as hostile to 
the liberty and independency of America.”  In Washington’s eyes, the solution was for 
the states to meet their obligations gladly.5 
In the state assemblies, governors pleaded with the legislatures to virtuously fulfill 
their obligations.  Upon receipt of the 1780 requisition, Massachusetts Governor John 
Hancock charged the legislature that “our own honor and safety…call upon us to employ 
every means for forwarding & compleating our military preparations.”6  But after the 
victory at Yorktown, the states grew less interested in paying.  In 1783, Hancock again 
challenged the legislature to pay “our portion of the national expense.”  It was necessary 
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for public credit, “to the most essential purposes of our sacred league, and to appeasing 
the loud complaints of those whose just demands on the public credit have long gone 
unsatisfied.”7    
 Despite Hancock’s plea, states cooperated in Congress, not out of virtue, but out 
of self- interest.  When dealing with one another, they treated one another as sovereigns.  
The small states understood that their only governing influence over the Western lands 
was through Congress, so they actively pursued the policy of expanding the power of the 
United States in the West and encouraging settlement.  The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 
stands as one of the few genuine success stories of the Confederation period.  
Connecticut and Pennsylvania even submitted their disputed claim over Western lands to 
Congress in 1782.  When it served their interests, they would present problems to 
Congress. In 1781, however, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware chose to settle their 
common boundary by commissioners, like sovereign states, rather than submit to a 
congressional decision.8  New York used its influence in Congress to block persistent 
efforts by Vermont to gain recognition as a state, because of its own territorial claims 
there.  The states gladly considered themselves part of an American union, but frequently 
operated as sovereigns when dealing with their neighbors and behaved as if national 
sovereignty were, in fact, not divided, but possessed by the states alone in their severalty. 
 In truth, many people still regarded the federal union as their nation, while 
believing their states were also sovereign.  In a speech on the Peace of Paris (1783) John 
Hancock expressed joy that his country, the Union, was at last a victor in the 
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Revolutionary war.  He praised God as the “August Ally” who contributed to the security 
of “our National Sovereignty and Independence.”   
Divine Providence has most kindly put into the hands of these states the means of our 
political happiness, and nothing seems wanting to compete it but a proper improvement 
of these means.  This is our Palladium.9  By this we have hitherto been saved, and the 
preservation of it can alone continue our liberty and safety … But this depends upon the 
temperament and energy of that general government which was instituted on purpose to 
combine the Sovereign States into one political body for their common security, and to 
draft forth in just proportions the United Strength of all for effecting important purposes 
of their Confederation.   
 
Hancock argued that the states collectively were a sovereign.  He recognized that the 
federal union was originally individual states who had purposed to join to secure their 
liberty and happiness.  If this union were to be successful, it would need to be improved 
to make it strong enough to achieve its ends.  Massachusetts, he hinted, should have been 
more wiling to pay their share of the national requisitions.  It had become necessary to 
reform the union to end its chronic problems.  However, he thought reforms could be 
implemented for the benefit of all, without depriving the states of their internal 
sovereignty.10 
 The failure of Revolutionary association was not limited to Congress.  Many of 
the state governments were also in constitutional crisis.  The initial constitutional designs 
concentrated power in the legislature and made the executive dependent on their will.  
With their emphasis on consent as the focus of government, the revolutionary 
constitutions mandated annual elections, so representatives would not stray far from the 
will of the people.  Problems arose when the people frequently changed their minds about 
public policy.  In Vermont, the revolutionary government passed a Betterment Act to use 
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the confiscated lands of loyalists to fund the war.  In 1780, it stopped the procedure and 
then in 1781, began to restore the confiscated lands to their original owners.  Purchasers 
of compensated property demanded money in exchange for improvements they had built 
on the property.  Land titles were embroiled in confusion for years.11  In Massachusetts, 
the town of Concord had challenged its own state in 1776 to immediately form a 
constitution.  Since then, Massachusetts had been ruled by its legislature without a new 
fundamental law.  In most other states, the legislatures themselves had drafted the 
constitution, but Concord urged that the state not follow these other precedents.  If the 
legislature could bind itself to a constitution, then it could also change that constitution, 
so it was not really under a limited government.12  Massachusetts did not immediately 
heed the call, but by 1780 it had drafted its constitution in convention and submitted it to 
the people for ratification.  States began to strengthen their constitutions so that elections 
took place less frequently and, to prevent abuses of legislative power, governors and 
judges were granted more independence from the legislature .  On the state level, these 
experiences made statesmen more sensitive to the requirements of a sound intuitional 
design.  When statesmen made real changes to state constitutions they began to push 
federal reforms as well.13   
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As the crisis of the union came to a head in the early 1780s, political thinkers 
began to consider new solutions.  They insisted that the preservation of the Union 
depended upon improving its powers.  The Union, Pelatiah Webster opined, was “a cask 
without hoops;” it lacked the effective power to hold its constituent parts together.  The 
problem was not with the federal system itself, but with the balance of governmental 
powers and the lack of authority to secure the ends of union.  The difficulties funding the 
debt, securing the obligations of its treaties, or even mediating basic disputes between the 
states demonstrated that the Union lacked legal authority to compel obedience.  The 
dream of a voluntary, non-coercive union that the Continental Congress had first pursued 
in the Articles of Association rested on the consent of virtuous citizens to sacrifice for the 
common good.  Now the dream appeared to be  
a ridiculous effort of childish nonsense….  To appoint a congress with powers to do all 
acts necessary for the support and uses of the union; and at the same time to leave all the 
states a liberty to obey them or not with impunity, is in every view the grossest absurdity, 
worse than a state of nature, without any supreme authority at all. 14 
 
State disobedience could eventually destroy the Union: “The government might lose its 
energy and effect, and of course the empire must be shaken to its very foundation.”15  
“Tullius,” an anonymous pamphleteer, also despaired that the Congress was growing 
weaker: “As the government of the several states have acquired vigor and maturity[,] 
their suspicions have operated like a secret poison … till the constitution itself may be 
overturned and destroyed.”16  The problem was not the danger of tyranny and corruption 
feared by the revolutionary theorists, but of impotence.  “The Continentalist” (Alexander 
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Hamilton) suggested that “The great danger had been shown that it [Congress] will not 
have enough power to defend itself and preserve the Union, not that it will ever become 
formidable to the general liberty.”  Hamilton’s argument was timely.17  A weak Congress 
was a greater danger to liberty than the empowered states were.   
Contemporary scholars usually interpret these criticisms against the 
Confederation as the harbingers of a nationalist constitution.18  While firmly defending 
the idea of a properly constituted federal union, however, most reformers did not 
contemplate an entirely new constitution.  In 1785, Noah Webster, warned that if the 
states were permitted to behave as if they were sovereign states, the Union would 
dissolve.  By transforming the Union a into a strong government, with executive and 
judicial branches, it would gain the means to secure the ends of union.  Despite his 
spirited nationalist rhetoric, the system he proposed was clearly federal.  It would 
preserve local autonomy just as the government of his native Connecticut reserved 
extensive powers to the town governments.  Webster insisted: “A system of continental 
government, thus organized, may establish and perpetuate the confederation, without 
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infringing the rights of any particular state.”19   “Tullius,” like Pelatiah Webster, believed 
that a genuine federal system already existed.  Congress possessed the “power of making 
war and peace,” exhibiting one of the primary traits of sovereignty.  The states, to be 
sure, were sovereign, but they only possessed a “separate, limited, juridical 
sovereignty.”20  Federal structure was determined primarily by the different ends of 
central and local government.  The Union was concerned with “the public safety,” while 
the states secured “private happiness.”21  Pelatiah Webster likewise divided the powers of 
government according the respective ends of Union and states:  “Each particular state 
shall enjoy its sovereignty and supreme authority to all intents and purposes,” excepting 
those powers granted to Congress for a general purpose.22  A federal union remained at 
the heart of American political theory, despite the crises it encountered.   
The specific policy recommendations of the pamphleteers to strengthen the union 
bear out this argument.  Pelatiah Webster recommended increased legislative authority 
and coercive power. In particular, he supported a five percent duty on imports that would 
have given the Congress an independent source of revenue.23 (Rhode Island blocked it by 
refusing to ratify an amendment granting Congress the power to enact it).   In Noah 
Webster’s plan, the Union would gain an executive branch with departments of states and 
a committee of three executives drawn from the three regions (New England, mid-
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Atlantic, and Southern states).  The division of legislative and executive power would 
provide safeguards against tyranny.  He also recommended safeguards for the liberty of 
the states by allowing them to veto Congressional legislation if a majority petition for 
repeal.24  Later, after the defeat of the impost plan, Noah Webster called for an even more 
expansive national government, with veritable enforcement powers and easier 
amendment procedures.  Webster represented a growing consensus among political 
statesmen that the federal union was dysfunctional.  While his specific proposals were 
neglected, he helped to bring the Union to a solution:  strengthen the national institutions 
while preserving the federal character of the union.   
The understanding of “union” was itself transformed by the crisis. The early 
national theorists appropriated Emmerich de Vattel’s comparison of social contract 
theory to the law of nations.  According to Vattel, just as an individual man joined civil 
society to protect his liberty, so too the states acceded the Articles to protect the liberty of 
societies.  Federal union could protect state liberties or rights as well as personal liberty.25  
This understanding of union was dramatically different from the pre-1776 social theory 
of association: since confederation by compact depended entirely on artificial agreement, 
not organic association, its authority was not derived from ancient traditions or even in 
common fraternal struggle against Britain.  If it was voluntarily entered into, it did not 
rest on the virtuous sacrifice of self to the community.  And while binding, the 
Confederation required institutional checks and safeguards, and consequently, citizenship 
rested in rational, calculating interest.  As Noah Webster explained, the union was a 
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matter of necessity, not romantic nationalism: “Self interest is, and ought to be the ruling 
principle of mankind; but this principle must operate in perfect conformity to social and 
political obligations … provincial interest is inseparable from national interest.”26   
The crisis had tempered their revolutionary optimism in the form of human 
association.  Inflationary monetary legislation, property confiscation, and popular unrest 
led them to distrust human benevolence.  Tyranny, Noah Webster argued, was a human 
fault, not an institutional one, and thus the states were just as vulnerable as Congress.  
Pelatiah Webster agreed that a more robust federal structure could not only protect 
against the excesses of the people, but the dangers of foreign machinations and eventual 
civil war: “We have, without the Union, no security against the inroads and wars of one 
state upon the other, by which our wealth and strength, as well as ease and comfort, will 
be devoured by enemies growing out of our own bowels.”27 
By arguing that the union was “a cask without hoops,” Pelatiah Webster argued 
that something stronger was needed to bind the union together.  The revolutionary idea of 
union presumed that ties of virtue, voluntary association, and the importance of their 
common cause would continue to bind them together when the conflict with Britain 
subsided.  Instead, self- interest and petty jealousy had induced states to contribute to the 
union mostly when it served their individual interests.  The proposals for a genuine 
republican government for the union could secure federal liberty where a federal union 
had floundered.   
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“Partly Federal and Partly National” (1787-1798) 
When the delegates assembled at Philadelphia in May of 1787, they shared the 
conviction that reform of the national government was imperative and were concerned 
with securing a more solid foundation for their liberty than existing constitutions offered.  
The question the Founders faced, as one Virginian expressed it, was “How are the state 
rights, individual rights, and national rights [to be] secured?”28  All three categories of 
rights need to be protected for liberty to be preserved.  The major debate at the 
convention faced this issue directly.  Would the Federal government represent the states, 
and so protect primarily state rights, or would it represent the people directly and secure 
personal liberty?     
The supporters of the federal principle immediately became defensive upon the 
introduction of the nationalist Virginia plan.29  When events carried the convention well 
beyond their instructions, the state rights supporters devised a plan that would retain the 
basic structure of the Confederation.  At its essence, the federal position, summarized by 
Gouvernor Morris, contended for the idea of union as “a mere compact, resting on the 
good faith of the parties.”30  If the states engaged in compact, then they treated with one 
another as equals.  The very basis of the union was their sovereignty.  As Luther Martin 
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passionately and repeatedly asserted, “an equal vote of states is essential to the federal 
idea.”31  This idea quickly became the primary assertion of the smaller states.  For 
Paterson, union meant either the federal or the national principle, not both.  He did not 
anticipate that a union could include both federal and national elements: “A confederacy 
supposes sovereignty in the members composing it and sovereignty supposes equality.”32  
Paterson even threatened disunion, suggesting that New Jersey would not confederate on 
a national basis.  Captain Dayton argued that the thirteen states had “entered into the 
compact.”  He inquired, “Will you now undermine the thirteen pillars that support it?”33  
Some of the delegates openly suggested that their defense of state rights was tied to the 
interests of their own, smaller states.  Bedford defended the “equal right of suffrage” as 
the only mechanism that would defend the smaller states from tyranny at the hands of 
larger states.34  They assumed that the large states hoped to improve their own place 
within the union.  Martin pointed out that the large states, who had insisted on a 
democratically elected congress, were quick to defend “The sacred obligation of State 
rights” when the small states tried to break them into smaller segments.”35  They argued 
that the Union had been constituted to protect state liberty and should be continued on 
these terms. 
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 The apologists for the federal idea were not against an expanded government per 
se.  They agreed that the Confederation needed drastic reforms and supported an 
expansion of Congressional power.  But they demanded that even in national 
government, representation should be apportioned by the federal principle.  If given an 
equal vote, even New Jersey would have acquiesced to a national government.  The plan 
proposed by Paterson on behalf of New Jersey made significant improvements to the 
Articles, within the boundaries they believed they were authorized to act.  Congress 
would be empowered to raise its own revenue, it would possess a plural executive, and a 
national court with jurisdiction over cases arising under admiralty, national treaties, and 
impeachments.  It even contained a supremacy clause.  But most importantly, the New 
Jersey Plan vested the legislative power in a Congress composed of delegates from state 
legislatures who would vote by state.  It embodied the Revolutionary sense that a national 
union should be expressed through a federal system of government. The New Jersey plan 
suggests that the Confederation could potentially have been reformed while retaining an 
essentially federal structure.  However, Paterson lacked the votes to preserve it.  By 1787, 
pressure had been created for significant reform, and the delegates in Philadelphia did not 
believe a purely federal plan would work.  Paterson’s plan was indefinitely postponed.36 
 The nationalists, like their erstwhile adversaries, drew upon the Revolutionary 
political grammar of association to articulate their proposed reforms.37  James Madison 
used contract theory to buttress his arguments. Much of Madison’s analysis focused on 
modern ideas of interest group pluralism and an extended sphere for republican 
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government.  Yet he used the older language of contract theory to persuade fellow 
delegates.  Madison prudently employed the core idea of consent to promote a basis for 
national government in the people, rather than the states.  Successful statesmanship 
required sensitivity to the universal language of contract theory.  Madison opposed a 
provision to allow the use of force against recalcitrant states because such a union would 
“be considered by the party attacked as dissolution of all previous compacts.”38  Madison 
implicitly acknowledged that the states would interpret the use of force as a violation of 
the civil contract.  The Convention would be unwise to include any provisions that would 
rouse the states to resistance. 
On other occasions Madison preferred to apply contract theory as if the union was 
bound by international law.  The Union, he argued in 1787, was not analogous to a social 
contract, but rather to an international convention between individual states.  The law of 
nations dictated that a breach of an agreement did not automatically dissolve it.  Instead 
the injured party could retire or compel the offender to repair the breach.  On yet another 
occasion, Madison vociferously opposed an argument derived from the law of nations 
that only the states, as parties to the compact, held absolute sovereignty: “The fallacy of 
the reasoning drawn from the equality of the sovereign states in the equality of compact, 
lay in confounding mere treaties … with a compact by which authority was created 
paramount to the parties & making laws for the government of them.”39  His opponents 
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looked at the Articles of Confederation as a system of treaties or compacts between 
sovereign states.  Madison argued that a real compact would rest in the consent of the 
people to form a new national government.  
If the defenders of state rights reasoned from social compact theory that the states 
were sovereign, then the nationalists placed ultimate political authority in the people.  
Wilson repeatedly employed the same arguments he had used eleven years earlier: that 
sovereignty was vested in the people and that their consent should be secured for the 
union by proportional representation.40  Nationalists repudiated the idea that the states 
were sovereign.  One delegate suggested that the states were “intoxicated with the idea of 
sovereignty.”41   The rhetorical strategy of the nationalists was to meet their opponents’ 
use of social contract theory with historical evidence.  Madison explained that the states 
had never possessed the absolute sovereignty ascribed to them:  
Some contend that States are sovereign, when, in fact, they are only political societies.  
There is a gradation of power in all societies, from the lowest corporation to the highest 
sovereign.   The States never possessed the essential rights of sovereignty.  These were 
always vested in congress. Their voting, as States, in congress, is no evidence of 
sovereignty.   … The states at present are only great corporations, having the power of 
by-laws and these are effectual only if they are not contradictory to the general 
confederation.42 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Founders’ use of compact theory in the context of international relations will be treated in more detail in 
chapter three. The major theorists of the law of nations include Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and Burlamaqui.  
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The Union had always possessed sovereignty, but not the indivisible legislative 
sovereignty described by Blackstone.43  Sovereignty under The Union was limited by 
fundamental law and divided into spheres of influence.  The nationalist argument 
reflected the revolutionary idea of federalism that accepted “gradations” of sovereign 
power.  States possessed internal sovereignty, but no absolute rights.  Rufus King also 
challenged their understanding of the term “sovereignty” by asserting that the states were 
not purely sovereign in the sense of European powers.  Since they could not make war, 
alliances, or treaties and were thus dependent upon the Congress for these things, the 
Union should be understood as a “consolidation.”   
A Union of the States is a Union of the men composing them, from whence a national 
character results to their whole. …If the states therefore retained some portion of their 
sovereignty, they had certainly divested themselves of essential portions of it.  If they 
formed a confederacy in some respects, they formed a nation in other.44 
 
Based on the structure of the Articles of Confederation alone, the nationalists believed 
that the states were not absolutely sovereign. 
 The nationalists were able to pose themselves as the defenders of the divided 
sovereignty created by the Articles of Confederation.  If they sought to expand the sphere 
of government and strengthen its powers, they would nevertheless maintain aspects of 
federal power.  All of the nationalists, except Hamilton, quickly refuted the charge that 
they would destroy the states.  George Mason declared that “he would never agree to 
abolish the state govts. or to render them absolutely insignificant.  They were as necessary 
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as the Genl. Govt.”45  Their opponents wanted to know how the federal and national 
principles could be balanced.  How could they “leave the states in possession of a 
Considerable, tho’ a subordinate jurisdiction” while preserving the “the general 
sovereignty and jurisdiction, which they proposed to give to the general government?”46   
 Despite their insistent defense of state liberties, the nationalists were deeply 
suspicious of the states.  Two of the initial ideas in their program were the use of coercive 
force against the states and a national veto over state law.  Madison quickly abandoned 
the first notion because states would interpret it as a violation of the contract and leave 
The Union.  Force was better applied to disobedient citizens than recalcitrant states.47  
But Madison deemed a national veto absolutely essential to the success of The Union.  
The ends of The Union, for Madison, included “the security of private rights, and the 
steady dispensation of Justice,” not merely the liberty of the states.  The states themselves 
had become a nuisance to private liberty.  Majorities, freed from the restraining influence 
of the Crown, had begun to persecute minorities.  In particular, factions of debtors had 
used representative government to try and prevent their creditors from collecting debts.  
Religious factions might persecute other sects.  Madison feared: “Was it to be supposed 
that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses practiced in some of the States?”   
A national government offered a solution by diluting the factions to the extent that they 
could not endanger liberty.48  In the end, however, the question of a national veto failed, 
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with only three votes in favor (Massachusetts, Virginia, and Pennsylvania).  The 
delegates believed the veto to be a fundamental threat to state liberty and would not give 
the national government a “power [that] may enslave the states.”49 
 The most intractable dispute between the advocates of state sovereignty and 
national power was the question of representation.  James Wilson and Madison fiercely 
supported a bicameral legislature constituted by proportional representation while 
Paterson insisted that only the states should be represented.  The Convention nearly failed 
over this issue.  Early in the Convention, Roger Sherman (Connecticut) repeated his 
proposal of 1776 that both the federal and national principles be taken into account, but 
neither side was ready for this compromise.50  Later, after the composition of the House 
of Representatives was assured on the national principle, Oliver Ellsworth (also of 
Connecticut) proposed that the Senate be constituted on the federal principle as a 
compromise measure. The resulting system, he explained would be “party national; partly 
federal.”51  The debate on his resolution forced the federal and national ideas into direct 
confrontation.  Luther Martin insisted he would never confederate except on “just 
principles,” while Wilson offered an extended proof of the popular basis of government.  
Neither side surrendered its principles, but the delegates possessed a growing sense that 
compromise was necessary if they were to proceed at all.  Caleb Strong pleaded, “If no 
accommodation takes place, The Union itself must soon be dissolved.” 52  Gerry also 
proved amenable to compromise.  Although a supporter of the nationalist position, he 
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understood that they must make concessions.  The Union was paramount.  Gerry was 
“utterly against a partial confederacy, leaving other State to accede or not accede.”  All of 
the states must be joined together.53  When the question was polled on July 16, Strong 
and Gerry voted for the Connecticut compromise, dividing Massachusetts vote.  The 
measure passed (5-4).54   
The remaining work of the framing a national government proceeded along the 
lines of the compromise.  Neither party was completely satisfied, but each received 
enough of what they found essential to hope that the new Constitution could succeed.  
Governmental powers were limited to those necessary for the function of a national 
government and enumerated to please those suspicious of centralized power.  The states, 
too, were limited in their ability to pass arbitrary legislation by protections of contracts, 
property, and prohibitions on ex post facto laws.  A supremacy clause was written to help 
address the weakness of confederate legislation. Because the powers of government were 
strictly enumerated, many argued that no bill of rights was necessary, but this alarmed a 
few nationalists as well as the advocates of state rights.  On September 19, hoping that 
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the new government would be sufficient, the Convention sent the finished Constitution to 
Congress, then to the states to be ratified.   
Although they achieved compromise, neither side was entirely persuaded by the 
other.  Defenders of state sovereignty still believed their social compact analysis to be 
valid, while Wilson and Madison stressed that government should be national in 
character, drawing on the people’s sovereignty and governing them directly.  
Compromise was achieved by determined efforts of a few moderates to compromise for 
the sake of union. Both sides believed that the government would be better equipped to 
protect both federal and individual liberty, but disagreed on how that liberty would be 
protected.  As a result, the nature of The Union was ambiguous. 
Two Theories of Union (1787-1798) 
Two theories of union had been expressed in the founding.  The first drew on the 
national project and Federalist politics, while the second built upon the revolutionary idea 
of association and Anti- federalist politics.  These ideas were by no means mutually 
exclusive.  In fact, they were usually articulated in ways quite complementary to one 
another.  Despite bitter disagreement through the 1790s, the political thinkers of the Early 
Republic tried to reconcile their differences.  Yet the differing emphasis that they laid on 
the national and federal ideas, arising both out of their firm political convictions, their 
understanding of what had been achieved by the new Constitution, and the policy needs 
of the republic led them to construe the meaning of the Constitution in increasingly 
divergent ways.  Ultimately, the disagreement over the nature of The Union planted the 





The Nationalist Theory of Union 
James Wilson’s writings after the Convention recognized that “the people” had 
joined “the states” as the fundamental units of political analysis.  Wilson believed that all 
governments were formed by social contract for the liberty of every individual member.  
The government of the United States posed a unique problem because of its federal 
character.  It sought to protect a new kind of liberty, “federal liberty,” as well as the rights 
of the people.  Just as natural man surrenders some of his liberty in the state of nature (i.e. 
the right to judge his own cause), so “states should resign to the national government that 
part and that part only, of their political liberty, which, when placed in that government, 
will produce more good to the whole an if it remained in the several states.”  The states 
retained all of their powers so far as they did not undermine the “welfare of the general 
superintending confederacy.”55  Yet contract theory led Wilson to defend the national 
principle in the end.  Because he believed that the people were the ultimate sovereigns, 
the national principle is superior because it represents the people of the whole union, 
rather than the people in their separate states.56  Wilson’s argument neglected the 
voluntary consent of individuals and associations (especially state and local governments) 
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that was such an important part of the Revolutionary idea of union and which played such 
a prominent role in his early writings against parliamentary authority.57  Instead, one 
nation could be constituted based on the sovereignty of the whole people, who would 
limit the government in their collective capacity.  The idea of a compact between national 
people became especially important weapon against the Jeffersonians.  By asserting that 
the people, not the states created The Union, Federalists were able to contest the Anti-
Federalists (1798) tendency toward state sovereignty.58  Among Federalists, individual 
rights of voluntary association, or even states rights had given way to the rights of a 
national people.   
As the patriotic idea of “the people” in the Early Republic found its expression as 
a newly minted national community, it neglected the historical roots of the nation in the 
Articles of Association and colonial charters.  The Declaration of Independence and 
Constitution became the twin monuments of American nationhood, and the roles that the 
Articles of Association and Articles of Confederation had played in forming a real union 
were neglected.  Jonathan Maxcy’s 1799 Independence Day referred to July 4 as “the 
birthday of our sovereignty.”  It alluded to the Constitution as “the establishment of an 
energetic government,” but makes no mention of earlier government.59  Other orations 
repeated the same pattern.  An 1802 speech given by Zephaniah Smith Moore began by 
praising the Declaration, but described the Revolution as a period of anarchy:  “Without 
law and without government, every man did that which was right in his own eyes.”  After 
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the war closed, the Constitution was established, which was able to secure natural rights 
under the administrations of Washington and Adams.  The Constitution remained “the 
sheet anchor of our peace at home, and safety abroad.”60  But the speaker neglected the 
importance of confederation in his history of the Union.  Frequent praise is offered for the 
Constitution in the political literature of the period, but references to the Articles of 
Confederation were rare.61  The place of the Articles of Association and Articles of 
Confederation in constructing a voluntary union were forgotten for a generation.   
Federalists successfully posed the contest of ideas as one between national union 
and disunion.  In the first Federalist essay, Publius skillfully posed the choice between 
“the Advantages of Union” and the “certain evils” that would visit the states upon its 
dissolution.62  Subsequent essays especially emphasized a strongly national vision of 
America, united in one people, tied by common customs, and the long and costly struggle 
for independence.  The glory of a national union he compared to the federal government 
they created under the pressure and desperate circumstances of war.  Publius explained: 
“It is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, should 
as an experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended 
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to answer.”  Intelligent men in more peaceful times were able to secure both The Union 
and liberty against the failure of the old government with a “national government more 
wisely framed.” 63  They neglected both the federal character of the Constitution and the 
alternative of a Union strengthened along the lines Paterson had suggested.  The old 
constitution had erred by granting too much power to the states.  “A sovereignty over 
sovereigns,” wrote Publius, “a government over governments, a legislation for 
communities as contradistinguished from individuals… is a solecism in theory, so in 
practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity.”64   
Nationalist theorists founded the legal authority of the new government in the 
legal institutions created by the people.  Nathaniel Chipman, in Sketches on the 
Principles of Government (1793) stressed how the binding law of the Constitution arose 
out of the failures of the recent Confederation.65   Association itself was the product of 
the Revolution, culminating in the Constitution.  Chipman clearly explained that the 
Revolutionary union not failed; the people had improved it through the Constitution.  In 
the colonial period, no connection existed between the colonies.  They possessed similar 
manners, but limited national feeling.  Only the requirements of mutual defense led to 
Union, which according to Chipman “was the germ of that general union of councils and 
sentiments, which produced the American Revolution.”66  The several states as “free and 
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independent” actors entered into the Articles of Confederation for “their mutual defense 
and the direction of national measure.”67  Congress, argued Chipman, possessed little 
more power that a group of ambassadors.  Thus, state governments behaved as 
independent sovereign powers, neglecting The Union, with the resulting crisis in public 
credit and civil disorder that led to the Constitutional Convention.  Here, Chipman 
believed the critical innovation was not so much national representation in the House of 
Representatives, but the clear enumeration of powers.  These were divided between “the 
general and particular powers, not so much by a subordination of one to another, as by a 
precise limitation in respect to their several objects, and rendering them mutually 
subservient, and even necessary to each others efficiency.” The resulting government was 
national in scope, but it belonged to the states “collectively.”68   
Chipman and Wilson, though nationalists, recognized that the constitutional 
settlement of 1787 created a government of broad national objects but limited means.  
The states, within this structure, possessed considerable sovereignty and independence, 
but were ultimately under the authority of the national government.  Neither paid much 
respect to the Confederation, considering it a failed experiment.  Both could agree that 
the new Constitution was not simply a sovereign nation or a confederation of states.  
Publius, likewise, respected the federal character of the new government.  “In strictness,” 
he argued, it was “neither a national nor a federal constitution.”  The foundation of The 
Union was clearly federal, but the powers given to The Union were to operate nationally, 
on all citizens.  The powers delegated to The Union had been strictly enumerated and 
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limited, protecting the federal rights of the states.  In terms of the “sources from which 
ordinary powers of government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national.”69 
Nationalists understood that voluntary association was not sufficient to hold The 
Union together.  Union required, not only national unity and federal co-operation, but 
also properly arranged institutions to guard both state rights and the national government 
against corruption.  Madison, as Publius, understood that the forces of self- interest and 
faction had gained control of the states and nearly dismembered The Union.70  As 
Madison had warned in the Convention, the states had become a serious threat to liberty.  
Debtors rose up against creditors; in parts of the nation, the frontier rose up in open 
rebellion against duly constituted legal authority.  The problem jeopardized the liberty of 
the entire union. 
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one, by destroying 
the liberty which is essential to its existence, the other, by giving to every citizen the 
same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.71 
 
The former would mean tyranny, the latter uniformity of thought.72  The revolutionary 
generation had hoped that their virtue and honor would enable them to choose the good 
of their communities over selfish interest, but Madison argued that good government 
could not take virtue for granted, noting that “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at 
the helm.”  The solution was not to get rid of self- interest but to accommodate 
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government to human nature.73  Republican institutions helped to control the effects of 
factions by choosing men who had a broad understanding of the interests of the whole 
country as representatives. Second by constituting the government on a national basis, 
politics became a coalition building enterprise between pluralistic interest groups, none of 
which had the power to dominate the others.  The institutions of a national government 
provided “a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican 
government.”74 
 The national government itself must be protected from faction.  A proper scale of 
representation would help to produce good rulers, but virtue could no longer be 
presumed.  Instead, Madison proposed that self- interest could be taken into account to 
strengthen institutions.  The presidency and Congress were made to oppose one another 
so that the respective ambition of politicians would counter-act one another and protect 
the institutions that guarded liberty.  Legislative power proved especially powerful, so it 
was divided into a bicameral legislature.  Even the state and the Federal government were 
set against one another so that each would keep the other accountable.  Nowhere was it 
assumed that the voluntary goodwill of the either the states or the national people would 
sustain The Union.  “Hence, a double security arises to the rights of the people … the 
different governments will control each other, at the same time, each will be controlled 
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by itself.”75  Institutional mechanisms, Madison hoped, could help to ameliorate the 
failure of “the virtuous and spirited union.”  These institutional checks and balances 
between state and national governments would later become an indispensable component 
in the cause of state rights. 
 
The State Rights Theory of Union 
 The national and federal principles sprung from different kinds of sources.  
Nationalism developed as the articulate theory of the American political elite.  It found 
expression in the letters and speeches of James Wilson, and Nathaniel Chipman’s 
treatises, and the commentary of Publius.  These men demonstrated the moderated 
character of nationalist thought with its roots in the theory of popular government and the 
text of the Constitution. In a curious twist of fate, the nationalists successfully assumed 
the mantle of the cause of federal union.  They placed the advocates of the federal 
principle on the defensive, labeling them with the deceptive moniker, Anti-Federalists.  
The Anti-Federalists appealed to the old revolutionary grammar of association but 
adapted it to face the challenges of the Federalist argument.  It was in this sense, both 
older and newer than the nationalist ideals of the Federalists.    
Although the dream of a union secured by voluntary association had collapsed by 
1787, many still believed that the normative ends of The Union could be secured by the 
revolutionary principles of association.  Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution 
offered two devastating critiques of the proposed Constitution.  First, they challenged its 
direct departure from the principles of local government, small republics, and voluntary 
association that the Revolutionary grammar of union had stressed.  Fortunately for the 
                                                 




Federalists, the critics themselves were disorganized and badly divided as to their actual 
ideology and policy preferences.76  Most agreed that constitutional reform was necessary, 
but that the new Constitution was likely to subvert the federal principle.  Elbridge Gerry, 
who had voted for the Connecticut Compromise, ultimately opposed the Constitution 
because it lacked traditional republican features.77  Many feared that the valuable role 
played by state governments would be eroded. Robert Yates and John Lansing of New 
York complained that reform of the Articles of Confederation ought to be premised on 
“the preservation of the individual states, in their uncontrouled constitutional rights.”78  
By securing state rights within The Union, they argued, the Convention could have 
solved the financial, commercial, and diplomatic crises of the Confederation.  “Instead of 
being thirteen republics, under a federal head,” “Federal Farmer” complained that the 
Constitution was “clearly designed to make us one consolidated government.”  Great 
faults could be found in the Confederation itself, but the critical failure was the 
corruption and abuses in the state governments, not the structure of the Articles of 
Confederation.  If the states had lived up to their end of the bargain, the old federal union 
would have thrived.  Anti-Federalists, then, disagreed with the nationalists’ contention 
that revolutionary idea of voluntary union had failed.79   
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Second, Anti-Federalists hoped that a new constitution would allow the pursuit of 
liberty under the old federal practices of voluntary association.  Many feared that the 
contractual grant lacked sufficient textual guarantees for the customary rights that 
Americans had traditionally enjoyed.  Unlike most of the states, the federal Constitution 
lacked a bill of rights. Federalists argued that a bill of rights was superfluous, because the 
general government would only possess delegated powers and no others could be claimed 
or exercised.  But the Anti-Federalist argument could not be so easily answered.  Both 
“Brutus” and “Federal Farmer” feared that the new union lacked safeguards for the 
customary English rights that they enjoyed at the state level.  Congress’ expansive taxing 
power, control over armies, and supremacy over existing state institutions meant that 
customary rights of property, militias, or legal procedure could potentially be overturned.  
George Mason, despite his nationalist stance, eventually opposed the Constitution 
because it lacked the protection to liberty that a Bill of Rights could offer.  He believed 
liberty was best protected by explicit limitations on federal power.80   
The Anti-Federalist critique enjoyed limited success.  Federalists successfully 
persuaded the public that the central government would only possess powers to manage 
tasks that were national in scope and character, particularly war, diplomacy, and fiscal 
policy.  The national government would be limited by the federal nature of The Union 
and the limits contained in the contractual grant of power.81   Anti-Federalists, however, 
won the public debate over whether the National Government needed to be limited 
further by a bill of rights to prevent abuses to liberty.  With the understanding that 
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proposed amendments would be forthcoming, enough Anti-Federalists agreed to join 
with the Federalists to secure ratification.   
The example of Virginia bears out this argument between nationalists and Anti-
Federalists.  A pointed and decisive debate occurred in the Virginia ratification 
Convention as to the nature and the structure of The Union.  Patrick Henry passionately 
argued from the floor of the convention that the Constitutional Convention had exceeded 
its authority:   
Who authorized them to speak the language of ‘We the people,’ instead of ‘We the 
states?’  States are the characteristics and the soul of a confederation.  If the states be not 
agents of this compact, it must be one great consolidated, national government of the 
people of all the states.82 
 
He assumed, as an Anti- federalist, that liberty could only be preserved by the states.  If 
the principles of federal union were abandoned, tyranny would emerge out of the 
consolidated government.  Edmund Pendleton countered that “Who but the people have 
the right to form a government?”83  Pendleton understood that the new system was 
something more than a confederation, which required a grant of power from the people.  
Other state resolutions echoed the nationalist foundation of the constitutional compact.  
Pennsylvania’s convention ratified the Constitution “in the name and by the authority of 
the …people.”  Other states used nearly identical language.84  Virginia likewise acted 
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through the delegates of the people and declared that “the powers granted under the 
Constitution [were] … derived from the people of the United States.”85   
Anti-Federalists like Patrick Henry objected to this language strenuously.  They 
proposed, as a substitute for ratification, that a declaration of rights, together with 
amendments to “the most exceptionable parts of the said constitution of government, 
ought to be referred by this convention to the other states in the American Confederacy 
for their consideration.” 86  Henry argued that disputes on the meaning and structure of 
federalism ought to be referred to the other states as the contracting parties.  The 
Federalists convinced the Virginia convention delegates that Henry’s proposal was a poor 
substitute for their proposed government.  Consequently, the new Constitution was 
ratified in necessarily nationalist language and terms.  The sovereign people granted 
power to the central government to perform a limited but essential set of tasks.   
 The ratification of the Constitution was a further expression of the spirit of 
compromise that had animated the Convention of 1787.  Although the state conventions 
agreed with the Federalists on the popular and national source of ratification, they 
adopted the Anti-Federalist concern that liberty would diminish under a central 
government.  Virginia’s convention resolved that the power granted to Congress by the 
whole people, could be resumed by them “at their will.”  It specified that Congress would 
not have the power to interfere with religious liberty, except as the Constitution explicitly 
provided.87  Virginia’s concern in 1788 was not so much for state sovereignty, which they 
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did mention, or of the rights of revolution, which they vested in the whole people and 
took for granted, but for the liberty of the whole people and the danger that Congress 
might usurp the liberty that the states had previously protected.  Virginia, and other states 
proposed amendments to the new Constitution designed to further limit the extent of 
national power.  Under the leadership of Madison, these concerns became embodied in a 
Bill of Rights, the strict construction of the Constitution, and a habit of state vigilance of 
the limits of federal power.  The Anti-Federalist concern for state and local liberty as well 
as their suspicion of power would become as much a part of the constitutional order as 
the popular basis of national power in the sovereignty of the people.  
 After Virginia’s convention disbanded, a group of disgruntled Anti-Federalists 
retired to the state legislative chamber to plan their continued resistance and opposition to 
the Constitution.  When he learned of the gathering, Patrick Henry quashed the nascent 
resistance to the Constitution with one speech.  Henry admonished them that “the 
question had been fully discussed and settled, and as true and faithful republicans, they 
had better go home!” He insisted “that they should cherish [the Constitution] and give it 
fair play….”88   
Former Anti-Federalists, then, became devoted supporters of the Constitution. 
They brought into the government their suspicion of corruption and the Revolutionary 
predilection for voluntary, federal theories of association.  For instance, “Brutus” had 
challenged the broad powers of the “Necessary and Proper” clause in Article I section 8.  
He expected that, “in forming a constitution, great care ought to be taken to limit and 
                                                 





define its power, adjust it parts, and guard against abuse of authority.”89  They insisted 
that textual limits on power and the Bill of Rights be scrupulously applied against 
national power.  As H. Jefferson Powell suggests, opposition politics in the Early 
Republic viewed the government through a “constitution of suspicion.”  They knew that 
that “the preservation of liberty required that the Constitution be read with a bias against 
power.”90  With its ratification Massachusetts specified that a new article be drafted 
clearly defining “that all powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid constitution are 
reserved to the several states to be by them exercised.”91  This principle was not simply a 
“truism.”92  It expressed their deeply held conviction that only institutional safeguards 
against national corruption could prevent corruption and tyranny.  The Anti-Federalists’ 
fear of consolidation, focus on enumerated powers, and concern for customary rights, 
along with the Revolutionary idea of a social contract, were all ideas that were enfolded 
into the Jeffersonian political project.  
Anti-Federalists soon found a target for their suspicions in the new administration.  
Hamilton’s 1790 plan for the new treasury department assumed that the national 
government possessed broad authority over economic development, drawing upon the 
new Constitution’s provisions that allowed direct taxation and the power to borrow and 
                                                 
89 Brutus I and II, Complete Anti-Federalist, 2.9.1 – 2.9.33. 
 
90 H. Jefferson Powell, “The Principles of ’98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval,” 80 Virginia Law Review 
(1994): 722-727.   
 
91 DHR 3:5.   
 
92 Chief Justice Stone’s opinion in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) Stone claimed of the 
Tenth Amendment that “The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of 
the relationship between the national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution 
before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government 





spend.  He proposed that the national Revolutionary War debt be paid at full value, to the 
considerable profit of speculators who had purchased the debt at a discount.  He proposed 
a national bank, an excise tax, and a policy for developing and supporting domestic 
manufactures.  Hamilton believed that the interests of the financial classes ought to be 
wedded to the survival of the national union.  Local men of finance would thus be 
financially invested in the success of the nation as a whole.93 
Initially, the most controversial aspect of Hamilton’s plan was the assumption of 
state war debts. The system of debt, like the whole of political economy in the 1780s, had 
been unevenly distributed.  Several prominent states, including Massachusetts and South 
Carolina had left their entire debt unpaid.  Many of the Southern states—Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia—had responsibly retired most of their debt.  These 
states took up the cause of state fiscal authority in Congress.  While they feared they 
would suffer at the expense of debtor states, they offered a broader objection that 
assumption would centralize financial power in Congress at the expense of the States.94   
It appeared, in 1790, as if the differing interests of the states might triumph over 
the national principle and cripple any rising national power.  Yet Jefferson and Madison, 
recognizing the need to buttress the fragile central institutions, agreed to compromise.  
They rallied support for the assumption of state debt in return for Hamilton’s future 
support for a permanent seat for the capitol on the Potomac River.  No doubt they hoped 
that a Southern location for the capital would help to insulate it from the atmosphere of a 
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royal “court” which they feared might grow up in a major city.  Jefferson, in any case, 
believed that without a compromise, no agreement on the public debt would be reached.  
It would be “the end of the government.”95   
To many former Anti-Federalists in the states, including Virginia’s Patrick Henry, 
the Hamilton plan threatened the federal liberty which the states required to protect the 
people against coercive central power.  Virginia immediately returned to the 
revolutionary model of non-coercive state association to oppose the Hamilton plan.  At 
the instigation of Patrick Henry, the Virginia House of Delegates complained that the 
new government had already transgressed the boundaries that the Constitution had 
assigned to it.  The assumption of state debt was “repugnant to the Constitution of the 
United States, as it goes to the exercise of a power not expressly granted to the central 
government….”96  Strict construction of the enumerated powers became a rallying cry 
against federal power.  Virginia believed itself to be a part of a federal union purposed on 
the preservation of both public and private liberty.  The Revolutionary threat to liberty 
had been met by voluntary association and pleas to Parliament and the Crown to abide in 
the existing constitution.  Now Virginia drafted a remonstrance, deliberately modeled on 
these revolutionary models.   
The report suggested that the new government was already abandoning the ideal 
of the virtuous union for corruption, trying to recreate the British system of “enormous 
debt” and “unbounded influence” of the executive branch, which had limited the rights of 
                                                 
95 Quoted in Sharp, 37. 
 





the opposition and threaten the tradition of “English liberty.”97  Virginia initially hoped 
that the people’s representatives would meet general threats to liberty with a virtuous 
response.  But when the threat to liberty had become the national government itself, the 
Virginia legislature assumed the role of the petitioner, explaining to the national 
government its constitutional errors.  
Virginia believed it had the right to participate in a just constitutional union.  This 
union would not allow speculators to dominate over the agricultural classes or burden the 
people with heavy debt and high taxes.  Hamiltonian policy had removed from the states 
a right that was justly theirs—“the power of taxing their own constituents for the payment 
of their own debts in such a manner as would be best suited to their ease and 
convenience.”98  The assumption of debts meant an increase in federal taxation and a 
denial of control to the states as to how those taxes would be levied.   
Virginia understood the Revolutionary grammar of association to require that 
power be exercised toward the proper political ends and with the appropriate 
constitutional means.  Assuming the role of a watchdog, the states should hold the central 
government to the strict terms of the agreement.  Here the language of the states shifted 
significantly.  The state ratifying convention had insisted on its right to defend the 
normative ends of constitutionalism because it embodied the people.  Now the Virginia 
Legislature claimed the same right, not for a ratifying convention but for the legislature 
itself.  They expounded their own duty “as the guardians, then, of the rights and interests 
of their constituents, as sentinels placed by them over the ministers of the Federal 
Government, to shield it from their encroachment, or at least to sound the alarm when it 
                                                 






is threatened by invasion.”99  The remonstrance spoke in defense of the states as 
contractual parties of The Union.  Virginia insisted upon the rights to taxation as one of 
the fundamental reserved rights secured by the terms of its entry into The Union.  
Assumption further violated the constitutional provision guaranteeing the obligation of 
existing debts.  The states could not remain silent, according to the Virginia Legislature, 
since “The rights of the states, as contracting parties with the United States, must be 
considered as sacred.”100  
Virginia’s remonstrance demonstrates the republican constitutional response to 
the centralization of administrative government in The Union.  When Hamilton proposed 
to form a centralized national bank within the executive branch, opposition quickly 
gathered against his plan.  As Secretary of State, Jefferson advised against the 
constitutionality of a national bank by citing those reserved rights of the states.  Because 
the power to charter a bank was not expressly delegated to the United States, Jefferson 
argued that it must have been reserved to the states.101  Jefferson and Madison decisively 
moved into opposition against the administration.  They formed a Republican caucus in 
Congress and initiated the founding of the National Gazette.   
Madison wrote prominently in the National Gazette to defend the vision of 
association that he had described in Publius.  Madison explained the source of the danger 
posed by centralization.  Because the legislature was too distant “to regulate all the 
various objects belonging to the local governments … [it] would evidently force the 
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transfer of many of them to the executive department.”  Republican feared that the 
concentration of power and pageantry would encourage the ambitious to establish a 
monarchy and eviscerate representative government.  Madison understood that the 
remedy to the dangers of consolidation was national as well as federal.  Like his 
revolutionary forbearers, Madison distinguished the powers of government, which he 
feared would be consolidated, from the social union of all Americans, which he knew 
would benefit from a “consolidation” of “interests and affections.”  Only as the people 
found their interests in common could they oppose a budding tyrant.  Madison explained: 
The less the supposed difference of interests, and the greater the concord and confidence 
throughout the great body of the people, the more readily must they sympathize with each 
other, the more seasonably can the interpose a common manifestation of their sentiments, 
the more certainly will they take the alarm at usurpation or oppression, and the more 
effectually will they confederate their defense of the public liberty.102 
 
Nationalists and republicans each had a vital role to play in securing liberty.  The 
Republicans should guard valiantly against encroachment, while the nationalists would 
work to harmonize the people. 
And let it be the patriotic duty of all, to maintain the various authorities established by 
our complicated system, each in its reflective constitutional sphere, and to erect over all 
the whole, one paramount Empire of reason, benevolence and brotherly affection. 
 
Madison tried to maintain the harmony of federal and national principles against the spirit 
of the times, but his appeal was precluded by mutual distrust.103  From this point, the 
constitutional discourse of Hamilton’s Federalists and Jefferson sharply diverged from 
the shared understanding of a “partly national and partly federal” union. 
Revolutionary Association Transformed:  (1798-1800) 
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Jefferson believed the people needed to be mobilized against the threat of 
corruption and the loss of liberty.  The vision of a national government embodied in 
voluntary federal union was in jeopardy.  The Republicans turned to the press, Congress, 
and the public to combat any further corruption of the nascent republic. The intensity of 
factional politics helped to convince Federalists that the Republicans were new 
revolutionaries, bent on destroying their hard won security and traditions of ordered 
liberty.  As the turbulent politics of the 1790s unfolded, Federalists became convinced 
that their political opponents were the most serious threat to the liberty of the republic.  
Under the real threat of an imminent war with France in 1798 and an imagined Jacobin 
conspiracy at home, the Federalist majority in Congress passed sweeping legislation 
collectively called the Alien and Sedition Acts.104  The Alien Act granted the President 
the power to deport any alien he believed was dangerous to The Union.  The Sedition Act 
was directed against their political opposition to silence the increasingly raucous criticism 
of the Administration. It made unlawful any conspiracy “with intent to oppose any 
measure of the government of the United States.”  Congress also prohibited any person 
from “writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false scandalous and malicious 
writing … against the government of the United States.”105  These acts were wielded by 
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Federalist judges and prosecutors with a determination to buttress the administration.  
Even Republican congressman Matthew Lyon of Vermont was convicted and imprisoned 
for sedition.106 
Facing restrictions in the press, and fearing that even their private mail might be 
subject to domestic spying, leading Republicans turned to the state governments. For a 
generation, citizens had believed that local associations were the surest guardians of their 
liberty.  Now protests secretly authored by Madison and Jefferson were introduced into 
the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures, respectively.  They denounced the Alien and 
Sedition Acts as a violation of the powers reserved to the states in the design of the 
Constitution.  Congress had taken another step toward the consolidation of all political 
power in the executive branch.  The legislation violated the Republican belief that the 
police powers had been reserved to the states.  Kentucky called the legislation “altogether 
void, and of no force” while Virginia asserted that the states, as parties to the 
Constitution, “have the right, and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress 
of evil, and to maintain within their respective limits, the authorities and rights 
appertaining to them.”107  
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 The substance of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions drew specifically upon 
the habits of the “constitution of suspicion” and the Revolutionary grammar of 
association.  Indeed, the parallels between the revolutionary ethos and the language of the 
resolutions are particularly striking.  Jefferson’s initial draft called for new “committees 
of correspondence” to organize resistance to the national government on behalf of the 
reserved powers of the states.  Jefferson himself went so far as to declare that the existing 
laws were invalid because they violated a higher law.108  During the Revolution, the 
people stood as the judge of violations of natural law.  Now Kentucky, drawing upon 
Jefferson’s draft, claimed that it held the authority to declare the law.  Kentucky 
deliberately evoked the memory of the Declaratory Acts which had bound the colonies 
“in all cases whatsoever by laws not made with their consent, but by others against their 
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consent.” 109  Virginia’s language was more moderate.  They identified as their enemy the 
impending threat “to destroy the meaning and effect of the particular enumeration, which 
necessarily explains and limits the general phrases; and so as to consolidate the states by 
degrees into one sovereignty.”110  Virginia’s appeal conjured up fears of the corrupt and 
ministerial government of Georgian Britain, not so much a fear of tyranny imposed by 
force.  Both believed that the revolutionary struggle had not ended.  They turned to meet 
the threat with the stratagem of virtuous and voluntary association that had succeeded 
against the crown. 
It is critical to note that the Republicans turned to the states as the legitimate 
agents of protest and action whereas modern opposition movements would have turned to 
mass protest, political organization, or media outlets.  To the Republican mind, these 
outlets still lacked the virtue and disinterested spirit that could be found in a state 
legislature.  As John Taylor explained, only state legislatures could genuinely represent 
the people.  Anti-Federalists had argued that federal representation in Congress was on 
too small a scale, and elections were too infrequent to be accountable to the people.  Now 
they contended that the state legislators more accurately represented the people.  State 
legislators lived in small districts where they knew their constituents and faced annual 
elections.111  State government offered the true expression of republican principles, and 
the best constitutional defense of liberty.  As Jefferson wrote, “The true barriers of our 
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liberty in this country are our state governments.”112  States provided “the most 
competent administrators for our domestic concerns, & the surest bulwarks against anti-
republican tendencies.”113   
 State protest was justified because Republicans felt that a legitimate constitutional 
power was being stripped from their jurisdiction.  As Jefferson wrote, “The power to 
create, define, and punish such other crimes is reserved, and, of right, appertains solely 
and exclusively to the respective states, each within its own territory.”114  The law 
explicitly violated the general principle of the Tenth Amendment, of the reservation of 
rights in the Virginia ratifying resolutions, and of Virginia’s remonstrance of 1790.   In 
addition it violated explicit provisions of the Bill of Rights which prohibited Congress 
from making laws respecting the freedom of speech or of the press.  Virginia 
persuasively quoted from its own ratifying resolutions to the effect that freedom of the 
press was to be untouched by the federal government.115 
The most far reaching impact of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions was their 
incorporation of the language of social compact theory into constitutional deliberation.  
While compact theory had been a staple of Revolutionary constitutional deliberation, the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions ensured that compact theory would remain an 
enduring component of American constitutional analysis.  Because the constitutional 
compact was the product of consent, and the states were believed to be the parties 
through which consent was given, Madison and Jefferson reasoned that the states 
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remained the best vehicle for consent to the constitutional actions of the general 
government.  The Virginia resolutions stressed that the states were parties to the compact 
that formed The Union, while Kentucky posed a stark alternative between total 
submission to the government, or a compact in which each state acceded as an “integral 
party” to The Union.116  The subtle differences between these two expressions of the 
character of consent would have far reaching consequences.  Madison’s language in the 
Virginia resolutions implied that the states held the power to consent collectively, so that 
constitutional deliberation was only authoritative if the states together expressed their 
vision of the constitutional order.  This limited the power of a single state.  Jefferson’s 
draft, and the eventual Kentucky resolutions, theorized that the constitutional compact 
was between an individual state and the rest of the states collectively.  Thus an individual 
state was entitled to declare that a law was “null and void” because it was an equal 
contracting party to the rest of the states.117 
The states clearly presented themselves as interpreters of the Constitution, over 
and against Congress, which had unconstitutionally restricted free speech and the press.  
Virginia and Kentucky were also fearful that the executive had consolidated its power 
over the judiciary.  Ultimately, the Alien Act was an abuse of due process that stripped 
domestic aliens of their right to trial by jury by presidential fiat.118  The loss of legal 
rights, and the consolidation of a judicial power in the executive, appeared to 
Republicans as imminent tyranny.  The states, not content with their announcement of 
constitutional violations, assumed for themselves the power of a constitutional court.  
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They believed that they could act as arbiters between citizens and the federal government.  
Virginia proclaimed that it had the duty to “interpose” to end the practices of the Adams 
administration.  Seemingly, Virginia intended to interpose its political power to bring to 
an end the questionable constitutional practices of the administration.  But later, states 
would call out the militia (as Pennsylvania did, resisting the result of U.S. v Peters in 
1809) or use the state courts to actively thwart the federal interpretation of the 
Constitution (as the Wisconsin Supreme Court did in Re Booth and Rycraft in 1855).119  
Kentucky, took the radical position immediately arguing that “Each party has an equal 
right to judge for itself” whether the Constitution has been violated.   
Given the Revolutionary lessons about the value of associations in politics and the 
“constitution of suspicion” that prevailed among Republicans in the 1790s, it is not 
surprising that state politicians would assume the right to interpret the Constitution on 
behalf of the state governments, particularly when liberty itself was perceived to be at 
risk.  The Constitution did not provide a “common umpire” for determining constitutional 
meaning in a dispute between branches of government.  It clearly established the 
supremacy of the national over the federal government, but then meticulously protected 
the reserved powers of the states.   Madison, in particular, had long argued that the state 
governments were as necessary to the preservation of liberty as was the popular unity of 
“interests and affections” between all of the people.120  The Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions simply assumed that the states were equally powerful constitutional actors, 
they were constitutionally empowered to speak more authoritatively than the judicial or 
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executive branches, because they were more representative of the will of the people and 
could better protect their liberty.   
From the perspective of constitutional history, the passage of the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions were a critical moment American federalism.  The Resolutions 
took the Revolutionary suspicion of power, welded it with the Anti-Federalist 
hermeneutic of strict construction, and produced a model of constitutional deliberation 
that permeated the politics of the next three generations.  They contended that the states, 
as integral parts of the American constitutional structure, possessed the authority to 
review the actions of the other units of government.  The theory of states rights 
emphasized that the states were vital and essential constitutional actors, with powers to 
call for constitutional amendment and clarify constitutional meaning.  Virginia and 
Kentucky contended that the states could speak definitively as to what the Constitution 
meant.  Constitutional disagreements in the early Republic were particularly thorny 
because practical institutional mechanisms for determining constitutional meaning had 
not yet been established.  Judicial review, while emerging as a definitive voice on the 
state courts, had not yet been comprehensively embraced by the Supreme Court. Those 
who espoused judicial review did not claim judicial supremacy over the Constitution.121   
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According to the logic of state rights, the judgment that the states were superior to 
the president or the courts in their power to determine constitutional meaning gave 
considerable power to the political branches of the states.  State legislatures weighed 
whether the circumstances were extreme enough to justify interposition.  When one state 
determined that a violation had taken place, it could send resolutions to the other states, 
protesting the grievance and appealing for political and constitutional aid in resolving the 
crisis.  Theoretically, the states could resolve the problem by applying political pressure 
to Congress, by ratifying a constitutional amendment, or even by organizing a 
constitutional convention.  Yet considering the deep political factionalism of the 1790s, it 
is not surprising that the state legislatures themselves were too deeply divided to offer 
Virginia and Kentucky much aid.  If the states could not practically act as an arbiter of 
constitutional meaning, then who was to decide ultimately?  The states were, in times of 
crisis, unwilling to cede that power to any branch of the federal government, either the 
President, the federal courts, or even Congress.  But given the political diversity of the 
states, it is difficult to imagine that any other mechanism could be consistently effective 
in difficult constitutional disputes. 
 The responses to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions refused to accept the 
resolutions’ claims.  Congress believed the resolutions were a campaign speech and 
responded to them as such.  In response, their resolutions dismissed the “acrimonious 
remonstrance” as an illegitimate, foreign-driven effort to weaken their strength against 
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France.  The Alien and Sedition Acts, they explained, were vital to national security.  
They provided “Parts of a general system of defense, adopted to a crisis of extreme 
difficulty and dangers.”  Congress explicitly defended the Alien and Sedition acts against 
the charge that they were an unconstitutional usurpation.  Congress argued that the laws 
only clarified the broad authority of the President.  The power to remove aliens, the 
Resolutions suggested, was incidental to the power the President held to defend The 
Union, while the Sedition Act enacted existing common law prohibitions against 
seditious speech.  The freedom of the press cited by the Republicans in the First 
Amendment simply granted “permission to publish without prior restraint.”  Congress, in 
essence, argued that the national government already held the broad power that Virginia 
and Kentucky charged they were usurping.122 
 Because Virginia and Kentucky argued that the states could judge the limits of the 
reserved powers, only the other states could refute their claim.  The states, like the 
Congress, charged that the resolutions were a political act destabilizing to the 
government.  New York denounced the “inflammatory and pernicious sentiments and 
doctrines” contained in the resolutions.123   But the states questioned the very right of 
Virginia and Kentucky to make judgments with authority about the nature of the 
Constitution.  New York challenged the theory that the Constitution was a compact 
between the states.  It explained that “the people of the United States have established for 
                                                 
122 Congress, United States, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., “Repeal of the Alien and Sedition Laws,” February 21, 
1799, American State Papers: Miscellaneous, 1:181-184.  Congress assumed that the common law had 
been federalized, which is what the states where fighting so strenuously to prevent.  Republicans contended 
that, if the Constitution were construed to include the common law, then very little power would remain for 
the states. 
 
123 New York, March 5, 1799, State Documents on Federal Relations: The States and the United States, ed. 
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themselves a free and independent national government.”124  Massachusetts agreed that 
the people had made the central government the judge of its powers, not the states: “The 
people, in solemn compact, which is declared to be the supreme law of the land, have not 
constituted the state legislatures the judges of the acts or measures of the Federal 
Government, but have confided to them the power of proposing… amendments.”125 
 The other states had argued that the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures had 
assumed a function that state legislatures were not competent to perform.  As Vermont 
explained, “It belongs not to state legislatures to decide on the constitutionality of laws 
made by the general government, this power being exclusively vested in the judiciary 
courts of The Union.”126  Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire 
agreed that the courts were the proper institution to declare the meaning of the law.  The 
New York Senate declared its own “incompetancy, as a branch of the legislature of this 
state, to supervise the acts of the general government.”127  The states were above all 
concerned with the instability that might arise if each state would speak with a different 
voice on the meaning of the Constitution.  Rhode Island even suggested that too great a 
diversity of state opinion risked “hazarding an interruption of the peace by civil 
discord.”128  Massachusetts agreed that while vigilance for liberty was admirable, 
Virginia and Kentucky had gone too far.  No state supported Virginia and Kentucky’s 
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claims, and given the risk of war and the fears of revolution, it is not surprising that the 
states carefully dissented from the Virginia and Kentucky doctrines. 
 The challenge posed by the states’ replies required Republicans to defend their 
states’ right to challenge the central government’s interpretation of the Constitution.  
Madison, in particular took the challenge of vindicating his doctrines before the public.  
After the heated criticism of the Virginia resolutions of 1798, Madison ran for the 
Virginia House of Delegates to play a prominent role in their defense.  The Virginia 
Report of 1800 clearly elaborated Madison’s principles on state action and the degree to 
which the states could challenge the general government.  His formulation deserves 
special treatment, because Madison had played such a prominent role in creating and 
defending the national government against the Anti-Federalist critique.  Just as in 
Federalist Thirty Nine and his essay in the National Gazette, the Virginia Report 
advanced the axiom that the government was “partly national and partly federal.”  The 
Constitution had been ratified in Virginia with the understanding that “the power not 
delegated to the states … were reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people.”129   
The nature of the Constitution itself, as a compact, was the source of Madison’s 
argument.  Because it was a compact, “the parties themselves must be the rightful judges 
in the last resort whether the bargain made has been proposed or violated.”130  The 
assertion that the states, as parties to the Constitution, could review the constitutionality 
of the central government’s actions had been greeted with considerable alarm in other 
states.  Madison clearly emphasized that when the “states” were properly defined, the 
Virginia doctrine was less alarming.  Constitutionally speaking, “states” meant not the 
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territory, societies, or even the governments of the “separate sections” of The Union, but 
“the people composing those political societies in their highest sovereign capacity.”131  
Because the parties were the states in their highest sovereign capacity (the people of each 
state severally), Madison was arguing that the people were the highest authority in 
American Constitutional deliberation.  Madison appealed to the fundamental principle of 
consent.  By consent, the people had granted governments powers to protect their liberty 
and set up Constitutions to oversee that grant.  Federalists arguments that the vigilance of 
the people was inappropriate, dangerous, or suggestive of exotic European 
revolutionaries contradicted what Madison felt was the essence of republican 
constitutionalism.  “The authority of constitutions over governments, and of the 
sovereignty of the people over constitutions,” Virginia declared, “are truths which are at 
all times necessary to be kept in mind; and at no time perhaps more necessary than at the 
present.”132   
Virginia’s report, then, was not a call to sovereign power, or unilateral action, but 
the reasoned attempt on behalf of the people to restore the constitutional principles of the 
American Revolution.  The state governments stood as an advanced warning “to descry 
the first symptoms of usurpation.”133  Aware that the republicans were deeply suspected 
of being Jacobin revolutionaries, Madison hastened to add that this case of action was 
lawful.  He stressed the “warm affection” for The Union and scrupulous fidelity to 
Constitution which characterized Virginia.134  But the people were jealous of their state 
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government, and had created constitutions to protect them.  Now they acted to police the 
limits they had set on the federal government.  Madison hoped that the people of Virginia 
would be affirmed by the other states and that the excess of the Federalist administration 
would be decisively curtailed.  His hope was in the people of The Union, acting severally 
through their state legislatures.  Virginia proclaimed with Madison: “There can be no 
tribunal above their authority to decide, in the last resort, whether the compact made by 
them be violated.”135  
Interposition provided a middle way for Virginia.136  Interposition would allow 
the state government to “arrest the progress of evil,” deny to the federal government 
powers that it had assumed, and thus protect the Constitution and the liberty of the 
people.  It allowed Virginia a way to protect liberty under law without endangering that 
liberty through violent resistance against federal government that might imperil The 
Union or a docile submission to federal supremacy.  State legislatures ought to interpose 
to defend the revolutionary project of liberty under law that they had pledged to protect in 
their own bill of rights and constitutions.  Only a constitutional violation should produce 
state interposition.  “In the case of an intimate and constitutional union,” Virginia 
explained, “it is evident that the interposition of the parties in their sovereign capacity can 
only be called for by occasions only deeply and essentially affecting the vital principles 
of their political system.”137  
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The states were understood as a critical counterbalance to federal power.  The full 
context of the Report of 1800 suggests that the purpose of interposition was to declare 
that the law was unconstitutional, on its face, and to refuse to co-operate with it, calling 
on the other states for support in repealing it.138  But the states had not supported 
Virginia.  In answer to his critics, Madison explained that state declarations of 
unconstutionality were not judicial because they did not bind the states with finality in the 
way that a judicial decree bound the parties to a suit.  In cases of state review, states 
resolutions are “expressions of opinion, unaccompanied with any other effect than what 
they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection.”139  They were intended to persuade 
the collective sovereign, the people operating in their sovereign capacity (the states) 
together,140 that the Constitution should be construed strictly.  The right of a state to 
organize with other states and invite concurrence was at the heart of the revolutionary 
tradition of association.  Madison believed that liberty required the right to “free 
communication” among the states, where the Constitution imposes “no restraint.”  The 
states themselves could take the appropriate and constitutional measure to amend the 
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139 Virginia (1800), Liberty and Order, 259.   
 
140 The language of the Virginia Report of 1800 emphasized the collective sovereignty of the states and the 
sovereignty of the people against the threat of consolidation into a singular national sovereign.  Compare 
the “interposition of the parties [plural] in their sovereignty” (244) and “sovereign parties [plural] to the 
constitution” (245) referring to the states, with “sovereignty of the people over constitutions” (245) and 
“the people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty” (353).  Sovereignty belonged to the 
people together, or, defined another way, to the states collectively, with the states understood as being  “the 
people composing those political societies in their highest sovereign capacity” (244).  In contrast, when 
sovereignty was referred to as a singular entity, Madison referred to the danger of consolidating all 
sovereignty in the general government.  This was the very evil that the Virginia Resolutions had been 




Constitution.141 According to the Virginia Report of 1800, the judiciary cannot be the 
sole bulwark, because issues will arise over which it had no jurisdiction: “The decisions 
of other departments, not carried by the forms of the Constitution before the judiciary, 
must be equally authoritative and final with the decisions of that department.”142  Thus 
the states, as a vital constitutional institution, could speak with equal authority to the 
other branches of government.  Madison’s response was an elaboration of the federal 
principle of his “partly federal and partly national” republic.  He sought to preserve the 
balance of power between the branches of government and between the federal and state 
governments through a measured political and constitutional protest.   
Despite his political optimism and his love of The Union, Jefferson’s treatment of 
state review took a more radical form than Madison’s.143  Jefferson contended that the 
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action by the Supreme Court.  Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419 (1793) reinforced the power that the 
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143 Jefferson was not as radical as the use of his ideas by secessionists would suggest.  Jefferson held an 
easy confidence that the republic would prosper.  Despite the rising political fortunes of Hamilton and the 
Federalists, Jefferson believed that the people would eventually restrain the excesses of the government and 
protect their liberty.  The radical language of the Kentucky Resolution was not a prelude to secession.  He 
knew such a division would be foolish and ultimately destructive. As Jefferson wrote to John Taylor on 
June 4, 1798, “…in every free & deliberating society there must, from the nature of man, be opposite 
parties & violent dissentions and discords.”  The popularity of Washington and the machinations of 
Hamilton had temporarily given the aristocratic and anti-republican Federalists the upper hand, but the 
“substantially republican” character of the people could guard against corruption.  The “scission of the 
Union” should not be contemplated because the factional nature of man would inevitably create new parties 
in any new union they might form.  Jefferson posited that New England was an excellent adversary for 
Republicans because “[t]hey are circumscribed within such narrow limits, & their population so full, that 
their numbers will ever be the minority….  A little patience and we shall see the reign of witches pass over, 




states had formed The Union by compact under certain conditional terms, which the 
central government must respect.  In this, he agreed with Madison.  But Jefferson 
believed that the Constitution was not formed by the people, acting within the several 
states, but by each state acting individually.  As he asserted,  
to this compact, each state acceded as a State, and is an integral party, its co-states 
forming, as to itself, the other party…and as in all other cases of compact among powers 
having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well as of 
infractions of the mode and measure of redress.144   
 
Jefferson’s argument appealed to the natural rights of the states to judge for themselves 
whether the compact has been violated.  It assumed, implicitly, that the states were still in 
a state of nature regarding the interpretation of the compact.  This is not to say that the 
compact had been dissolved, or that revolution was their only recourse. Jefferson simply 
could not find any national institution with authority over constitutional interpretation.  
Instead, it was left to the states and the people to preserve the “real laws” against the 
usurpations of the executive branch.145 Because each state acceded to union as a 
sovereign entity, Jefferson believed that it could act alone, to declare that an extra-
constitutional act was void and null. 
Jefferson did stress the need for collective action against the Alien and Sedition 
Acts.  His original draft proposed that “a committee for conference and correspondence” 
                                                                                                                                                 
principles” (Liberty and Order, 227-28)  Jefferson believed it was best to remain united with the Federalist 
states and to fight for the true principles of union (Gutzman, 484). Despite his strong disagreement with the 
broad construction Hamilton advocated, he had not resorted to the power of the states because when the 
Republicans held the administration, they could revise the constitution to prevent such broad construction.  
Only the direct threat that the Alien and Sedition Act had posed to the political liberty of the Republicans, 
clearly against the spirit and the letter of the Constitution, justified the theory of nullification that Jefferson 
proposed. 
 
144 Thomas Jefferson, “Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798,” Works, 8:461. These key differences 
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stressed the sovereignty of the individual states, and so prepared the South for eventual nullification and 
secession.   
 




be created in the revolutionary style to co-ordinate voluntary association with the states in 
resistance to undelegated power.  Jefferson believed that the states still were jealous of 
their powers and would not “submit to undelegated, and consequentially unlimited 
powers.”  Jefferson suggested that if the government had merely stretched the bounds of 
the delegated powers, rather than inventing new powers, he would have patiently waited 
for the people to correct the error through the political process.  But when “powers are 
assumed which have not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful 
remedy.”146  Jefferson’s argument implies that individual states could nullify federal law:   
Every state has a natural right in cases not within the compact, (casus non foederis), to 
nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits: that 
without this right, they would be under the dominion, absolute and unlimited of 
whosoever might exercise this right of judgment for them.147   
 
Congress was not even a co-equal branch of government, but “merely the creature of the 
compact.”  It was subject in its powers to the will of the states that created it to serve 
them.   
Jefferson’s appeal to natural rights was moderated by the patient strategy he 
proposed to Kentucky.  He called upon the other states to share their beliefs on the Alien 
and Sedition Acts.  Jefferson did not try to steer Kentucky on an individual course against 
the will of the nation.  He sought to convince the other states that the actions of the 
Adams administration proved that it was unrestrained by the strict enumeration of its 
powers.  Jefferson described a threat identical to the one faced in 1774.  The government 
was  
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seizing the rights of the States, and consolidating them in the hands of the General 
Government, with a power assumed to bind the States, not merely as the cases made 
federal (casus foederis), but in all cases whatsoever, by laws made, not with their consent, 
but by others against their consent: that this would be to surrender the form of 
government we have chosen, and live under one deriving its powers from its own 
will….148   
 
Jefferson expressed confidence that the states would collectively respond to the looming 
presence of arbitrary government, by following Kentucky’s declaration that the offending 
laws were “void, and of no force.”  If no support from the other states was forthcoming, 
Kentucky would make the declaration alone. 
The Kentucky legislature significantly moderated Jefferson’s radical language 
while retaining his criticism of centralized power.  It denied his call for a Revolutionary-
style committee of correspondence, and avoided his theoretical emphasis on the natural 
rights of the states.  Instead, Kentucky phrased its resolutions as instructions to its 
delegates in Congress.  It also sent the resolutions on to the other states, with the hope 
that they shared their opinion.  Kentucky embraced Jefferson’s critique of the 
monarchical executive.  Quoting Jefferson, they hoped to “bind him down from mischief 
by the chains of the Constitution.”149 They adopted Jefferson’s comparison of the central 
government to the British government in their claim to “exercise power of these states of 
all powers whatsoever.”150  Kentucky, like Madison and Jefferson, conceded that the 
administration had the power to bind them with respect to the powers delegated by the 
Constitution (casus foederis), but not in all cases whatsoever.  They followed Jefferson’s 
reliance on the states as agents of resistance.  They believed that the rights violated were 
the rights the states held by compact, not the constitutional rights granted by the people.  
                                                 
148 Thomas Jefferson, “Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798,” Works, 8:477. 
 
149 Kentucky (1798), Languages of Power, 133. 
 




Kentucky did not really hope to act alone, because it understood that one or two states 
could not carry their interpretation against the fierce opposition of the other states.  They 
appealed to the states to “concur in declaring these acts void, and of no force” as 
Kentucky had done and to seek the repeal of the law in Congress. In 1799, after facing 
harsh criticism by the other states, Kentucky insisted that nullification was still the 
rightful remedy, but now asserted that this remedy would only be accomplished 
collectively by the “sovereignties” that formed the Constitution.  Kentucky, under the 
guidance of Jefferson, committed itself to a political solution.  It sought to change the 
laws while conducting its opposition from within the Constitution.  An appeal to the 
states was Kentucky’s best hope to restore the constitutional order without a risky 
recourse to its full natural rights.151 
 According to H. Jefferson Powell, nineteenth-century America would recognize 
“The revolution of 1800…as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that 
of 1776 was in its form….  The nation declared its will by dismissing functionaries of 
one principles and electing those of another.”152  Despite Federalist denunciations, the 
presidential election of 1800 vindicated Republican principles.  Jefferson’s victory 
established the doctrines of strict construction, reserved rights of the states, and compact 
theory of the Constitution as the orthodox reading of the Constitution.153  The ideas of 
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state rights remained the lingua franca of constitutional theory, long after the decline of 
the Jeffersonian political dynasty.  State resolutions became a major element in 
constitutional deliberation as the states attempted to construe the Constitution to protect 
and support their reserved rights.  State rights did not mandate that the states should 
dominate the central government.  Jefferson’s Inaugural Address of 1801 directly 
supported “the preservation of the general government, in its whole constitutional vigour, 
as the sheet anchor of our peace at home, & safety abroad.”154  Yet for most of domestic 
policy, he insisted that the states were the proper constitutional vehicle of government.  
“The support of the states governments in all their rights, [is] the most competent 
administrators for our domestic concerns, & the surest bulwarks against anti-republican 
tendencies.”155  The states, then, assumed the task of policing the “partly national and 
partly federal” character of The Union. 
The importance of the resolutions in constitutional history stretches far beyond 
the immediate context. With the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, Madison and 
Jefferson had given all the states invaluable tools to define and defend the boundaries of 
their rights.  The controversy surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts was incorporated 
into the rich political grammar of association and constitutional deliberation.  It 
encouraged states to both interpose and/or nullify when faced with a federal transgression 
of constitutional limits.   The differences between Madison’s interposition and Jefferson’s 
nullification proved significant and led to major discrepancies between proponents of 
state rights in antebellum political theory. Madison’s project of cooperative state review 
more closely followed the Constitution by using the states to propose amendments or a 
                                                 






constitutional construction.  Jefferson certainly wanted the support of the other states, and 
understood that a political solution would provide much greater security.  But he 
theorized that any state could act alone when the government assumed a new power not 
delegated to it.  
The differences between Madison’s theory of collective state action and 
Jefferson’s theory of nullification by individual sovereign states were significant.  By the 
Jacksonian era, they would serve as two starkly different expressions of the federal 
principle.  Jefferson’s doctrine created a thorny epistemological problem.  If the states are 
divided, then who decides whether the assumption of a power by the government was 
undelegated?  In a partisan political and sectional environment, the states would by nature 
disagree with one another.  Nationalists seized upon this disagreement to insist that 
constitutional deliberation between the states could never be decisive.  Meanwhile state 
resistance became a widely used tactic.  Madison’s justification for limited interposition 
influenced the tactic of resistance to federal authority from New Hampshire to 
Wisconsin, while Jefferson’s theories were cited by South Carolina to justify nullification 
and secession.  The language of association became deeply embedded in the cause of 




Chapter 3:  “No Common Umpire”:  Sovereignty and 
Constitutional Interpretation  (1777-1812) 
 
 
Historians of federalism need to take into account the connections between the 
doctrine of the law of nations and development of the theory of sovereignty as they 
developed in the early Republic.  The conventional nationalist argument eschews the 
literature on the law of nations and assumes that sovereignty naturally coheres in a 
powerful centralized state.  Applied to the early Republic, contemporary nationalists 
assume that Jefferson and Madison re- introduced the idea that states were sovereign 
parties to a constitutional compact into the Constitution as a political response to the 
Alien and Sedition Acts.1  The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, then, became the basis 
for the development of a states rights tradition employed, first by New England (1804-
1814) and then in the South, through the work of John Taylor of Caroline, St. George 
Tucker, and John C. Calhoun, and fully tested in the Nullification Crisis (1828-33) and 
then implemented in 1861.   
 In contrast, I am advancing a different argument about the idea of sovereignty as 
it developed in the North. The question of sovereignty arose during the American 
Revolution, not in 1798.   The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions played a vital role in 
the transformation of the revolutionary grammar of association.  Yet the American 
conversation on the nature of sovereignty largely took place within a context of 
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principle more sensitive to its relationship to the federal principle, see Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: 




international ideas.  The law of nations, social compact, Westphalian sovereignty, a 
distinctly American way of thinking about “the state” called the Philadelphia system, and 
popular sovereignty all shaped the way that Americans thought about state rights.  
The theory of sovereignty, as it developed in the early Republic was rooted in two 
European ideas: the social contract and the law of nations.  Chapters one and two dealt 
extensively with the nature and rights of consent that states and citizens held under social 
contract theory.  This chapter will explore how American ideas of sovereignty derived 
from the law of nations.  American constitutional actors lacked a clear means of 
distinguishing where the sovereignty of the state governments ended, and where the 
sovereign power of the national government began.  To the extent that states were 
sovereign, they operated within a community of sovereigns (The Union) which they 
understood and analyzed through the law of nations.   
This chapter will also focus on the resolutions of state legislatures as evidence of 
how Americans forged these concepts into their own theory of sovereignty. In particular 
it will examine who had jurisdiction over admiralty court cases between the Revolution 
and the War of 1812 and examine the development of the state legislative remonstrance 
and resolution as a tool for constitutional deliberation and dissent.  State legislatures 
believed they could interpret the Constitution with authority because sovereignty had not 
been vested wholly in the general government.  The division of authority over the 
Constitution reflected the division of government itself between national and federal 
elements—a division that reflected the multi- faceted character of American association.  
As both nation and the states asserted their respective right to construe the Constitution in 




umpire” to adjudicate their dispute with the federal government.  They hoped that the 
states together might act, just as sovereigns acted jointly under the law of nations, to 
determine constitutional meaning. In this contested legal terrain, Americans 
conceptualized their own theory of sovereignty. 
Theories of Sovereignty 
The early American theory of sovereignty was profoundly influenced by 
European social and political thought, even as Americans developed the European idea of 
sovereignty in new directions. By the American Revolution, Americans already had a 
highly articulated theory of association.  As discussed in chapter one, Americans 
embraced a distinct expression of contract theory, blending the Lockean idea of the rule 
of law and the early modern idea of the social compact. Unlike early modern European 
theorists influenced by Jean Bodin, Americans did not believe that sovereignty was 
indivisible or absolute.  They also rejected traditional and paternalist theories of a 
sovereign who ruled by divine right (Charles I) or the desperate consensus of the 
oppressed (the Hobbesian Leviathan).  Americans had clearly separated the government, 
based upon a civil compact and operating under the rule of law, from sovereignty, which 
was rooted in the people and society. Like Althusius and Grotius, they believed 
sovereignty was inalienably vested in the people.  To the extent that government 
exercised sovereignty, it was “with usufruct only.”2 
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For the purposes of this essay, Daniel Philpott’s definition of sovereignty is the 
most helpful: sovereignty is the “supreme authority within a territory.”3  This definition 
encompasses the relationship between the sovereign and the ruled in the idea of authority.  
Second, not all authority could be said to be sovereign.  Although teachers have 
pedagogical authority over their students they could not be said to possess sovereignty 
over them.4  Third, modern sovereignty varies based upon the territory in which one 
resides.  A British subject had a different kind of sovereign (Crown in Parliament) than 
an Ottoman subject (the Sultan).  Sovereignty has both internal and external faces.  This 
most commonly refers to the authority to govern within a territory (internal), but it also 
includes the ability to control ones borders, and the ability to work with other 
international sovereign powers as legal equals (external).   
Finally, sovereignty encompasses the Westphalian principle of non- interference 
within its own territory.5   The heart of Westphalian system was the direct control that 
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4 Philpott’s use of the term supreme emphasizes the modern character of sovereignty.  Medieval 
sovereignty meant lordship.  It expressed a relationship between the ruler and the ruled, in a never-ending 
chain of being that stretched from the Divine Ruler to the lowest servant.    The Oxford English Dictionary 
(2nd ed.) defines sovereignty as “One who has supremacy or rank above, or authority over, others; a 
superior; a ruler, governor, lord, or master (of persons, etc.).”  Thus William Shakespeare would write The 
Taming of the Shrew, “Thy husband is thy Lord, thy life, thy keeper, Thy head, thy soueraigne.” (Act V. 
Scene ii. 147). The husband, in relation to his wife was said to have sovereign, supreme power, while the 
husband himself was subject to the sovereignty of his lord.  Usually the term was used to refer to the 
crowned monarch as in the “dread sovereign lord King James” of the Mayflower compact. 
 
5 Philpott, chapter 2; and Stephen D. Krassner, Sovereignty:  Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 9-25. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) was designed to secure the peace of Europe 
against a generation of religious war.  Previously, sovereignty was best understood as relational.  It 
expressed the supremacy of one person in a relationship over another.  Thus a married woman in Mainz, 
might have simultaneous loyalties to the Holy Roman Emperor, the Archbishop of Mainz, the pope, and her 
husband, each of which she might refer to as her sovereign, depending on the context.  Sovereignty was 
diffuse and did not neatly reflect territorial boundaries.  The Peace of Westphalia divided up Europe into 
territorial sovereignties, so that Protestants could worship under the protection of the state, without outside 
interference.  The Holy Roman Empire itself shifted from a diffuse, theoretically sovereign body, to a 




rulers were given over domestic institutions, free from outside interference, so that in the 
realm of a prince, people could practice their faith without interference from a sovereign 
emperor or church.  Westphalian sovereignty meant “the exclusion of external actors 
from domestic authority configurations.”6   
Americans seeking European wisdom on sovereignty and the state were 
particularly influenced by two eminent theorists: Christian Wolff and Emmerich de 
Vattel.  While Wolff and Vattel had little influence on the ideas of social compact and 
sovereignty in the American Revolution, they became prominent sources of republican 
political theory in the Early Republic. Wolff and Vattel dealt with the same issue: the 
basis for a law of nations that could govern the behavior of sovereign states.  Wolff’s Jus 
gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (1749) was slow to be translated and had little 
direct impact.  His influence reached the United States because his ideas were analyzed 
and contested by Vattel’s Law of Nations (1758), first translated into English in 1760.  
Wolff worked in the traditional, scholastic mode of Aristotelian natural law.  
International society existed for the good of the whole, to “give mutual assistance in 
perfecting itself and its condition.7  This “civitas maxima” or great republic8 had the right 
to enforce a normative law of nations on its members because the good of its citizens was 
                                                 
6 The heart of the system was the direct control that rulers were given over domestic institutions, free from 
outside interference, so that in the realm of a prince, people could practice their faith without interference 
from a sovereign emperor or church.  According to Krassner, Westphalian sovereignty meant “the 
exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations.” (Krassner, 21).  Krassner is quick to 
note that this principle was frequently violated in practice.  For instance, until the Seventh International 
Conference of American States (1933), the United States refused to accept that the principle of Westphalian 
non-intervention in Latin America. 
 
7 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, “Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Republicanism,” The 
American Journal of International Law 88 (1994): 285. 
 
8 This assumes the translation of civitas as republic, which is too loose a translation.  Civitas is the Latin 
equivalent of the Greek politea, connoting a species of voluntary association that it treated as a 




the good of the whole world.  “Sovereignty rests with the whole, which in the present 
instance is the human race divided into people and nations.”9  The people of the earth 
possess only a theoretical sovereignty; justice must be pursued by rules on their behalf 
through reasonable application of natural law.  According to Vattel, “The will of nations 
[is]… that which they agree upon if following the leadership of nature, they use right 
reason.”10 
 Vattel developed Wolff’s doctrine in a thoroughly modern direction.  He 
abandoned Aristotelian natural law as the source of the law of nations.  Like Hobbes, he 
grounded law in modern natural right.  The normative law of sovereigns could be found 
in their patterns of action and the treaties they signed.  Europe was thus not a republic, 
but a community of nations in a state of nature.  Vattel explained, “I find the fiction of 
such a republic neither reasonable nor well enough founded to deduce wherefrom the 
rules of a law of nations at once universal in character, and necessarily accepted by 
sovereign states.  I recognize no other natural society than that which nature has set up 
among men in general.”11   
 The differences between Wolff and Vattel were differences that the Americans 
disputed among themselves.  Both espoused a kind of sovereignty in the people.  Wolff 
used it to argue for a universal sovereignty of the people.  Many Americans, like the 
Federalist Nathaniel Chipman, followed in his interest in natural law and the sovereignty 
of the people. Vattel stressed that the sovereignty of a people, transferred directly to 
particular governments.  He emphasized the sovereign independence of the state, 
                                                 
9 Onuf, 286. 
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constrained by the positive treaty law and by conventional practice, but not by an 
international civil society.  The autonomous, capable sovereign power had much to attract 
republican American commentators and lawyers who sought to buttress the idea of an 
absolute sovereign, either a state government’s internal autonomy in a Westphalian sense, 
or the absolute powers of the Federal Government in foreign policy and war powers. 
At the same time that the U.S. embraced government by the consent of the people, 
Europe was repudiating much of revolutionary, social contract theory.  “By the turn of 
the nineteenth century, Europe was repudiating the core principles of the federal union 
and an international civil society ruled by natural law.  As the violence and warfare 
incited by the French Revolution swept across Europe, the last vestiges of Wolff’s civitas 
maxima dissolved. Europe during the Napoleonic wars seemed more a war of Hobbesian 
sovereigns than a republic “writ large” and took increasingly from Vattel a perspective on 
international law that stressed the autonomy of sovereign states.  “With the reaction 
against eighteenth century political theory came the development of a doctrine of the 
organic and personal nature of the state, which was impossible under the dominance of 
the revolutionary idea.”12  From within this European framework of thought, the 
American nation has come to be seen as a “stateless” political community.  For 
Europeans, the normative condition of politics was perceived to be the organic, Hegelian 
nation in which society and the state are collapsed into a centralized bureaucratic 
apparatus.  Sovereignty was the state.13 
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13 The question of locating political supremacy has become hotly contested today, as it once at the turn of 
the nineteenth century.  Harold Laski wished, “it would be of lasting benefit to political science if the 
whole concept of sovereignty were surrendered.” (Quoted in F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 211-216.  Originally in Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics, (1941)).  




For many contemporary scholars share this European perspective that “the 
dominant units [of political life] are states, which hierarchy order, a monopoly on 
legitimate violence, and sovereignty.”14  Because the federal government of the early 
Republic did not have the police power, or undivided sovereignty, they have frequently 
tried to solve the problem of “Why there is no state in America?”15  In fact, as Daniel 
Deudney argues, the “Philadelphia System” of the pre-Civil War period was designed as 
a counter to the European models.  It sought to preserve the states against a consolidation 
of sovereign authority like that of Imperial Britain.  The Constitution also aimed at 
preventing a re- lapse into the disorder of confederal union.  According to Deudney, the 
Philadelphia system cannot be understood in terms of the European “Westphalian” 
system.  Westphalian analysis vested sovereignty either in an autonomous sovereign state 
or a confederation of sovereign states—it did not recognize anything in between them.  
Americans did not so much divide their sovereignty, which was vested in the people of 
                                                                                                                                                 
by Benedict Anderson’s path-breaking deconstruction of “nation,” but more especially by the end of the 
cold war, scholars have come to question whether the sovereign nation state is anything more than a 
historically contingent construction. 
 Stephen Krassner challenges scholars that sovereignty is nothing more than “organized hypocrisy.”  He 
contends that despite a resilient Westphalian idea of sovereignty, nations have never completely respected 
one another’s internal sovereignty.  “The European Union, the practices of international finance 
institutions, some minority rights agreements after Versailles, and treaties providing for religious toleration 
in Europe such as the peace of Westphalia have all involved invitations to compromise Westphalian 
Sovereignty.”  (Krassner, 238). 
 
14 Daniel Deudney, “The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and the Balance of Power in the 
American States-Union,” International Organization, (1995): 192.  This captures the approach of the realist 
school of international relations. In framing their definitions, liberal idealists have been more concerned 
with what a state ought to do  
 
15 In classic terms Hegel had insisted that the United States were not a “Real State,” and contemporary 
scholars from Walter Dean Burnham to Allen Steinberg have agreed.  Recent scholarship has established 
that American government was “qualitatively different” from the patterns of Europe, but should not be 
recognized as stateless.  The best treatment of this literature can be found in William J. Novak’s The 
People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century America, (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996), 1-9ff; and Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The 





the United States, but they divided the authority to wield that sovereignty between state 
and central governments.  Essential aspects of this sovereignty, including the right to 
make war, were in part reserved to the state governments to prevent consolidation of 
authority into one government.  Thus, Deudney asserts that the second amendment and 
state control over their militias helped to prevent the consolidation of the power to make 
war exclusively in the federal government.  The resulting system is not anarchy, as it 
might have appeared to European visitors, but “negarchy;” it is not the absence of 
government, but a government whose authorities were designed to negate its own 
strengths, to keep the balance between confederation and nation.16 
Many American observers were highly critical of European-style sovereign 
autonomy.  Such was the view of Joel Barlow, who stressed, “there is no absolute 
independence of nations more than individuals.”17 The international community could 
then access natural law to rule for the good of the whole community.   Many Americans 
still operated within the normative framework of association and Aristotelian reasoning.  
Particularly with respect to the law, they endeavored by right reason and a close analysis 
of constitutional texts and the principles of international justice to apply the law to the 
problem of inter-state action.18  But despite their disagreement with Vattel over the nature 
                                                 
16 Deudney, 195-210. “What most strikes the European who travels through the United States is the absence 
of what is called among us government or administration.”  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 
Trans.  Harvey C. Mansfield and Deborah Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 67. 
 
17 Joel Barlow, “To his Fellow Citizens of the United States, Letter II: On Certain Political Measures 
Proposed to Their Consideration,” (Philadelphia, 1801) in Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz eds., 
American Political Writing during the Founding Era, 1760-1805 (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983), 1104. 
 
18 Right reason was a term frequently employed in political theory for the exercise of Aristotelian reason to 
discern the natural law.  (See Thomas Aquinas,’ Summa Theologica, Pt I-II, Question 93, Article 3).  Early 
natural law jurisprudence and Nathaniel Chipman’s close analysis in the Principles followed this normative 
line of reasoning.  As Justice Chase reasoned in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 388 (1798), “It is against all reason 




of sovereignty, The Law of Nations provided the most accessible authority on the 
application of the federal principle to international law.  Vattel became the authority on 
the law of nations in the states.19   
American residents of Europe likewise saw the distinctions between the American 
and European conceptual frameworks.  Joel Barlow, longtime observer of French politics, 
recommended that France needed an American-style system of republics.  “For the 
purposes of local or interior legislation and police,” France should be divided into about 
twenty provinces. 
While for the purpose of general legislation, exterior relations defense, canals, roads, and 
every common concern, they should remain concentrated in one great union, or 
community, with a national legislature and executive, restricted in their powers to the 
simple objects of great national interest, which object should be defined with the utmost 
precision in their good constitution.20  
 
Republican government arranged in a federal system proved to be a great advantage to 
Americans.  France should work with the other republics forming nearby in the wake of 
the Revolution and form into a general confederation of republics.21  This American 
federal system of sovereignty was viewed as a clear alternative to the Westphalian 
                                                                                                                                                 
that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our State Governments, amount to a 
prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them.” 
 
19 The Court of Appeals for admiralty under the Continental Congress employed Vattel in Miller v. the Ship 
Resolution, 2 Dall. 1 (1781)) to apply a treaty between Britain and France regarding Dominica to American 
proceedings.  In 1793, then secretary of state Jefferson used Vattel as a buttress for his argument on the 
natural rights of neutral powers.  By 1814, Vattel was everywhere.  In Brown v. U.S., 8 Cranch 110 (1814), 
both the majority and dissenting opinions (by Marshall and Story respectively) made extensive use of 
Vattel.  His theory of autonomous inviolable sovereigns came to exert wide influence in the United States. 
Charles Fenwick, “The Authority of Vattel,” American Political Science Review 7 (1913): 407-413. 
 
20 Joel Barlow, American Political Writing, 1101. 
 
21 Barlow, in fact, presages recent changes in European sovereignty by nearly two hundred years.  His call 
for “a great union of republics, which might assume the name of the United States of Europe and guarantee 
a perpetual harmony among its members” (American Political Writing, 1105) closely mirrors the current 




sovereignty system.  This was a novel idea.  Nathaniel Chipman explained the audacity of 
it:   
… [A] number of integral republics, each claiming and exercising all the powers of 
internal sovereignty, within the limits of their respective jurisdictions, formed into one 
general government, with powers of legislation for all national purposes, and the power 
of exercising all their laws, within the several states, on the individual citizens, and that 
independently of the local authority.  The experiment was new, and the success has 
hitherto exceeded the most sanguine expectation of its advocates.22 
 
So novel was the American experiment that practice forged ahead of theory.  
Americans wrestled in legislature and courts with the implications of what their system of 
sovereignty meant, before the constitutional commentators and political theorists had 
time to meditate on the system.  Between 1790 and 1810 the most important 
developments in the idea of sovereignty were presided over by state legislatures, courts 
sitting in admiralty jurisdiction, and state governors.  They drew upon their revolutionary 
theories of union, compact and association.  Americans also employed the law of nations, 
which explained how Westphalian sovereigns, operating under natural law and treaties, 
ought to behave in the international system.  Applying this model to the Philadelphia 
system, they debated how the states should relate to one another under the federal union. 
Sovereignty and Revolutionary War Jurisdiction 
The influence of the law of nations discourse on sovereignty is particularly 
evident in the debate between the states and the central government over who had 
jurisdiction in the Revolutionary war admiralty cases.  Because admiralty was 
traditionally adjudicated under the law of nations, the states used Vattel to assert their 
own sovereignty within the Philadelphia system.  They sought to protect the internal 
sovereignty they still held by sustaining their Revolutionary War jurisdiction over 
                                                 




admiralty.  In this way, they hoped to sustain their Westphalian sovereignty in the present 
by claiming they had held even greater sovereignty in the past. 
As the last chapter demonstrates, the early process of constitutional development 
produced deep ambiguities about the nature of sovereignty in The Union.  Neither side 
received what they hoped for.  Both believed they had received more than they did 
receive.  Immediately, they took their understanding of the nature of The Union into the 
new federal courts to resolve complex admiralty cases that dated back to the early years 
of the Revolution.  They quickly resorted to historical arguments about the nature of the 
Confederation instead of textual debates about the meaning of the Constitution. 
Admiralty had traditionally been adjudged according to the law of nations, but 
given the collapse of formal authority during the early stages of the Revolution, it was 
unclear where jurisdiction should be vested.  In November 1775, Congress recognized 
that they were already in the midst of naval war with Great Britain and that “the good 
people of these colonies” had already responded by arming ships for self-defense.  Under 
the law of nations, the taking of prizes without authorization from a government was 
considered piracy, so Congress authorized commissions for captains who wished to seize 
British military supplies.  They “recommended to the several state legislatures in the 
United Colonies, as soon as possible, to erect Courts of Justice or give jurisdiction to the 
courts now in being.”23  They assumed the power to grant commissions as part of their de 
facto powers to make war, which they had exercised in a concerted fashion since that 
spring.  Yet Congress recommended that the states create courts to try these cases 
because it lacked the means to establish courts in every major port along the coast.  
Congress at this point was little more than a committee of public safety; they lacked the 
                                                 




authority to govern at a local level.  But so that Congress might have oversight over the 
cases, they permitted an appeal to “the Congress, or such persons as they shall appoint for 
the trial of appeals.”24 
Many of the states subsequently organized admiralty courts and began to hear 
cases as the prizes came into port.  Generally, the states mandated that juries should 
determine the facts of the cases, and they provided for an appeal to Congress in the 
language similar to the Congressional resolution.  In January of 1777, Congress finally 
organized a committee to hear appeals from admiralty cases in the states.25  Conflicts 
inevitably arose between the proceedings of the states, who increasingly thought of 
themselves as sovereign and who conducted their trials by jury, and the Court of Appeals 
in Congress, who sought to secure the interests of The Union over the interests of the 
particular states.  That the appeal was initially heard by Congressmen, and not a judge or 
jury, was the subject of much dissention by states who were jealously fighting for the 
right to a jury trial against the crown.26 
Two admiralty cases in particular stand out as examples of this growing tension 
over sovereignty: Houston v. the Sloop Active in Pennsylvania, and Treadwell and 
Penhallow v. Brig Susanna in New Hampshire.  Both cases were complicated by the 
presence of claimants from outside their respective states.  The libel for the “Active” was 
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25 Penhallow v. Doane, 60. 
 
26 Jury trials had been considered a fundamental element of representative government and a check on an 
unelected, appointed royal judiciary.  Parliament, through the enforcement of The Act of 35 Henry VIII had 
asserted the right to try the violation of the Townsend Duties in England, removing the cases from the 
protections offered by colonial juries.  (1767)  Later Parliament included in the coercive acts a provision 
removing the trials for British officials accused of capital crimes from Massachusetts.  (John Phillip Reid, 
Constitutional History of the American Revolution, abridged ed., (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 
1995), 69-70. 90).  For these reasons, local jury trials were considered a fundamental legal right to 





contested between the State of Pennsylvania and the owners and crew of the 
“Convention” and the “Le Gerard” on the one hand, and a group of seamen, lead by 
Gideon Olmsted of Connecticut, who had been impressed aboard and then mutinied 
against their captors.  Both claimed the right to the proceeds of the vessel.  At the trial in 
Philadelphia under Judge Ross on November 4, 1778, the jury did not make a statement 
of the facts, but awarded one quarter of the prize to Olmsted and the rest was to be 
divided between the original claimants.27  Subsequent debate reveals that they did not 
believe that Olmsted had been in full possession of the ship and thought that the mutiny 
was a British ruse.  Olmsted enlisted the aid of Connecticut native and military governor 
of Philadelphia Benedict Arnold in return for a share of the claim.  Arnold wrote to 
Congress that Judge Ross intended to secure possession of the money, whatever the 
decision of Congress.  Ultimately, he suggested that the State of Pennsylvania would put 
the money in its treasury in order to secure it from Congress.28  When faced with a prize 
worth almost 50,000 pounds for the cargo alone,29 Pennsylvania acted swiftly to preserve 
its interests. 
Olmsted explained his subsequent course of action: 
We appealed from [the Pennsylvania] Court to the Congress December 18th.  It was tried 
before the Congress.  They gave the whole to use and gave orders to Judge Ross to order 
the money to be paid to us.  Judge Ross got all the money into his hands and refused to 
                                                 
27 The best sources on the long and interesting dispute between Gideon Olmsted and Pennsylvania are 
Margaret Ruth Reilly Kelly, “State Rebellion, State’s Rights, and Personal Politics: Pennsylvania and the 
Olmsted Case (U.S. v. Peters), 1778-1810,” Ph.D. diss. (State University of New York at Buffalo, 2000);  
Kenneth W. Treacy, “The Olmstead Case, 1778-1809,” Western Political Quarterly 10 (1957): 675-691; 
William O. Douglas, “Interposition and the Peters Case, 1778-1809,” Stanford Law Review 9 (1956): 3-12; 
and Edward Dumbauld, “Olmstead’s Claim: The Case of the Mutinous Mariner,” Supreme Court Historical 
Society (1977): 52-58, 69. 
 
28 Benedict Arnold to Congress, January 3, 1779, in Houston v. the Sloop Active file, Records of the Court 
of Appeals on Cases of Capture, case 39, National Archives. 
 




pay us.  All the reason he gave was that Congress had no right to try a case that had been 
settled by the admiralty court of Pennsylvania.30 
 
The Committee of Appeals instructed Matthew Clarkson as the marshal to keep the 
money, pending further instructions from Congress.  Clarkson respected the authority of 
his own state and the court that employed him more than the instructions of the 
Continental Congress.  He gave the money from the sale of the cargo to the court, instead 
of to Olmsted. Judge Ross passed the money on to David Rittenhouse, the state treasurer, 
who gave a bond back to the court. 31   
 Under the circumstances, Congress was powerless.  Having declared that Olmsted 
and his men were entitled to the entire prize, the committee could not enforce the decree.  
They were unwilling to charge Judge Ross and Clarkson with contempt, “lest 
consequences might ensue at this juncture dangerous to the public peace of the United 
States.  [We] will not proceed further in this affair nor hear any appeal until the authority 
of the court shall be so settled as to give full efficacy to their decrees and processes.”32  
Congress tried to mediate the dispute with Pennsylvania, but Pennsylvania insisted the 
result of the jury was sacrosanct under common law.  They refused to overturn it.33   
The sole right of Pennsylvania to hear the case was loudly contested in Congress, 
but to no practical avail.  A committee to examine the powers of the Committee of 
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31 Matthew Clarkson to Congress, January 4, 1779, in Houston v. the Sloop Active file, Records of the 
Court of Appeals on Cases of Capture, case 39, National Archives.  See also Douglas, 6. 
 
32 Decree of the Committee on Appeals, January 19, 1779, in Houston v. the Sloop Active file, Records of 
the Court of Appeals on Cases of Capture, case 39, National Archives. 
 
33 “It is the proper business, and the strict right of juries to establish facts; yet the Court of Appeals took 
upon them to violate this essential part of jury trial, and to reduce, in effect, this mode of jurisprudence to 
the course of the civil law; a proceeding to which the State of Pennsylvania cannot yield.”  Pennsylvania 




Appeals was formed and claimed that Congress did have the power to examine the facts 
in Jury cases.  It stressed that the rights of appeal were not dependent upon an act of 
Congress but on the nature of the authority given to Congress.  Possessing “the sovereign 
supreme power of war and peace,” the committee claimed that Congress could “compel a 
just and uniform execution of the law of nations.”  Appeal to Congress was necessary so 
the actions of juries would not violate the rights of foreign powers (or implicitly, the 
rights of a citizen of Connecticut).34  However, in 1779, Congress lacked the political 
power to enforce a claim that it possessed the sovereign power to make war.  That 
Pennsylvania owned a share of the “Convention,” and was able to successfully defend its 
interpretation suggests that it possessed de facto sovereignty in admiralty cases.  Because 
it did not consider that the right of jury trial had been respected (though this seems a mere 
justification), Pennsylvania ignored the ruling of the Committee on Appeals. 
 The case against the brig “Susanna” proceeded in a similar fashion.  A group of 
twelve citizens of New Hampshire lead by John Penhallow owned the brigantine 
“M’Clary” which in October of 1777 captured the “Susanna” under a commission from 
Congress.  They duly filed a libel and were contested by three citizens of Massachusetts 
led by Elisha Doane who claimed “Susanna” as their ship.  Like in Houston v. Active, the 
state court ruled in favor of Penhallow on December 16, 1777.  Doane attempted to 
appeal to Congress but was “refused by said court because it was contrary to the law of 
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 Congress consistently maintained that admiralty trials should be conducted “according to the usage of 
the law of nations and not by jury.”  In establishing a Special Court of Appeals in 1780 for capture cases, 
Congress explicitly reaffirmed this principle.  (Journals of the Continental Congress, 16:61-62).  
Pennsylvania, together with New Hampshire and Massachusetts unsuccessfully tried to insert the right of 
jury trials into federal admiralty courts.  Later in 1780, Pennsylvania abandoned jury trials in its own 




the State.”35  Doane then appealed to the Superior Court of New Hampshire, lost and in 
October of 1778 petitioned Congress for an appeal. The Court of Appeals ultimately ruled 
in favor of Doane in 1783, but just as in Houston v. Active, the decree was never 
enforced. 
 Revolutionary admiralty disputes demonstrated just how fragile co-operation 
between state and federal authority could be.  States readily insisted that due process 
should be employed in these cases and interposed the sovereign power of the states to 
protect their rights.  The ambiguity in jurisdiction had proved to be intractable for The 
Union.   When the Articles of Confederation were ratified in 1781, Congress gained 
constitutional authority over foreign relations and the power to make war, except over the 
militia and naval vessels necessary for defense.  The states retained control over these, to 
be used in cases of invasion and piracy.  The United States also assumed exclusive 
authority over establishing courts and hearing appeals in cases of capture.  No one 
contested that new (post-1781) admiralty cases belonged under federal jurisdiction.  But 
difficult cases initiated before 1781 continued to be bitterly contested under the creation 
of a new independent judiciary system in the Constitution of 1787.  The states continued 
to use their power to protect their residual jurisdiction in the pre-1781 cases.   
Sovereignty in the 1790s:  Georgia and New Hampshire 
The creation of the federal republic fundamentally changed the forum in which 
arguments over sovereignty were understood.  State resistance to federal authority had 
enjoyed a decade of success.  Legislatures were accustomed to criticizing and resisting 
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the authority of the Congressional admiralty jurisdiction through the Confederation 
period.  Without clear precedent, no one in 1787 knew how the states would react to a 
truly independent judiciary.    
 The strategy of state reaction that shaped the subsequent actions of the states was 
employed decisively in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793).  When a citizen of South Carolina 
sued Georgia in federal court over Revolutionary War debts, Georgia refused to appear, 
claiming immunity as a sovereign state.  The Georgia legislature formulated its position.  
To accept the suit would “effectively destroy the retained sovereignty of the states, and 
would actually tend in its operation to annihilate the very shadow of state government, 
and to render them tributary corporations to the government of the United States."36 
Georgia did not rely on a position of absolute sovereignty, but they believed that what 
sovereignty they possessed placed them in a position of a Westphalian sovereign vis-à-vis 
an external lawsuit.   
Georgia’s position proved difficult to sustain before the Supreme Court.  The 
Constitution (Art. III, sec. 2) explicitly gave the federal courts jurisdiction over disputes 
between one state and the citizen of another.   Justice Iredell, dissenting, relied upon the 
law of nations rather than the Constitution in his defense of Georgia.  Iredell did not 
defend the absolute sovereignty of Georgia, but only that sovereignty not surrendered to 
The Union.  He avoided the constitutional issue by insisting that the text in question 
required a congressional act to implement it.  In the absence of such an act, he argued the 
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction and the law of nations applied.   
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The majority of justices, however, disputed that reserved sovereignty provided 
immunity for suits.  Justice Blair argued that by ratifying the Constitution, Georgia 
accepted the jurisdiction of the court and, “in that respect, [has] given up her 
sovereignty.”  The law of nations was not the authority here, but the Constitution.37  
Justice Cushing dismissed the idea of sovereignty as a distraction.  “All states are 
corporations or bodies politic.  The only question is, what are their powers?”  He insisted 
that the people had granted this division of powers and created an independent judiciary 
to enforce it.38 Wilson, in his opinion, stressed that the people of the United States, under 
the Constitution, and not the global society of international law, were the source of legal 
authority.  Wilson, Cushing and Blair downplayed the idea that Westphalian sovereignty 
was relevant in order to reinforce the authority of the judiciary to hear cases under the 
people’s Constitution. 
The opinions of Chief Justice Jay, in contrast, addressed the sovereignty question 
directly.  Instead of applying the text of the Constitution, he stressed that the American 
people were historically a people before the Declaration of Independence.  This people, 
and not a sovereign monarch, were the source of The Union.  According to Jay, the idea 
of sovereignty advanced by Georgia was entirely monarchical.  “That system 
contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and privileges; it is easy to perceive that 
such a sovereign could not be amenable to a court of justice, or subjected to judicial 
control and actual restraint.” Under this system, no sovereign could be sued.  But Georgia 
missed the “distinction between the prince and the subject.  No such ideas obtain here; at 
the time of the revolution; sovereignty developed on the people.  [They are] … joint 
                                                 
37 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419 (1793), 452. 
 




tenants in the sovereignty.”39  As free and sovereign citizens, then, the people may sue a 
state. 
Despite this emphatic challenge to sovereign statehood by the Supreme Court, 
Georgia’s construction of the Constitution ultimately prevailed in the state legislatures.  
The states immediately reacted to the decision and collectively lobbied Congress for an 
amendment excluding the suability of the state.  The September session of the 
Massachusetts General Court denounced the right to sue a state as “unnecessary and 
inexpedient, and in its exercise dangerous to the peace, safety and independence of the 
several states.”40  Virginia feared the tendency toward “general consolidation of these 
confederated Republicks.”41 The shape of the resistance was clear.  Massachusetts passed 
a resolution instructing its Senators in Congress and imploring its representatives to seek 
a constitutional amendment.42   It was passed in the next session of Congress and ratified 
by three-quarters of the states on February 7, 1795.43 
A mood of uncertainty about the nature of the federal jurisdiction prevailed during 
the 1790s.  Many plaintiffs with outstanding verdicts that had been ignored by state 
courts filed suit again hoping they could attain a better result.  In 1792, Gideon Olmsted 
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filed suit again in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County against Judge Ross’ 
executors and won when they failed to appear.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania again struck down Olmsted’s appeal, by challenging the jurisdiction of the 
Lancaster Court to decide an admiralty case.  Chief Justice M’Kean emphasized again 
that the ruling of the jury—that Olmsted was not in possession of the ship when the 
“Convention” arrived—was not revisable on appeal under common law.  However, the 
other opinions revealed dissatisfaction with this line of argument.  Shippen agreed that 
the Lancaster court had no jurisdiction, but defended the right of “the sovereign power of 
the nation, vested by the joint and common consent of the people and the states of The 
Union with the exclusive rights of war and peace (!),” and the right of higher courts to 
hear an appeal on the facts of an admiralty case.  Justice Yates was also inclined to grant 
power to the Continental Congress commensurate with the objects of The Union.  Even 
on the state courts, advocates of federal jurisdiction could be found.44 
The executors of Elisha Doane also availed themselves of the federal courts in 
1793 in their attempt to enforce the Congressional Court of Appeals decision in 
Penhallow v. Brig Susanna.  In the New Hampshire District Court the issue hung on 
whether New Hampshire was a Westphalian sovereign.  Justice Blair, riding on Circuit 
Court, ruled for Doane’s executors.  He placed the issue of the law of nations clearly into 
the case.  Despite the claim of sovereignty for New Hampshire, Blair argued, the law of 
nations still applied, even before the Declaration of Independence.  “Was it not necessary 
in such a war, as in any contending nations, that the law of nations should be observed, 
and that those who had conducting of it, should be armed with every authority for 
preventing injuries to neutral powers, and their subjects, and even cruelty to the 
                                                 




enemy?”45  At any rate, Blair believed Congress possessed sufficient war powers to try 
admiralty cases.  He ruled for Doane. 
The New Hampshire Legislature reacted to the ruling with alarm.  In keeping with 
the revolutionary tradition of protest and remonstrance and the effective campaign that 
was being waged for the Eleventh Amendment, they petitioned to Congress.  New 
Hampshire argued that it possessed original independence prior to 1781, and while it 
accepted the authority of Congress now, it claimed prior authority for itself.  In particular, 
it was alarmed that the courts might retroactively declare that they had a sovereignty, 
which they did not then possess.  Finally, it asserted the need for state government to 
prevail.  “A declaration by any body whatever contrary thereto is subversive of the 
principles of the Revolution; unsettling all of the proceeding of the State governments 
prior to the existence of the Constitution.”  New Hampshire firmly proclaimed its loyalty 
to the true idea of union of strong states.46 
In Penhallow v. Doane (1795), the U.S. Supreme Court considered detailed 
arguments from the appellants and respondent on the law of nations.  Penhallow’s 
attorneys took the line advanced by Georgia in Chisholm, which was being vindicated by 
ratifying state legislators, that New Hampshire, at least until 1781, was a Westphalian 
sovereign.  They rested this argument on an argument from the law of nations.  “War,” 
the appellant argued citing Vattel, “is that state in which a nation prosecutes its rights by 
force.”  New Hampshire in 1777 had been vigorously engaged in war against Britain, and 
had not surrendered exclusive power to Congress.  “At this period the states must have 
been possessed of individual sovereignty; for, the sovereign power alone can raise 
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troops.”47  New Hampshire, in this argument, delegated to Congress the power to grant 
commissions, but retained the right to hear the cases.  “A court of appeal,” the appellant 
contended, “is not a necessary incident of sovereignty.”48   
The respondent for Doane offered a counter argument, also from the authority of 
Vattel.   
Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without any dependence on a 
sovereign power, is a sovereign state.  In every society there must be a sovereignty. … 
The powers of war form an inherent characteristic of national sovereignty; and it is not 
denied, that Congress possessed those powers.49 
 
Both arguments failed to appreciate the nature of the Philadelphia system as it 
developed between 1776 and 1787.  The appellant assumed that because New Hampshire 
exercised some war powers, it was essentially sovereign in 1781.  The respondent offered 
a similar argument that because the nation possessed the war powers, it was the sovereign 
power.    By attempting to claim Westphalian sovereignty for themselves alone, each 
argument missed the character of sovereignty as it was practiced.  During the revolution, 
events disclosed that Congress possessed de facto powers over war making, foreign 
policy, and matters of international law.  Yet the states retained control over the local 
courts and local military affairs.  The Framers strengthened the power of the National 
government decisively in 1787 by founding the Constitution with the consent of the 
people and granting the government power over the people.  However, they preserved the 
power of the states by strictly enumerating the power of the national government and 
reserving the rest to the states.  Both sides in Penhallow forgot that under the 
Philadelphia system, neither held absolute sovereignty.  Sovereignty was located in the 
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people who divided the exercise of sovereign power between the states and central 
government.   
The Court’s decision for Doane in the Penhallow case hinged on the question “did 
the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction in this case?”  As Justice Patterson opined, the 
crisis of the revolutionary war disclosed the real national authority of Congress. 
The powers of Congress were revolutionary in their nature, arising out of events, 
adequate to every national emergency, and co-extensive with the object to be attained.  
Congress was the general, supreme and controuling council of the nation, the centre of 
union, the centre of force, and the sun of the political system.  To determine what their 
powers were, we must inquire what powers they exercised.  Congress raised armies, fitted 
out a navy, and prescribed rules for their government: Congress conducted all military 
operations both by land and sea:  Congress emitted bills of credit, received and sent 
ambassadors, and made treaties:  Congress commissioned privateers to cruise against the 
enemy, directed what vessels should be liable to capture, and prescribed rules for the 
distribution of prizes.  These high acts of sovereignty were submitted to and acquiesced 
in, and approved of, by the people of America.50   
 
Patterson’s assertion that The Union possessed sovereignty before the Articles of 
Confederation were ratified provided an unequivocal endorsement of national 
sovereignty.  The exercise of powers by Congress demonstrated that the people had 
granted them that authority.  Patterson placed the authority of the Congress on the 
informal, unwritten constitution of its powers, exercised during times of great crisis and 
acquiesced in by the majority of the states.  “Whether that league originated in compact, 
or a sort of tacit consent, resulting from their situation, the exigencies of the times, and 
the nature of the warfare, or from all combined, is utterly immaterial.”  As a member of 
the Congress, the state was bound by the decisions of the majority of the states in foreign 
policy.51 
According to Patterson, New Hampshire stood not as a complete sovereign but as 
one state among other equal states in a Congress where the majority of states bound their 
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actions.  Patterson explained that New Hampshire had even accepted this interpretation 
during the Revolution.  New Hampshire’s claim was decisively damaged by its refusal to 
recognize other states claims.  It had voted with the majority to support Olmsted’s appeal 
against Pennsylvania in the Active case.  Patterson thus suggested that New Hampshire 
had supported the national authority of Congress.  In fact, in matters of admiralty, the 
states still held many sovereign powers, including recognizing prize claims and trying 
admiralty cases.  Patterson deftly switched the discussion of sovereignty from purely 
military matters, in which sovereignty was functionally divided, to matters of foreign 
policy, where international recognition was critical.  Here The Union held primary 
sovereignty and the right to adjudicate the law of nations on equal footing with other 
nations.   
Patterson’s opinion argued from a selective recounting of the powers exercised by 
Congress.  He correctly asserted that sovereignty flowed from the people, but erred when 
he suggested that Congress had been given authoritative admiralty jurisdiction.  New 
Hampshire, Patterson insisted, had acquiesced in Congress’ assumption of national 
authority.  In fact, when Penhallow captured the “Susanna” in 1777, Congress operated 
within a system of voluntary association that left the states the power to manage 
admiralty decisions.  The states had insisted that federal attempts to adjudicate these 
matters were overturning the necessary legal process of a trial by jury.  The people had 
consented to the management of foreign policy by Congress, but they left the powers of 
judiciary and enforcement with the states, assuming that they would virtuously sacrifice 
for the good of the whole.  Patterson had exaggerated the actual authority of Congress 




Deeply disappointed by the result of the case, the New Hampshire legislature 
composed an impassioned second remonstrance “against a violation of state 
independence and unwarrantable encroachment in the courts of the United States.”  They 
refused to accept the idea that their laws might be declared “null and void,” calling it a 
“flagrant insult to the principles of the revolution.” They took great exception to the 
history of sovereignty sketched out by the court.  New Hampshire “cheerfully” admitted 
that Congress possessed legitimate authority now, but objected to the proposition that 
New Hampshire never possessed such authority.  Like Virginia, they saw the tendency 
for consolidation in the influence of the courts.52 
 New Hampshire struggled to find a way to answer the Supreme Court.  Surely 
they hoped that their petition to Congress would be effective, but the language of the 
remonstrance suggests they were aware of the futility of their action.  Like Georgia, they 
turned to Congress in the hope that “the rights of state governments and the interests of 
their citizens will be secured against the exercise of power in a court, or any body of men 
under congress, of carrying into effect an unconstitutional decree of a court instituted by 
a former congress, and which, in its effects, would unsettle property and tear up the laws 
of the federal states.”53  But they stopped short of the interposition intended by the 
Georgia house (but denied by the senate).  New Hampshire instead appealed to Congress 
for the redress of its grievances.  Ultimately, they refused to submit their own laws to 
“the adjudication of any power on earth, while the freedom of the Federal Government 
shall afford any constitutional means of redress.”  The hint of extra-constitutional 
                                                 





resistance here is very faint.  New Hampshire hoped that Congress would redress the 
problem raised by their courts. 
 While New Hampshire had the precedent offered by Georgia’s successful 
challenge to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, they did not have the 
arguments developed by Virginia and Kentucky in 1798.  New Hampshire repeated the 
charge of consolidation, but identified the judiciary rather than the executive as the 
primary threat.  While New Hampshire hinted at resistance only after all constitutional 
measures were exhausted, the Kentucky resolution defended the right of any state to 
“judge for itself, …infractions [as well] as the mode and measure of redress.”54  In 1798, 
Virginia and Kentucky developed compact theory as the basis of The Union more 
explicitly than New Hampshire.  They chose to appeal to the other states, rather than 
simply appeal to Congress.  What Virginia and Kentucky shared with Georgia and New 
Hampshire was a confidence in their original sovereignty and the doctrine of reserved 
powers.   
Interposition in Pennsylvania 
With the increasing power of the Federal Courts demonstrated in Penhallow, 
Gideon Olmsted tried his suit again, this time in the U. S. District Court in Pennsylvania.  
He applied to Judge Peters for a judgment against the executors of David Rittenhouse, 
former state treasurer, who still held the state’s share of the proceeds from the sale of the 
Active in his possession.55  Pennsylvania unsuccessfully tried to apply the Eleventh 
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Amendment to the case to protect their immunity against lawsuit.  Judge Peters followed 
the Penhallow case and applied the Court of Appeals decision.  He ruled that the 
Eleventh Amendment did not apply, because Rittenhouse, and now his heirs, had held 
U.S. securities among their possessions.56  His daughters Elizabeth Serjeant and Esther 
Waters had refused to give these up to the state after the death of their father, and now 
they refused to surrender them to the court. 
 Immediately after Peters found in favor of Olmsted in April of 1803, the 
Pennsylvania legislature acted to protect the interests of the state.  They repeated the 
charge that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction because the Pennsylvania statute 
creating the admiralty court provided that there could be no appeal of facts from a jury.  
Because Congress had presumed to rule by the law of nations, they could legally hear no 
appeal.  Pennsylvania quoted M’Kean’s opinion in Ross v. Rittenhouse that the opinion of 
Congress was “extrajudicial, erroneous and void.”  They found Judge Peters’ opinion 
“null and void,” because the suit had no standing under the Eleventh Amendment.57   
 The legislature authorized two courses of action.  First they commanded the 
Attorney General to get the certificates from Waters and Serjeant so they would clearly 
be in the possession of the state.  Second they “authorized and required” the governor to  
protect the just rights of the State in respect of the premises by any further means and 
measures that he may deem necessary for the purpose, and also to protect [Waters and 
Serjeant] from any process whatever issued out of any federal Court in consequence of 
their obedience to the requisition.58 
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This appears on its face to be an authorization of interposition on behalf of Waters and 
Serjeant from any penalty they might face by the court.  With this assurance, they paid 
the securities into the treasury, and received a bond in return.59 
 The partisan warfare between the Federalist and Republican parties that 
characterized national politics in the 1790s continued to color Pennsylvania politics after 
Jefferson’s victory.  Benjamin Rush commented in 1805 that the state had split into four 
factions: Tories, Federalists, Republicans, and Democrats.  Republicans and Democrats 
had united in favor of Governor McKean and Thomas Jefferson in 1804, and remained 
united against any co-operation with the judiciary in the Olmsted crisis. 60  They had 
struggled against national claims over revolutionary admiralty jurisdiction for over a 
quarter century; now they faced a new challenge from the court.    
In 1805, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously for the Holland Land Company in 
Huidekoper Lessee v. Douglass.61  The dispute was driven by constituent protests, 
regional divisions between the Eastern establishment and Western settlers, and increasing 
tensions between the legislature and Governor M’Kean.  The Democrats moved 
aggressively to protect the rights of improvements of small settlers against the property 
rights of foreign land companies in northwest Pennsylvania, while M’Kean hesitated.   
M’Kean had proved Pennsylvania’s strongest defender of the trial by jury principle in 
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Ross v. Rittenhouse.  But an intense factional struggle destroyed the alliance between the 
Republicans and Democrats.  M’Kean vetoed a legislative resolution denying that the 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction in the Huidekoper case.  He contended that the legislature 
was sitting as a court, substituting their judgment for that of the Supreme Court.  If the 
Pennsylvania legislature could control the actions of the federal government, then “The 
Union can no longer exist but as a name.”62   
 In 1807, Olmsted again brought suit before Judge Peters, to enforce Peters earlier 
judgment.  Waters and Serjeant replied that the securities had been deposited in the 
treasury.  Peters now faced a dilemma.  He could not let the issue lapse, but neither could 
he hope to get the money from Pennsylvania.   
…[F]rom prudential, more than other motives, I deemed it best to avoid embroiling the 
government of the United States and that of Pennsylvania (if the latter government chose 
to do so) on the question which has rested on my single opinion . . . and, under the 
influence of this sentiment, I have withheld the process required.63   
 
Recognizing that Pennsylvania would meet any attempt to obtain the money from the 
treasury with disdain, Peters willingly encouraged an appeal to the Supreme Court by his 
inaction. 
Nevertheless the increasing Republican defense of the federal courts would 
explode in partisan rancor after the Olmsted Crisis had passed.  In the 1808 elections, 
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M’Kean’s Republican faction paid for their stand.64  Simon Snyder’s election promised a 
continuation of legislative resistance to the Federal Courts.65  
 Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in U.S. v. Peters (1809) addressed the three 
major issues of the case: the suability of a state, the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary War 
Court of Claims, and Pennsylvania’s claim of interposition.  Marshall bypassed the 
Eleventh Amendment concerns by arguing that the certificates were technically in the 
possession of Rittenhouse, passing on to his heirs.  The jurisdiction of the Court of 
Claims proved to be a larger issue, but Marshall took the issue to have been decisively 
settled by Penhallow.  Marshall did not pretend to analyze the issue in admiralty, as did 
the Penhallow opinion.  His recounting of the facts closely followed the ruling 
established under the law of nations by the Court of Appeals against the jury verdict.  
Marshall, however, did not consider the law of nations as a source of authority, resting 
his argument instead on the constitutional nature of judicial power.  Finally, Marshall 
addressed the validity of Pennsylvania’s constitutional claim of interposition. 
If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of 
the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution 
itself becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its 
laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals.66   
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Pennsylvania, he charged, was not claiming a universal right to interpose, but only a right 
when the courts went beyond their proper jurisdiction.  It is this right to determine the 
jurisdiction of the courts that Marshall defends as the linchpin of federal jurisdiction.   
If the ultimate right to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union is placed by 
the Constitution in the several State legislatures, this act [Pennsylvania Act of April 
1803] concludes the subject; but if that power necessarily resides in the supreme judicial 
tribunal of the nation, than … the act of Pennsylvania … cannot be permitted to prejudice 
the question.67 
 
In keeping with Marbury v. Madison and the developing doctrine of departmental review, 
Marshall stressed that it was the authority of the federal judiciary to determine its 
jurisdiction under the constitution. 
On February 24, 1809, Governor Snyder received word that the state had lost the 
Supreme Court appeal.  The case had been “brought to a point where the interposition of 
the state becomes necessary.”68  The governor called out a brigade of the state militia led 
by Brigadier General Michael Bright.  Bright posted two noncommissioned officers and 
twelve privates at the Philadelphia home of Waters and Serjeant.69  As Snyder feared, 
federal marshal John Smith tried to serve a warrant to Walters and Serjeant on March 
25.70   
On Saturday, at 12 o’clock, the Marshall of the district of Pennsylvania, went to the place 
of resistance of the representatives of David Rittenhouse, deceased, to endeavor to 
execute the peremptory mandamus.  As he was proceeding towards the door to enter the 
house, his progress was arrested by the  presentation of a well polished bayonet to his 
breast.71 
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Smith proceeded to swear out a posse commitas of several thousand deputies in 
Philadelphia to assemble on April 15th to attempt to serve the warrant again.   
Pennsylvania reacted to the pending confrontation by asserting its position even 
more strongly.  They followed the model of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions in 
sending their resolutions to “her sister states” with a call for constitutional change.  The 
heart of the resolutions is the charge that the federal courts cannot be considered to be an 
impartial judge of their constitutional powers.   
     Resolved, that from the construction the United States’ Courts give to their powers, 
the harmony of the states, if they resist encroachments on their rights, will frequently be 
interrupted; and if to prevent this evil, they should, on all occasions yield to stretches of 
power, the reserved rights of the States will depend on the arbitrary power of the courts.  
     …To suffer the United States courts to decide upon STATE RIGHTS will, from a bias in 
favor of power, necessarily destroy the FEDERAL PART of our government72   
 
The revolutionary republican suspicion of consolidation prevented them from trusting the 
federal judiciary. 
Pennsylvania had a strategy to protect its rights.  First they claimed their own 
rights to defend their authority.  They expressed, “the hope they will not be considered 
acting hostile to the general government, when, as guardians of the state rights, they 
cannot permit an infringement of those rights, by an unconstitutional exercise of power in 
the United States Courts.”73  In keeping with this strategy, Governor Snyder had called 
out the militia to resist the federal marshal.74  Second, they appealed to practical solutions 
to handle the problem.  They asked for commissioners to be appointed to negotiate a 
settlement, a solution that would allow them to negotiate with Congress instead of the 
judiciary.  A negotiated settlement by commissioners would reinforce the sovereign 
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rights of the state under the compact.  Pennsylvania also asked the other states to pursue a 
constitutional amendment that would set up an independent tribunal to adjudicate 
difficult constitutional disputes between the states and the federal government.75 
Faced with a potentially violent confrontation, a nervous militia general, and the 
weary women under virtual house arrest,76 Governor Snyder appealed to his fellow 
Republican, President James Madison.  He appealed to Madison’s reputation as a 
defender of sound constitutional principles, “one who is so intimately acquainted with the 
principles of the federal constitution—and who will discriminate between the opposition 
to the constitution and laws of the United States and that resisting the degree of a judge, 
founded … in a usurpation of power.”  He eagerly hoped that the President could “adjust 
the unhappy collision of two governments, in such a manner as will be equally honorable 
to both.”77  In 1809, the Republicans controlled the Congress and the Presidency and had 
a history of hostility to the judiciary.  Given Snyder’s vigorous support for the Embargo 
and the national Republic cause, he expected a favorable response.   
Before Snyder received his response, the crisis was averted.  Federal marshal 
Smith quietly obtained entry into the rear of the house and served the warrant, at which 
point Waters and Serjeant capitulated.  The Governor ordered the money to be paid for 
their release and the militia was withdrawn.78  Despite direct interposition by the 
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Governor, the Federal judicial process was accomplished.  State Militia leader Michael 
Bright and his men were tried before Federal Justice Bushrod Washington for resisting 
the court.  Bright was ultimately sentenced for three months and fined $200.  Madison 
used his power of pardon to grant them a reprieve and end the crisis.79 
During the Sedition Act Crisis, Madison had insisted that interposition by the 
states was not judicial in character because it opposed the action of Congress and did not 
speak with finality in the same way that a judicial result bound the parties to a suit.  Now 
he stood with the enforcement of judicial decree against the states.  On April 15, Madison 
sent Snyder a formal reply to his plea for support.  He duly submitted the Pennsylvania 
resolutions to Congress, but declined to intervene. 
The executive of the United States, is not only unauthorized to prevent the execution of a 
decree sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, but is expressly enjoined 
by statute, to carry into effect any such decree, where opposition may be made to it.   
 
Instead, he appealed to Snyder’s patriotism.  As governor of Pennsylvania, he could 
decisively end the conflict by ceasing the interposition.80  
Pennsylvanians rejected Madison’s analysis and supported that of Governor 
Snyder.  A Democratic-Republican assembly in Montgomery County retorted: 
holding, as they do, the independence of the state governments to be the firm rock on 
which the federal government is founded; believing that the destruction of the state rights, 
by whatsoever means would be tantamount to a destruction of liberty, cannot see those 
states invaded and be silent.81 
 
A procedural right which was endangered by Parliament during the Revolution, “that the 
finding of the jury shall establish the facts, without reexamination or appeal,” was now 
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endangered again by the “usurpation and injustice” of the judiciary. 82   The meeting 
endorsed the governor’s use of the militia to defend “by the only means in his power, the 
just rights of the state.”  The meeting also ordered its resolutions published in 
sympathetic papers throughout the state in hopes that other political associations 
throughout the states could pressure the Congress to limit the power of judges by 
amendment.83   
Yet as insistent as Pennsylvanians were to defend thier rights, they did not argue 
that sovereignty should be consolidated in the states.  Pennsylvania did not claim, as the 
seceding Southern states of 1861 did, that each state was an entirely sovereign member of 
a confederate union. The state legislature explained, “Whilst [Pennsylvania is] 
contending for the Rights of the state, … it will be attributed to a desire of preserving the 
Federal Government itself, the best feature of which must depend upon keeping up a just 
balance between the general and state governments, as guaranteed by the Constitution.”84  
Pennsylvanians had a duty to both the states and the Union.  The Democratic-Republican 
meeting in Montgomery County proudly proclaimed their citizenship in both 
Pennsylvania and the Union.  It was their equal duty, “to support the constitutions of 
both, believing that by preserving the independence and sovereignty of each inviolate, 
and preventing the exercise of any powers by any branch of either, not expressly 
delegated, we shall insure the greatest permanency to our institutions…”85  Loyalty was 
not divided, or placed solely in a sovereign state or national government.  Pennsylvanians 
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stood loyal to the whole union, ready to both either state and federal government to the 
express boundaries of the Constitution.   
After the crisis had passed, the problem of collective state action once again 
confronted Pennsylvania, as it had confronted several state legislatures before it.  
Although eleven states sent responses, none of them was positive.  They universally 
asserted that Pennsylvania’s course of action was a greater threat to the Union than the 
exercise of authority by the independent federal judiciary.  Virginia, which a decade 
before had been agitating against consolidation, now opposed the idea of an impartial 
tribunal outside of the federal judiciary.  It would “invite, rather than prevent” a collision 
between the federal and state courts.  Instead, they suggested that the independence and 
experience needed for an impartial tribunal could be found in the Supreme Court!86  
Kentucky called the resolutions, “inexpedient.”87  
The debate of 1809 presented a fundamental issue over constitutional 
interpretation.  Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court offered contending claims as to how 
the constitution applies to the judicial branch.  Marshall’s claim that the High Court could 
determine the limits of the judicial power conflicted with Pennsylvania’s assertions of 
reserved sovereign power.  Pennsylvania could make a strong case for a separate 
constitutional mechanism (either in the states or an independent tribunal) that could apply 
the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments against the federal government.  Given the 
republican fear of corruption and consolidation, such an institution might be seen as a 
necessity.  Until the development of a full- fledged theory of nationalism in the “Era of 
Good Feelings,” American political theory stressed divided authority, not 
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incontrovertibly delegated authority to a Westphalian state (either state or federal 
governments).  It should not be surprising then, that states and central governments 
would both try to interpret the Constitution in disputed cases.88  When Pennsylvania 
acted, they did not do so as pure sovereigns, but as “guardians” of state rights.  Within the 
American constitutional framework, its action relied as much upon right reason applied to 
the structure of the Constitution as did Marshall’s defense of the judiciary.  Pennsylvania 
took as its starting point the revolutionary suspicion of power.  It took from Lockean 
contract theory the idea that no man was a fit judge of his own cause.  It is fully 
consistent with this theory that they would try to create a tribunal that could manage the 
dispute between the states and the courts.   
 In fact, the theory and institutional design of the Constitution did not consider that 
the judiciary might be in conflict with the states.  Just as Congress was presumed not to 
need additional checks and balances against the “least dangerous” branch of government 
(i.e. the judiciary),89 so the states, because they possessed an independent power base in 
the people, were not given a veto on federal power.  The Constitution was framed in a 
moment of strength for the states and profound weakness for the Union.  Nationalists had 
feared that granting states power to directly choose senators and not giving Congress a 
veto over state action would be fatal to The Union.  The fear that a counter-weight might 
be needed against an expansive and aggressive national authority certainly did not prevail 
at Philadelphia.  Madison and Marshall could justify judicial review as theoretically 
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necessary because of the supremacy clause and the long line of precedent stretching back 
through Kemper v. Hawkins to Bracton’s Dicta.   
Unfortunately for Pennsylvania, the state replies were correct when they argued 
that the existing judiciary was the best equipped to handle these cases.  No truly 
disinterested tribunal could be found.  The best practical alternative was professional and 
(relatively) independent federal judges.  The Republican administration of Madison 
wisely accepted the authority of the judiciary and rejected Snyder’s plea to join him in 
opposing the judiciary.  The position of the federal judiciary gained acceptance within 
constitutional theory. 
Resistance to Federal Power in New England 
At the same time that Pennsylvania was developing theories of resistance to 
federal power, New England was acquiring a reputation as a hotbed of secessionism.  In 
contrast to Pennsylvania’s well-developed theory of state rights and state constitutional 
deliberation, New England’s approach was driven by political factionalism and separatist 
conspiracies.  Prominent statesmen expressed the fear of secession frequently in the 
correspondence of the period.  Benjamin Waterhouse opined, “The British Party, or 
Tories, have long contemplated a separation of the states and a formation of a northern 
confederacy, the end of which was to be opposition to France and to the Southern states 
and a sort of alliance with England.”90  Pennsylvanian Richard Peters expressed his 
suspicion that Timothy Dwight’s century sermon on the text “Come out from them and 
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be ye separate” was code for secession.91  Many Federalist leaders admitted, with Roger 
Griswold, “There can be no safety to the Northern States without a separation from the 
confederacy.”92 
 Federalist leaders in New England reacted out of a sense that the national political 
tide was turning against them.  They had closely lost the election of 1800 to Jefferson 
(73-65), and some complained that the margin of victory was provided by electoral votes 
provided by the 3/5 clause in the constitution.  Federalists believed that the Louisiana 
Purchase had been unconstitutional and unwise.  Westward expansion would gradually 
erode the electoral strength of New England.93 In Congress, Josiah Quincy (F-MA) 
denounced the admission of Louisiana to the Union in Congress with a defense of the 
rights of the existing state over potential states.  The essential question considered the 
problem of sovereignty.  As the states were the original parties of The Union, the existing 
members should not be made subject to ethnically French residents of the Louisiana 
Territory.  “Have the three branches of this government a right, at will, to weaken and 
outweigh the influence respectively secured to each state in this compact, by introducing, 
at pleasure, new partners, situated beyond the old limits of the United States?” Such was 
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the injustice that they faced that Quincy charged it would be the duty of the Northeast to 
“prepare for a separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must.” 94 
 In 1804, leading Federalists, including Timothy Pickering conspired to separate 
the northeastern states from the Union.95 The hope of the conspiracy was that a favorable 
political climate might be created where the Federalist states might seize back control of 
New York, either directly, or through sympathetic Republicans like Aaron Burr.  Burr’s 
known hostility to Jefferson, it was hoped, would make him amenable, “and if a 
separation should be deemed proper, the five New England states, New York, and New 
Jersey would naturally be united.”96 
Timothy Pickering’s primary grievance was political, not constitutional.  The 
focus of his rhetoric was on the diabolical “Mr. Jefferson’s plan of destruction.”97 He 
stressed that the North was being oppressed by “Negro representation” in Congress.98   
But his solution was found in the principles of revolution, not in interposition against the 
judiciary.99  In the midst of the partisan wars of the Jeffersonian Era between the 
republican-controlled Congress and the Federalist-stocked judiciary, Pickering despaired 
at the persistent efforts of a Republican congress to reduce the legitimate influence of 
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New England to naught.”100 Fortunately for the Union, Hamilton moved decisively 
against Burr, preventing many influential New York Federalists from participating in the 
conspiracy.101 
For much of the early nineteenth century, New England bore the stigma of 
disloyalty and secessionist politics.  Even today, many scholars associate New England 
with radical state rights.102  Yet Pickering’s political theory does not represent the main 
current of state rights thinking in the North.   Although this conspiracy was real, and 
Pickering would have genially destroyed The Union if could he attain the necessary 
influence, New England did not share his sympathies.  Northerners were willing to use 
interposition and conspiratorial politics to limit the power of the central government, but 
they understood that The Union was too important to be risked.  Despite the efforts of the 
old guard in the Federalist Party, the majority of Federalists were not interested in 
secession.  Instead of despairing at the rise of democracy, they decided to tame it and 
channel it into party activism.103  Nationally minded leadership like that of John Quincy 
Adams disapproved of the addition of Louisiana, but hoped that a stronger national 
government might compensate for a weaker New England section. He believed, “a 
severance from the union … [would be] a remedy more desperate than any possible 
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disease.”104  It was an assessment shared by the people.  After the battle between the 
Chesapeake and the Leopard in 1807, the Federalist dominated Boston Town Meeting 
denounced the British attack as “a direct violation of our national honor, and an 
infringement on our national rights and sovereignty,” to the dismay of party leadership.105 
New England separatism is well illustrated by the crisis over the Embargo.  While 
widely supported by the nation as a whole (Snyder vigorously supported it), New 
England was outraged by it.  Over one third of the total tonnage of the Union was berthed 
in Massachusetts alone.  The Northeastern economy was overwhelmingly commercial.  
Yet despite fierce political opposition to the Embargo, a visible secessionist movement 
never emerged.   
 The Federalist response to the Embargo represented a more developed 
constitutional theory than the conspiracy of 1804.  The leadership were aware that rumors 
had hurt them badly and that they needed to move far more cautiously.106  Even the fiery 
Pickering admitted that while he would rather destroy the Union than change it, a 
constitutional critique would be more effective with the people, as they did not want to 
leave The Union.   
Pray look into the constitution, and particularly to the tenth article of the amendments.  
How are the powers reserved to the states respectively, or to the people, to be maintained, 
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but by the respective states judging for themselves and putting their negative on the 
usurpations of general government.107  
 
 In 1809 the state legislatures took up the task of addressing the constitutionality of 
the Embargo and the Force Act.  Massachusetts, at the urging of its leadership, purged its 
resolution of any hint of disunion.  They stressed their loyalty to a union as a 
“confederation of equal and independent states with limited powers.”108  The resolution 
did not make an issue of the states acceding to The Union as states, speaking more 
frequently about the rights reserved to the people.  Their reliance upon the people as the 
ultimate sovereigns helped to rein in their rhetoric.  Nevertheless, they denounced the 
Enforcement act of 1809 as “unjust, oppressive, and unconstitutional, and not legally 
binding on the citizens of this state.”  They asserted that it was the duty of the legislature 
to defend the rights of the people, “by peaceable and legal remedies.  While this state 
maintains its sovereignty and independence, all the citizens can find protection against 
outrage and injustice in the strong arm of the state government.”109  Massachusetts, then, 
set about the course of remonstrating Congress and seeking constitutional amendments 
with the other states. 
 Several other states participated in the resistance to the Force Act.  The governor 
of Connecticut urged the legislature that it was “their duty, to interpose their protecting 
shield between the right and liberty of the people, and the assumed power of the general 
government.”110  The legislature then refused to aid in the “execution of measures, which 
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are unconstitutional and despotic.”111  Most New England states took this course of 
passive resistance, actively enforced.  Rhode Island declared that the act undermined the 
rights of the people, and declared it unconstitutional, but stressed that they supported 
constitutional measures that would “remove the political evils under which we are now 
suffering.”112  Delaware was even more explicit: 
We have the fullest confidence, that the patriotism of the good people of the United 
States will induce them to submit to unwise and arbitrary laws, rather than resort to 
violence; and that they will use the remedy pointed out by the constitution for the evils 
they suffer, rather than jeopardize the union of the states and the independence of their 
country, by an open opposition to the laws.113 
 
Despite the genuine threat of civil war that loomed during the Embargo, the Federalist 
dominated states carefully moderated their constitutional strategy.  They avoided threats 
of armed resistance, stressing that they preferred to work through the political process for 
change.   
 The unified opposition of these states to the Embargo was partly successful in 
securing its replacement by a non-intercourse policy, which allowed trade with neutrals.  
Virginia’s resolutions in response blamed the Federalists for the failure of the embargo.  
“It is not failed because our enemies have not felt its force, but because they believe we 
have felt it too sensibly; because the unfortunate opposition which the measure has met in 
some other parts of The Union has inspired them with a fallacious hope, that we 
ourselves, either would not bear its privations.”114  If constitutional argument of the 
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Federalist legislatures’ resolutions was not successful, their political strategy met its 
aim.115 
Conclusion: 
 In contrast with the Federalists, Pennsylvania Republicans struggled to understand 
the theoretical significance of its confrontation with the judiciary.  In 1810 the 
Pennsylvania legislature assembled again to choose a final course of action.  Having been 
decisively defeated in their attempt to interpose against the enforcement of U.S. v. Peters, 
they struggled for a remedy that would allow them to vindicate their cause.   The state 
was now deeply divided between moderate Republicans and radical Democrats over the 
best course of action against the federal government.  Pennsylvania Republicans appeared 
slightly chastened by the crisis.  In the legislative debate on proposed resolutions, several 
Republicans were especially vociferous in their criticism of the actions of the state and 
Democratic constitutional doctrine.  “What is meant by state rights and sovereignty?” 
asked the fiercely Republican William Duane.  “I have been accustomed to believe that 
there is no sovereign in this country but the people.”116  He charged that Pennsylvania 
was the real source of danger to liberty.  Massachusetts’ reputation for disunion was far 
exceeded by Pennsylvania.   
[T]he disorderly proceedings of some private men, or the impotent resolutions of the 
legislature of that state vanish into insignificance when compared with the regularly 
organized and governmental opposition of Pennsylvania:  there you saw a war of words, 
but here you saw the bayonet thrust into the constitution of the union.117 
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The Democratic faction, who persuaded a majority to support their position, continued to 
defend, in principle, the right of the state to guard the liberties of the people against 
usurpation.  Mr. Tarr drew an analogy from criminal law.  “Would it not be just, if a 
constable without proper authority, would break open and search the trunks of 
gentlemen--would not gentlemen be justified in knocking him down?”118  The principle 
for Pennsylvania was much the same.  The state had never given the right to the federal 
government to have admiralty cases heard upon appeal.  The majority understood the 
crisis in light of the “constitution of suspicion.”  History was replete with examples of 
republics that lost their liberty to consolidation, and Tarr believed consolidation was the 
present threat.  The Philadelphia system existed to guard against such a danger. 
 Both moderates and radicals agreed that they were for state sovereignty within 
prescribed constitutional limits.  Each accepted that separation from The Union would be 
ruinous.  The majority of the legislature expressed its obedience to the federal courts 
within their proper jurisdiction. Yet its resolutions condemned the action of the federal 
courts as illegal and unconstitutional.  They sought a constitutional amendment to create 
an “impartial” constitutional tribunal.  Pennsylvania recognized that the rights the state 
sought to defend against federal incursion depended upon the ability to declare that a 
violation had taken place.   
It may be asked, who is to decide the question?  If it be alleged that the state has not the 
right, it may be justly replied, the power invading it had not.  It is a case unprovided for 
in the constitution, and there is no common umpire.119
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Chapter 4:  “The Euthanasia of our Constitution”: Monopoly, 
Commerce, and Concurrent State Power in the Steamboat Cases 
The same want of general power over Commerce led to an exercise of this power 
separately by the States, [which] not only proved abortive, but engendered rival, 
conflicting and angry relations….  In sundry instances of as N.Y. N.J. Pa & Maryd. the 
navigation laws treated the Citizens of the other States as aliens. 
     -James Madison, 1787.1 
 
Northern Republicans’ denial of an authoritative “common umpire” for 
constitutional disputes meant that state legislatures held considerable authority in the 
actual construction of the Constitution within their own boundaries. Without a “common 
umpire,” the several states came to divergent understandings as to how to define the 
boundary between the reserved and delegated powers.  If the Supreme Court could not be 
trusted to interpret the Constitution without a bias toward its own power, the states soon 
discovered that they were just as likely to interpret the Constitution to benefit their own 
interests.  The lack of a “common umpire” was directly tied into the rise and fall of state 
sovereignty in New York during the Early Republic.  New York, like many other states, 
believed it possessed sovereign legislative power over internal domestic matters despite 
the growing assertions of Congressional and federal judicial authority in constitutional 
construction.  This chapter examines the debate over the locus of sovereignty, state 
legislative authority, and the concurrent regulation of property that surrounded the 
steamboat cases—a debate that had its root in the political grammar of American 
constitutionalism. 
                                                 





The steamboat cases illustrate this rise and fall of legislative sovereignty 
particularly well.  They reveal the actual power that state governments claimed and 
exercised over commerce, the domestic economy, and technological development.  The 
development of steamboat technology created a new area of economic enterprise 
governed by the states that challenged the regulation of economic development under the 
common law.  The North River Steamboat Company (NRSC), with an exclusive state 
monopoly on the Hudson River, quickly engendered a complex legal dispute concerning 
the balance between individual, state, and federal rights over property and commerce 
within the rapidly developing economy.  New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, the federal 
government, and entrepreneurs struggled to formulate a legal doctrine that would govern 
this largely private development.  As the steamboat cases wound their way through the 
state legislatures, state courts, and finally the Supreme Court, the public recognized the 
need for a “common umpire” to provide a common legal framework for economic 
development.  New York’s claim to regulate steamboat at first entirely with its sovereign 
legislative power, and then concurrently, collapsed under the weight of public 
complaints, the resistance of New Jersey and its citizens, and the interposition of the 
Supreme Court.  When the Court finally affirmed the power of Congress over interstate 
commerce in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), the state powers reacted with acquiescence, 
rather than interposition.  In the process, national power over national commercial 
development was established, and the role of the Supreme Court as the “common 
umpire” of the powers delegated to the national government was decisively asserted.2   
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The steamboat cases did not simply establish the commerce clause as the vehicle 
through which the Supreme Court or Congress asserted its power over this national 
economic regulation.  Examining the cases solely in terms of the commerce power does 
help to explain the origins of the modern commerce clause, which was exercised to 
powerful effect by the post Civil War Supreme Court.  But the cases involved much more 
than a dispute over the nature of commerce.  Taken as a whole, the cases express the 
disparate economic and legal doctrines used to govern the constitutional law of economic 
development.  They reveal the difficult role that states and entrepreneurs played in 
balancing the common law, individual liberty, the desire for economic growth, and state 
constitutional rights.   
Because the commerce clause doctrine emerged gradually, three additional legal 
doctrines played a key role in deciding these conflicts and provide security for both 
individual rights and technological innovation: intellectual property and patent rights, the 
sovereignty of state legislatures, and a critique of special monopoly privileges.   
First, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution hoped to define and protect intellectual 
property rights through a federal patent power.  However, patents proved difficult to 
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enforce and only offered weak protection.  Inventors frequently sought stronger 
protections for their intellectual property in an exclusive state grant of usage through a 
monopoly.  This exclusive right operated to protect original inventions where federal 
patents were easily copied and stolen.  In the case of the steamboat, New York asserted 
its power on behalf of Robert Fulton and his financial backers to induce them to risk their 
invention and capital in the marketplace.3  It claimed sovereign legislative authority 
under the powers reserved to the states to regulate all inventions in its territory, patented 
or otherwise, and to grant exclusive use to whomever it desired.   This second legal 
doctrine—the sovereign legislative power—proved a double-edged sword.  Entrepreneurs 
in New Jersey likewise turned to the sovereign power of their legislature to protect and 
defend their own rights on the Hudson River.  Conflict between the sovereignty of New 
York and the sovereignty of New Jersey proved intractable.  Finally, the business and 
legal community sought to protect the rights of business and innovation through critiques 
of state’s grant of exclusive monopoly rights or special privileges.  They stressed that the 
state laws violated both the principles of natural justice, common law protections of the 
rights of public navigation, and the constitutional rights secured to citizens under the 
national Bill of Rights. 
Each of these three doctrines—protection of intellectual property through patent 
law, the sovereign power of state legislatures, and the critique of special privileges as a 
contradiction to fundamental rights—offered persuasive arguments for inventors and 
businessmen who sought to secure their individual rights.  Each of these doctrines 
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suggests that the constitutional history of economic development should not be presented 
as a exercise in state building organized by Congress and enforced by the Supreme 
Courts, or even as driven by state versus federal conflict over internal improvements.  
The conflict was more complex.  Individual entrepreneurs sought ways to secure their 
investment against state sponsored competitors.  They turned to the common law, patent 
protection, the sovereign power of the other states, individual property rights arguments, 
interstate comity, and only finally to the commerce clause.  By the 1820s, the persistence 
of businessmen like Thomas Gibbons and state politicians like William Duer forced the 
issue to the Supreme Court and disclosed the “common umpire” provided by the federal 
Constitution.  Any analysis of how federalism affected economic development should 
place the state legislatures and individual entrepreneurs who developed these doctrines at 
the heart of the narrative. 
National Internal Improvement  
During the early Republic, the contentious national debates that surrounded 
economic development concerned not the commerce clause, but the character of internal 
improvements.  After the War of 1812, Americans hoped to promote a flourishing society 
through a national program of legislation.  The failure of the Hartford Convention and the 
defeat of the British themselves led to a temporary rise in national identity and patriotic 
feeling.  Hezekiah Niles celebrated the return to the Revolutionary sentiment that “these 
United States are, of God and by our right, free, sovereign, and independent.”4  For 
Republicans, the victory offered a “golden opportunity” to crush Federalist faction and 
secure a prosperous and firm union.  Joseph Story hoped to extend the power of the 
                                                 




national government as far as the Constitution would allow.  Military schools, a larger 
army and permanent navy, uniform bankruptcy and navigation acts, national wardens and 
justices of the peace, and “judicial courts which shall embrace the whole constitutional 
powers” would create a chain of national interest to bind the people together.  Petty 
factions in the “great states” would give way to popular national government.5   
Initially, it seemed as if the wave of nationalist fervor would lead to a 
permanently enlarged government.  Madison’s annual message to Congress in December 
1815 echoed Story’s call for “enlarged and liberal institutions.”  He proposed re-
incorporating the national bank, expanding the military, protecting fledgling industry 
with a tariff on manufactures, establishing a national university in D.C., and developing 
an national system of roads and canals through the authority of the federal government.  
The latter idea, in particular, would be a boon to the national economy and help to bind 
“our national confederacy” together.  He suggested that the Constitution should be 
amended to that end, if necessary.6  In answer to his call, Congress enacted many of the 
reforms Madison suggested.  Despite fierce opposition from both the traditionally minded 
Republicans, and the mercantile faction of the Northeast (including Webster), Congress 
passed a mildly protective tariff in April 1816 under the influence of John C. Calhoun.7  
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The re-charter of the bank, in March 1816, was a testimony to the conversion of many 
republicans to the nationalist point of view.  Even Madison, a Democratic-Republican, 
signed the bill.8 
The issue of internal improvement in roads and canals proved more difficult for 
the President.  Under the leadership of Calhoun, Congress proposed to use the $1.5 
million bonus from the National Bank’s new charter as a fund for internal improvement.  
Calhoun justified this, as Hamilton had as Treasury Secretary with the general power 
granted to Congress to spend money for the general welfare.  According to Calhoun, a 
“plain, good sense” reading of the Constitution was more plausible than a reading that 
limited spending to the enumerated powers.9  Madison disagreed.  On his last day in 
office, he vetoed the Bonus Bill as an unconstitutional exercise of power.  His reliance on 
the Constitutional balance between state and federal governments echoed the “Partly 
National and Party Federal” description of the Union articulated by Publius in Federalist 
Thirty Nine, an expression that should be taken as the essence of moderate Republican 
thought.  Returning to the doctrine of enumerated powers, Madison stressed that no “just 
interpretation” could include it among those powers necessary and proper for 
                                                                                                                                                 
exercise; for if it were so to judge then its judgment and not the constitution would be the measure of its 
authority.”  Virginia, also a bastion of republicanism, stressed that the power to charter the bank was vested 
in the states, not Congress.  A congressional re-charter, would be a usurpation of its sovereignty. 
(Pennsylvania, January 11, 1811, Senate Journal of Pennsylvania, quoted in State Documents on Federal 
Relations: The States and the United States, ed. Herman V. Ames (New York, Da Capo, 1970), 53-54.  See 
also the Virginia’s resolutions against the bank, SDFR, 54). 
 
8 During the war, the Treasury Department faced a severe shortage of credit and consumers faced a run on 
specie in the states outside New England.  Under the leadership of Calhoun and Henry Clay, and with the 
assent of Madison, the constitutional defense of reserved powers, which was so fiercely asserted in 1811, 
was nearly absent.  Calhoun argued cogently that given the vast amounts of paper money issued by the 
states, a national bank was the only practical means by which Congress could regain control over its 
constitutional power to issue the currency.  It was necessary under the circumstances faced by the nation 
(Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America, from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1957), 227-237). See also James Madison to C. J. Ingersoll, February 2, 1831, 
Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1865), 4:160-161. 




government, because it could not be tied to a specific purpose of government.  To the 
suggestion that the commerce clause might be available to justify the bill, Madison flatly 
replied that such a construction would distort the “ordinary import of the terms” as 
originally understood by the Founders caught in the grip of a crisis of trade in 1787.  
Madison probably meant that commerce did not constitute the ability build roads, but to 
regulate trade “among the several states.”  In his later years, Madison explained that the 
commerce clause had been intended as a restraint on state power and a guarantee of 
private liberty, not as a grant of expansive power to the national government: 
It is very certain that it [the commerce clause] grew out of the abuse of the power by the 
importing states in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative and 
preventive provision against injustice among the states themselves, rather than as a power 
to be used for positive purposes of the government, in which alone, however, the 




Madison found Congress’ use of the general welfare clause was even more problematic.  
Such a broad reading would completely negate the limits on power that the Framers had 
established by carefully enumerating the powers that were granted.  The policy authority 
of Congress would expand to the detriment of the U.S. Constitution and state municipal 
law.  Not even the Supreme Court would be able to answer this new claim of power.  The 
courts must defer to Congress on questions of the general welfare, because issues of 
public policy do not lend themselves to judicial involvement.  Instead, Madison argued 
the safer policy was the approach suggested by the enumerated character of the 
Constitution.  By limiting Congress to spending money in pursuit of the enumerated 
powers, the Constitution still left to Congress the “great and important measures of 
Government.”  If the construction of roads and canals is essential, then this purpose 
should be added to the list of enumerated powers by the amendment process suggested by 
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the Constitution itself.11  Madison’s cautionary veto message suggests that even during 
the heyday of nationalist legislation, the doctrine of enumerated and reserved powers was 
too important to be surrendered. 
Despite the attempts of Congressional leaders to design a broad theory of 
constitutional construction, the majority of Congress accepted the rationale of Madison 
that constitutional amendment was required.  Subsequent vetoes by Monroe (1822) and 
Jackson (1830) of major transportation projects reinforced the traditional Republican 
belief that the Constitution did not permit such expenditure.  Consequently, internal 
improvements remained the subject of state legislative and private action.  The doctrine 
of reserved powers remained the basis for state constitutional theorizing.  The necessary 
and proper and commerce clauses remained unavailable for the kind of state building that 
the National Republicans favored. 
The states had not been idle while Congress debated the constitutionality of 
transportation spending.  While national east-west roads lay far beyond their financial 
capability, the states for the decade before the War had heavily invested in turnpikes and 
canals.  In New York alone, over four thousand miles of turnpikes were constructed 
between 1815 and 1821.12  The Erie Canal—the largest transportation project of the era—
came at the behest of the New York legislature of 1817 and spawned an entire generation 
of canal building.  The canal demonstrated to the nation that state projects could be both 
                                                 
11 James Madison, “Veto of Internal Improvement Bill,” Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 
14th Congress, 2nd Session, 1060-1061.  Jefferson concurred with Madison’s exercise of executive review 
(i.e. the veto power).  He considered it the Republican party’s distinction from the Federalists that they 
considered the general welfare clause to be limited to those powers “specifically enumerated; and that, as it 
was never meant that they should provide for the welfare but by the exercise of the enumerated power, so it 
could not have meant that they should raise money for purposes when the enumeration did not place under 
their action”  (Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, June 16, 1817, Thomas Jefferson Papers, (Ser. 1, General 
Correspondence, 1651-1827), Library of Congress. 
 




open the interior of the nation to commerce and prove tremendously profitable.13  These 
projects did not generate much political theorizing about the Constitution, because they 
fell within the well-established sphere of state municipal law and the reserved powers.   
The Steamboat Revolution (1785-1809) 
So much attention has been focused on the federal debate on internal 
improvement, that Constitutional scholars have neglected the importance of technological 
and legal developments at the state and local level.  The steamboat cases demonstrate the 
strong and vital role that the states played in the constitutional definition of the extent of 
the reserved powers.  Although the government was heavily involved in the legal 
regulation of steamboats, steam technology proved unique among transportation projects 
during the early Republic in its lack of direct government investment.  In this area of 
private development, new enterprises challenged the old common-law guarantees of 
public navigation, traditional doctrines of legislative sovereignty, the rights of property 
and contract, and the rights of private inventors against the public, while reshaping the 
concurrent authority of the states over commerce and patents and the regional course of 
economic development.14 
Before the development of canals, steamboats, and improved roads, the vast 
majority of the American countryside lay beyond the reach of affordable transport for the 
commercial farmer.  The cost of shipping goods to market over land was prohibitive to 
the extent that water transport was universally favored from the colonial period until the 
development of rail transport.  Even on major rivers like the Hudson, Delaware, Potomac, 
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and especially the Mississippi, upriver transport proved slow and difficult.  For instance, 
the journey down the Mississippi from Pittsburgh to New Orleans (1,950 miles) could 
take a month floating downstream by barge.  Returning by land might take four months.  
Steamboats revolutionized passenger transport almost immediately and promised to open 
the West to cheaper consumer goods by allowing easy transport upstream.15  Many 
Republicans hoped that the better communications that accompanied improved 
transportation would bind the fractious Union together.  Fulton hoped, “The union must 
be kept from dismemberment by bonds of strong communication, education, and art.”16  
Into this unique opportunity for technological growth and business investment, men of 
political genius, wealth, oratory, and scientific ability brought their considerable energies 
to bear to accomplish… both bind the nation together and secure their personal fortunes. 
Successful steamboat development demanded more support than the technical 
genius of a Robert Fulton.  It required a wealth of legal and financial support to make the 
technology profitable.  Equally important, would-be entrepreneurs required weighty 
political patronage to succeed.  Three men were integral to bridging the cultural divide 
between the eighteenth-century world of kinship ties, aristocratic privilege, and 
entrenched wealth with the new world of democratic politics, commercial enterprise, and 
business partnership.  Robert R. Livingston had been Chancellor of New York and, while 
in political decline by 1807, still maintained deep financial pockets and networks of 
kinship with many of the influential landowners in the state.  Aaron Ogden had been a 
senator and the last Federalist Governor of New Jersey.  Thomas Gibbons was a wealthy 
planter from Georgia with a keen business sense and a reputation as an intractable lawyer 
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and political strategist.   For Livingston, Ogden, and Gibbons, success depended upon 
multiple sources: their financial resources (needed to sustain long and successful legal 
battles and to constantly improve their boats), forensic skill, political connections, and 
personal business acumen.   
For many inventors, the hopes of profiting from their invention failed because 
they lacked these resources.  As early as 1787, two American inventors, James Ramsey 
and John Fitch, had produced working steamboats capable of traveling at four miles per 
hour.  Ramsey’s model employed an innovative water jet propulsion system that secured 
the active support of George Washington and the Philadelphia scientific community.  But 
even after obtaining patents from both Virginia and Maryland, Ramsey could not secure a 
profitable base for his business.  In the same way, John Fitch made surprising technical 
breakthroughs with his stern paddle steamboat.  Despite the support of private investors 
and monopolies from Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, Fitch could 
not sustain enough interest on the Delaware River for a passenger line.17   
The research and construction of functioning steamboats required a heavy 
investment of capital.  Ramsey and Fitch had both turned to the federal Patent Office to 
grant them the exclusive use of the steam engine and a profitable domestic monopoly.  
This patent would help persuade investors to support their enterprise.  Their hope that a 
U.S. patent would secure an exclusive market proved false.  In 1791, the Patent Office 
accepted the claims of both Fitch and Ramsey on the same day.  By accepting both 
claims, the patent office offered little security to future inventors.  Had a third patent 
closely modeled on the first two with minor modifications been presented, it is likely that 
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the patent office would have accepted it as well.  No attempt was made to determine 
which inventor had an original design.  Without an exclusive national privilege and with 
poor financial return, Fitch and Ramsey left for Europe in pursuit of richer markets.18  
 Given the failure of the U.S. patent to offer security to steamboat inventors, new 
inventors turned to state government to protect their inventions.  New York held near 
total autonomy over transportation development on the Hudson River, precisely because 
patents were so weak.  The constitutional reluctance of the federal government to fund 
internal improvements also created a lack of legislative authority that New York readily 
assumed.  Private entrepreneurs understood that state regulation was necessary to provide 
security for their business investments and intellectual property.  In the case of the 
steamboat, when Robert Livingston began to investigate steamboat technology, he 
ignored the U.S. Patent Office and appealed directly to the New York Legislature for 
support.  By 1798, Livingston had already served as Chancellor and was actively 
campaigning for governor.  He persuaded the legislature to repudiate Fitch’s monopoly, 
because Fitch had never operated a boat in the state.19  He justified his request for an 
exclusive privilege because the “uncertainty and hazard of a very expensive experiment” 
would make it unwise to proceed without assurances from the legislature.  The legislature 
promised him a fourteen-year privilege, but only if he could prove his boat could travel 
four miles per hour up the Hudson River within a year.20   
                                                 
18 Shagena, ch. 8; and Baxter, 6-7.  A cogent argument could be made that because Fitch and Ramsey’s 
inventions rested on such different methods of propulsion, they both deserved patent protection. 
 
19 Baxter, 8-9. 
 
20 New York Assembly, 27th March 1798, in “A Review of the Letter Addressed by William Alexander 
Duer, Esquire, to Cadwallader Colden, Esquire, in Answer to Strictures Contained in his ‘Life of Robert 
Fulton’ Relative to Steam Navigation, With an Appendix Containing the Acts of the Legislature,” (New 




Livingston in failed his initial efforts to build a steamboat.  Despite the aid of 
inventors John Stevens and Nicholas Roosevelt, Livingston could not perfect the 
technology.  The boats he laid down were broken up and sold at a loss.  Fortuitously, 
Jefferson appointed him a minister to France.  While in Europe, Livingston had occasion 
to meet Robert Fulton who was working on developing underwater torpedoes and 
convinced Fulton to partner with him in the venture.  The legislature recognized the 
potential of the partnership with repeated offers of an exclusive grant in 1803 and then in 
1807.  With Livingston’s backing, Fulton successfully ran the Steamboat up the Hudson 
to Albany in 1807.  Fulton’s boat was deemed to meet the conditions required by the 
1807 statute.  Using his considerable political influence, Chancellor Livingston was able 
to secure an extension of the monopoly to thirty years and a provision that anyone 
navigating “by fire or steam” without a license, would forfeit their boat to Livingston and 
Fulton and pay penalties.21    
Despite these extreme penalties, the Steamboat was quickly challenged by a rival.  
In 1808, Livingston’s brother-in- law and former partner, John Stevens launched a ferry 
service from New Brunswick, NJ to New York City based on research he and Roosevelt 
                                                                                                                                                 
Council of Revision objected to the proposed law as a violation of Fitch’s property rights.  The rights 
vested by the legislature, argued Judge Genson, were not revocable by the legislature once vested (Council 
of Revision, 23 March 1798., in “A Review of the Letter Addressed …”, 24-25).  The Legislature moved to 
repeal the grant to Fitch in 1799 to support its grant to Livingston.  Given Livingston’s later assertion that 
his contract with the state could not be repudiated, his deprivation of Fitch’s rights was particularly ironic.  
The potential conflict was averted by tragedy, however.  While the New York Legislature was repudiating 
his grant, John Fitch died of a drug overdose in Kentucky in 1798, so the point about his vested rights never 
became an issue (Shanega, 203-204).  Ramsey had already died in 1792 while pursuing a patent in Europe.  
His patents had also expired and posed little threat to a new inventor. 
 
21 “An Act Relative to a Steamboat,” April 5 1803; “An Act to Revive an Act, entitled, ‘An Act Relative to 
a Steam Boat,’” April 6, 1807; and “An Act for the Further Encouragement of Steam Boats, on the Waters 





had continued while Livingston was in Paris.22  The new boat’s (Phoenix) top speed of 
six miles per hour posed a significant threat to Livingston and Fulton as did the Federal 
coasting license for which Stevens planned to apply.23  Initially, it seemed Livingston and 
Stevens might combine their interests, but negotiations quickly broke down over money.  
Because they were related by marriage through Stevens’ sister Mary, Livingston and 
Stevens confined the dispute to their personal correspondence to avoid dragging their 
family into the courts.24 
The correspondence between the brothers-in- law raised most of the arguments 
that were later deployed in the steamboat cases.  The acute legal mind of Livingston 
stressed the positive law authority of the legislature to grant monopolies, while the 
entrepreneurial drive of Stevens preferred the protections offered to intellectual property 
by patent right.  In a private letter to Stevens, Livingston stressed that the state possessed 
a sovereign power to promote science by rewarding innovation.  Hence, Livingston’s 
own great public service and the genius of Fulton justly deserved a reward from the state.  
This reward took the form of a “contract” explicitly acknowledged in the 1808 law.  
Fulton and Livingston had provided the state with a steamboat service of three ships in 
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24 Shagena, ch. 12; George Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston of New York, 1746-1813 (New 
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sovereignty, state legislative authority, and rights of property, necessarily offers a different perspective, 





exchange for a thirty-year exclusive grant.25  Livingston believed that a contractual state 
grant would provide a firmer ground for investment than a patent.  Even if another 
inventor secured a patent, the state’s municipal laws could control the use of the patent 
within the state.  He wrote to Stevens, “Were a man to patent a new musical instrument, 
would that give him the right to play in your garden and set your children to dancing 
when you wished them to study?”26  For Livingston, the sovereign power of the state to 
regulate the details of life trumped any patent that the federal government might grant. 
Because the NRSC believed the sovereign power of New York was sufficient, 
Fulton had chosen to not file for a federal patent.  In contrast, Stevens relied heavily upon 
his federal patent and coasting license as justifications for his right to ply the Hudson 
with his ferry.  Stevens challenged Livingston that Fulton had not even really invented 
anything, but merely combined existing inventions into a working model.  Furthermore, 
the state of New York should not be able to interfere with the paramount power of the 
national government to patent.  The New York State monopoly was also an 
unconstitutional violation of national authority over commerce “among the states.”  
Finally, he disagreed with Livingston that the monopoly’s services to New York justified 
the grant: “Monopolies are very justly held, in every free country, as odious.” Nothing 
could justify such a grant of special privilege.27   
In his 1808 reply, Livingston adopted a more moderate tone in the hopes of a 
financial partnership yet threatened a lawsuit if they could not reach an agreement.  On 
the one hand, Livingston argued that the entire nation, with the exception of New York, 
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was open as a market to steamboats, and Stevens could thus use Fulton’s technique 
profitably in other states without fear of legal repercussions and with their blessing.28  On 
the other hand, New York state law clearly vested in Livingston and Fulton a right of 
property that is “full and clear” unless in blatant contradiction of the U.S. Constitution.   
Livingston began from the assumption that sovereignty had been divided between 
the states and the general government.  Reasoning from the general structure of The 
Union, Livingston stressed that the state power to regulate property was concurrent with 
federal power; while the U.S. Constitution clearly did contain powers over patents, those 
powers existed to confirm pre-existing natural rights, which the states were already 
regulating.   By arguing that “All property must be held subject to the conv[entions] of 
the community,” Livingston concluded that the power of the general government to 
support the natural right of property in patents was concurrent with the right of the 
community to regulate property subject to its own conventions:   
…the states and Congress have concurrent jurisdictions in matters that are vested but not 
exclusively vested by the constitution in Congress.  The right to grant patents, is not 
among those which the states are prohibited from exercising.  The Congress also enjoy it, 




The argument for concurrent regulation of commerce would become a prominent part of 
New York’s defense of its sovereignty. 
 Concurrent jurisdiction over technological development offered a new perspective 
on the federal principle.  Instead of dividing sovereignty according to function (whereby 
the national government might be said to have full authority over the war power and the 
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state hold full power over education), sovereign power over some functions could be 
shared.  Concurrent sovereignty had more in common with the multi- leveled associations 
of Revolutionary political grammar.  It emphasized the de facto division of the usufruct 
of sovereignty by the Revolutionary people, more than the careful enumeration of powers 
in the Founder’s Constitution.  According to Livingston, the enumerated powers in 
Article I section 8 in Congress were also to be exercised by the states unless they were 
explicitly prohibited from exercising them.  While the Union was paramount in the case 
of a conflict, those conflicts would be rare.  States were accustomed to the limited 
exercise of legislative sovereignty during the Confederation Era over economic 
development and patents.  They had only surrendered the powers when specifically 
demanded by Congress and the federal courts.  Livingston and the state of New York 
consistently averred that they would submit to federal authority when the central 
government made a valid constitutional claim. 
 The dispute between Livingston and Stevens over concurrent sovereignty 
continued to fester throughout the winter of 1808.  While they maintained a polite 
correspondence, each invested heavily in improving their steamboats for the spring thaw.  
Both understood that the conflict would ultimately be settled outside the courts because 
neither man wanted to subject his family to a lawsuit.  Instead, they focused their 
energies on securing an advantage.  Livingston received an informal written opinion from 
the Secretary of State, James Madison that New York could ban a patented item within its 
jurisdiction, while Fulton improved the speed and profitability of the Steamboat.  By 
July, it carried 140 up to Albany in one trip and was making over $1,000 per week in 




without a legal challenge, but as the Steamboat proved difficult to compete with, he grew 
more amenable to compromise.30   
In the end, the dispute was settled more by the monopoly’s legal advantages than 
by the niceties of the constitutional theory.  In 1809, facing rumors of competition from a 
new company in Albany and the hint of a steamboat operating on Lake Champlain from 
Canada,31 Livingston and Fulton proposed a legal compromise to Stevens.  First, they 
offered to split the national market with Stevens granting him the Delaware, Chesapeake, 
Santee, Connecticut, and Savannah Rivers for seven years.  To pressure Stephens to take 
the offer, they licensed John R. Livingston, Robert R. Livingston’s brother to employ 
their newly built boat, the Raritan, between New York and New Jersey (between Sandy 
Hook and Powles Point) in direct competition with Stevens.  John Livingston threatened 
to cut his rates to one-third of Stevens and secure an injunction against him for violating 
the 1808 law.  In addition, Fulton secured a federal patent for his invention.  Faced with 
these threats, Stevens took the proposed franchise from Livingston and Fulton and left to 
run a passenger line on the Chesapeake and Delaware.32  Livingston also recognized that 
a lawsuit could potentially cost them their lucrative monopoly.  It proved safer to 
compromise than to risk the forfeiture of his monopoly before the courts.  Livingston and 
Fulton would still enjoy the strong protection of the monopoly in New York and the 
protection of Fulton’s patent. 
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32 Stevens, “Letter Relative to Steamboats,” 425; Phillip, 229; Baxter, 21. 
 Fulton, Livingston, and John Livingston subsequently subscribed to his steamboat company (Dangerfield, 
414).   Stevens successfully brought steam service to the Delaware and continued to improve his boats.  He 




The Livingston Monopoly (1809-1815) 
The Failure of Patent Protection 
Today, inventors might expect a U.S. patent to provide security for intellectual 
property rights.  In 1811 however, Fulton was deeply frustrated by his attempts to defend 
his patent and the difficulties of complying with the requirements of a patent application.  
Opponents of the monopoly gleefully pointed out that Fulton had copied tables from 
other technical manuals and had failed to patent original items.  Technically, the items 
presented for patent—a combination of parts on a ship, including sails!—were not 
patentable at all.33  Concomitantly, U.S. Patent Commissioner William Thornton was 
privately speculating in steamboat technology himself and thus had little personal interest 
in ensuring that other inventors properly applied for their patents.34  Because many of the 
steamboat components patented by Fitch and Thornton in the eighteenth century were 
now in the public domain, it is surprising that Fulton eventually succeeded in obtaining a 
U.S. patent.  
Even if Fulton had possessed an impeccable patent, the power of the federal 
government to enforce patents was weak at best.  Eli Whitney (cotton gin inventor) 
complained to Fulton in 1811, “A patent is but a species of right which but a few can 
acquire & will always be liable to be trembled under foot by the many.”  A suit for 
infringement inevitably had the facts tried by a local jury that was more sympathetic 
toward the local infringer than the distant inventor.35  Fulton’s patent ultimately collapsed 
when challenged by steam towboat inventor John Sullivan of Massachusetts.  U.S. Patent 
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Commissioner William Thornton had advised Sullivan to challenge Fulton, not on the 
originality of his invention, but on a fault of the application process.  Even with the 
sympathetic Eli Whitney on the arbitration committee, the committee ruled unanimously 
for Sullivan.36  Fulton’s faulty patent surely made him more vulnerable to future lawsuits.  
Understanding the weakness of the patent process, Livingston was wise to seek a firmer 
ground for the steamboat line in New York statutory law. 
Opponents of the monopoly soon turned to the U. S. government to balance the 
economic dominance that New York had granted to the NRSC on the Hudson River.  
Like Stevens and Sullivan, other opponents of the Livingston-Fulton monopoly tried to 
develop the federal power over patents into a counterweight to the state monopoly.  They 
argued that Congress had been given exclusive and not concurrent authority over patents.  
The argument over patents quickly devolved into a contest between the supremacy of the 
federal government, and the authority of municipal law or the state police power to 
regulate federal patents.  Because Fulton’s patent itself proved clumsily executed, it could 
not sustain his patent rights against other inventors who more carefully secured their 
patents.  In addition, Thornton believed that the states could not restrict river navigation 
against a patented ship and was quick to tell anyone who asked that New York’s 
monopoly was a violation of U.S. rights to grant patents.  The security of Fulton’s grant, 
then, depended on the power of the state of New York to grant exclusive use to his patent 
and regulate other patents on grounds of public health, safety, or (in the end) simple 
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expediency.  In the aggressively competitive business climate of the Early Republic, 
opponents of the monopoly power turned to the courts to challenge it directly.   
Livingston v. Van Ingen  (1811-1812) 
The lull in competition secured by the departure of John Sullivan for the 
Delaware River was brief.  In the summer of 1811, a company comprised of 
approximately two dozen Albany businessmen including James Van Ingen, (henceforth 
referred to as the Albany Company), built and ran the Hope from Albany to New York 
City in direct competition with the Steamboat.  Because the Hope was very nearly a 
direct copy of Fulton invention and the businessmen’s superb local advertising was 
winning the upstate market, Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton felt it worth the risk 
to test their monopoly in court.37  Rather than risk a jury trial for patent violation, they 
first filed a bill for an injunction in U.S. Circuit Court for the District of New York, 
headed by their kinsman Justice Henry Brockholst Livingston.38  Justice Livingston 
denied that the circuit court had any jurisdiction over patents as a court of equity, and 
ruled that it would be improper for the court to engage in “interposition” against the state.  
He pointed to the state Chancery court as the proper tribunal to grant them an 
injunction.39 
Fulton and Livingston took Justice Livingston’s advice.  Their bill in Chancery 
relied heavily upon the arguments for state sovereignty that Livingston had developed 
against John Stevens.  New York had justly rewarded Livingston and Fulton’s North 
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River Steamboat Company (NRSC) for the hard work, financial investment, and time 
with an “exclusive privilege” for thirty years.  Livingston and Fulton’s contract with the 
state entitled them to an injunction to restrain the Albany Company from operating.  They 
believed state statutory law was sufficient to decide the case.  In answer, the Albany 
Company mirrored Stevens’ arguments that the monopoly contradicted the patent and 
commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 40 
While Chancellor and Republican leader John Lansing refused the injunction, his 
opinion did not repudiate state legislative power as completely as most scholars have 
suggested.41  Lansing acknowledged that the states had possessed sovereignty when the 
original grant was made to Fitch in 1787, although some of that sovereignty had devolved 
on the Confederation by acts of the states.  However, the Constitution had changed the 
character of the government, granting to it real power over patents and commerce.  
Because Lansing’s opinion was confined to refuting the NRSC’s reliance on statutory 
law, he disregarded the issue of patents and scientific progress.  The matter in question 
was the power of the state to grant exclusive privileges or monopolies.  Here, Lansing 
alluded to the distinction between a grant from executive prerogative, which under 
common law had been called monopoly, and the just power of a legislature.  A legislative 
right to regulate navigable waters for a public purpose was “unquestioned” in his belief, 
but the case did not make it necessary to determine how much this right was limited.  His 
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nod to existing doctrine on legislative power shows Lansing’s careful efforts not to 
challenge state authority too directly.42 
The strongest challenge to the state-granted monopoly came from the common 
law.  Lansing downplayed the constitutional conflict suggested by the Albany Company.  
Lansing cited the privileges and immunities clause, the patent power, and the commerce 
clause to acknowledge tension between the U.S. Constitution and N.Y. Statues.  Yet the 
acts were not fundamentally in violation of the rights of citizens, of federal patents, or of 
interstate commerce because Livingston and Fulton had scrupulously avoided potential 
conflicts.  The NRSC had justified the monopoly as a municipal law regulation of the 
other patents.  Municipal law or police powers jurisdiction allowed the states to regulate 
federal patents regarding their effects on public health, safety, or nuisance.  Lansing 
found the ground to overturn this argument in traditional common law liberty.  He 
stressed that the acts respecting steam navigation were not a grant to operate a specific 
type of machinery, but of the right to navigate in general.  Under the common law, 
however, New York’s grant of navigation was in fundamental conflict with traditional 
liberty.  Lansing explained:  “Sound maxims of justice and jurisprudence … from able 
and learned jurists” stretching from Justinian through Magna Charta to Blackstone 
emphasize the jus publicum to free usage on the seas and navigable rivers, which even the 
king could not bar.43 Parliament and the New York state legislature had both, on 
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43 Blackstone himself emphasizes that “the element of air and flowing water, are incapable of any other 
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occasion, regulated navigation by creating wharves, but neither had ever gone so far as 
the monopoly granted to Livingston and Fulton.  “It would certainly seem,” opined 
Lansing, “that it was considered contrary to the jus publicum” that an exclusive grant of 
navigation right could be made.44  
Building the common law into a federal legal principle, Lansing implied that the 
jus publicum might restrict all legislative sovereignty.  A right to public navigation could 
operate as a rule of law over the legislature, both in its own right, and through its 
incorporation into the “privileges and immunities clause” of Article IV, section 2.  
Suggesting that the Constitution “intended to secure equal rights to all” through the 
common law, Lansing challenged the very possibility that a contractual right of property 
made in statutory law could be “legally carved out of the jus publicum of the citizens of 
the United States.”45  Yet at the very moment, when Lansing boldly suggested the 
incorporation of the common law into constitutional rights, the Chancellor retreated.  Out 
of deference to the state legislature, he refused to undertake such a significant review of 
legislative authority.  He stressed instead that the complexity and “novelty” of the 
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questions raised sufficient doubts to prevent an injunction from issuing against the 
Albany Company. 46 
Livingston and Fulton immediately appealed to the Court for the Correction of 
Errors for reversal.47  Livingston and Fulton employed Cadwallader David Colden, 
Fulton’s personal lawyer, and Thomas A. Emmet, an Irish-American with a reputation for 
brilliant oratory.  Their core argument emphasized that the supreme, sovereign state 
power was bound to protect their property rights by its contract in the 1808 law.  The 
appellants challenged Chancellor Lansing’s opinion that a monopoly power was 
inconsistent with the jus publicum of navigation.  Such a radical doctrine would 
dangerously limit the sovereignty of the states.  The power to grant exclusive privileges is 
a power “inherent in every sovereign and in every regular government … exercised for 
the promotion of industry, enterprise, commerce, science, and the arts.”48  The appellants 
argued that the legislature possessed intrinsic sovereign power to vest them with an 
exclusive grant of navigation; it did not need a municipal health or safety justification.  
Lansing’s opinion unduly emphasized the limits of royal prerogative; the legislature itself 
was not so limited.  Citing Lord Hale, counsel for Livingston stressed that “the 
parliament may control the jus publicum, as to navigable waters, though the king 
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court of review for judicial opinions (Baxter, 23).   
 




cannot.”49  Against a common law conception of sovereignty, limited by natural law, they 
posited a theory of absolute legislative sovereignty to make positive law, limited only by 
the higher positive law of the Constitution.  In so doing, however, Colden and Emmet 
abandoned the Revolutionary Whig principle that the legislature was bound by a 
constitution of customary right.  New York, they claimed, possessed the power to do 
everything that not been specifically enjoined by the U.S. Constitution.  
Counsel then returned to the agent that the monopoly, was in fact a municipal 
regulated “air and water … to prevent public injury.” 50  This power, they asserted, 
clearly could be held concurrently by the states and Congress.  Congress might prohibit 
the importation of slavery, but so can the states.  Congress might patent an item, but the 
state under municipal law still reserves the right to prohibit “an immoral or blasphemous 
book or a noxious medicine.”51  
Because Congress already possessed power over commence and patents, it 
became necessary for New York to develop the doctrine of concurrent powers, so that the 
states could also exercise their authority in this sphere.  Livingston had developed this 
argument in his correspondence with Stephens in 1808.  Now, the counsel for the NRSC 
found the doctrine in the text of the U.S. Constitution.  As they explained, “All power 
not, in its nature, exclusively vested in Congress, not expressly prohibited to the states, 
remains concurrent in the states.”  Following their reasoning, Article I sec. 8 enumerates 
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51 By stressing that states had the power to regulate property on the grounds of nuisance, health, or morals, 
the monopolists unwittingly opened themselves to future criticism.  Opponents would argue that the 
monopoly was not really a regulation of property grounded in municipal law, but the kind of grant to 
navigation rights asserted by Lansing.  When the question over inter-state commerce arose, as New Jersey 
businessmen challenged the monopoly, the courts recognized that the monopoly was actually a regulation 




what Congress is permitted to do; however, the states also exercise these powers 
concurrently unless explicitly prohibited by the Constitution (Art. I sec. 10).  They argued 
that if Congress had exclusive authority, as in the power of making war, then that power 
has been alienated from the states.  But the power to promote science, Emmet argued, 
was necessary for both states and Congress.  To be sure, if a specific Congressional 
statute conflicted with state law, than the state must yield to the supremacy of the national 
government in their exercise of a concurrent power.  But “the rights of the states are not 
to be explained away by metaphors and figures of speech.” 52 To drive out the state 
jurisdiction, counsel for NRSC explained that there must be a “complete, entire, and 
exclusive” legislation by Congress.  In consequence, however, the NRSC opened itself to 
the possibility that the court might reject the idea of concurrent sovereignty, and that the 
state would lose all practical authority over steam navigation. 
The counsel for Van Ingen faced a daunting challenge.  They were bound to 
defend Lansing’s ruling by the need to sustain the ruling of the lower court and prevent 
an injunction.  Yet they were forced to argue against sovereign legislative authority 
before the Court of Errors, which was seated in the New York Senate.  Competitors had 
easily undermined Fulton’s patent; it proved much harder to persuade the senate to 
sustain Lansing’s bold use of the common law against their own grant of monopoly.  
Where possible, counsel for Van Ingen focused their critique on Constitutional issues.  
They cogently argued that the patent power of Congress is supreme over the state 
legislature.  Congress’s 1793 patent law provided the legislation necessary to overrule 
state patents, because the Constitution made federal law supreme over state law.  Such 
                                                 




laws must be uniform across the nation to be effective, and so New York’s patent power 
needed to be subservient to the federal power to for patent protection to be effective.  
Because the NRSC’s monopoly did not rely on patent law, however, this argument was 
insufficient.53 
Consequently, The Albany Company’s main assault followed Lansing’s common 
law critique of the monopoly.  The NRSC had challenged that because the legislature had 
a sovereign power to limit the jus publicum through positive law, they did not need a 
municipal law justification.  To undermine this claim, counsel for Van Ingen argued that 
the power to make municipal law qualified, but did not destroy the public right of 
navigation.  They argued, “Every man must use his property in such a manner as not to 
injure another.  Because a man has no right to ride over a neighbor’s field without his 
consent, it does not follow that his horse is not his own and that he may not ride on a 
public highway.”54  Inventors, they implied had some right to protection of their property 
rights.  However, in depriving other businessmen of their property rights (by seizing the 
Hope through injunction), the monopoly grantees violated both universal justice and the 
power of Congress to patent inventions. 
The Court of Errors unanimously overturned the Chancery court ruling and 
ordered that the Hope be forfeited to the North River Steamboat Company.  The conflict 
in Livingston v. Van Ingen was between the ancient common law on the one hand, and 
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the sovereign power of the legislature on the other.  The argument thus dealt significantly 
with the commerce clause because the conflict took place entirely within state lines.  As 
expressed in Livingston v. Van Ingen (1812), New York chose its positive law contract 
with Fulton and Livingston over the traditional common law restraints on sovereign 
power.  Because the court was composed of the state senate, sitting with the state 
supreme court, it is not entirely surprising that they vindicated legislative sovereignty.  
Yet the Court of Error vindicated the monopoly in such clear and striking terms that 
Livingston v. Van Ingen became the byword for legislative authority in New York.  The 
judges largely agreed with the NRSC’s contention that the state retained the power, first 
to grant monopolies to promote progress and second, to regulate navigation and patents 
concurrently.  Judge Joseph C. Yates insisted that to prevent the state law from touching 
on commerce might “lead to the total prostration of internal improvements.”55  Neither 
the state nor the central government would have the power to build local roads.  Judge 
Smith Thompson explained that the surrender of a state power to promote science was 
“repugnant to state sovereignty, and unnecessary relinquishing a power not contemplated 
by the Constitution.”56  The Court overturned Lansing’s integration of the jus publicum 
into the rights of national citizens.  New York refused to countenance the federal 
supremacy over patents and commerce suggested by Lansing’s opinion, because it would 
lead to the evisceration of state sovereignty itself.   
Chief Justice James Kent, one of the most capable legal minds of the Early 
Republic, gave the only opinion to advance beyond the doctrine suggested by Thomas A. 
Emmet and Cadwallader Colden—that state legislative sovereignty could control the jus 
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publicum.  Kent opined that the central question at stake was the sovereign authority of 
the legislature.  Rejecting any conflict between vested rights (“the fundamental principles 
of all government”) and the grant to Livingston and Fulton, Kent stressed that the only 
possible conflict to the grant lay in the U.S. Constitution.  If the people had given “the 
whole original power of the subject matter of the grant” to the United States, then the 
monopoly would be invalid.  Accepting the idea of concurrent powers, then, it was 
necessary that some specific collision be found to challenge the grant: 
It strikes me as an … inadmissible proposition, that the State is divested of a capacity to 
grant an exclusive privilege of navigating a steamboat, within its own waters, merely 
because we can imagine that Congress, in the plenary exercise of its power to regulate 
commerce, may make some regulation inconsistent with the exercise of its privilege.  
When such a case arises, it will provide for itself; and there is, fortunately, a paramount 





Kent agreed with Emmet that a state provision must only be overruled on an express 
violation.  To overrule the state grant because it might interfere would be a “monstrous 
heresy.”  However, Kent recognized that should the federal courts rule against them, it 
would be the duty of the state to respect the courts.  He did not contemplate the 
interposition practiced by Pennsylvania in 1809, or by Kentucky and Virginia in 1798.  
Kent recognized that the stability of the law required a “common umpire” to prevent a 
collision between state and federal jurisdiction.  However, Kent thought the possibility of 
such a federal court undermining state law quite remote.58  
Kent did not anticipate that existing federal law conflicted with the monopoly.  
Chancellor Lansing had suggested that the traditional rights of jus publicum might be 
incorporated into the privileges and immunities clause to invalidate the state grant.  In 
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contrast, Kent insisted that the power of the state over the “internal commerce of the state 
by land and water remains entirely, and I may say exclusively, within the scope of its 
original sovereignty.”59 The Court of Errors decision settled the question of state 
legislative power, and grounded it on a Blackstonian conception of legislative 
sovereignty.  The state was still duty bound to protect property, promote science, and 
permit commerce, but it was markedly free from the restraints of the common law in this 
pursuit.  The sole restraint on the power of the legislature was the grant that the people 
made in the U.S. Constitution to the general government.  Should an explicit conflict 
arise, New York suggested it would defer to the legitimate authority of the national 
government.  Until then, “the faith of this State” required that it keep the grant it made, 
and punishes the disregard of the Albany Company for the law.60  Thus in 1811, the 
NRSC’s argument for concurrent regulation and state sovereignty was incorporated into 
state constitutional law. 
 
 
“The War of Legislation” between New York and New Jersey 
While New York had promoted the initial development of the steamboat in 1807, 
it now sought to stifle future innovation and competition, while reserving the benefits of 
the steamboat to itself and the grantees.  Paradoxically, Kent’s assertion of New York’s 
sovereignty created the perfect opportunity for opponents of the monopoly to undermine 
it.  In the wake of Kent’s opinion, inventors and entrepreneurs in the several states turned 
to the sovereign, positive law-making authority of their own states to challenge the power 
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of New York State.  New Jersey twice passed retaliatory confiscation statutes against any 
New York steamboat operator who might seek an injunction against a New Jersey boat 
(1811 & 1820).  A contest quickly developed which pitted the “state rights” of New 
Jersey, not against the federal government, but against her “sister state” of New York.  
New York found that the several states would not accept New York as the “common 
umpire” for constitutional meaning, any more than Pennsylvania had accepted the 
Supreme Court in 1809.   
If New York tried to protect its state legislative power from too broad a reading of 
the U.S. Constitution, New Jersey identified the primary threat to its state rights as New 
York itself.  In addition to threat of confiscation by injunction in New York court, New 
Jersey steamboat operators like John Stevens encountered a bitter dispute about the state 
boundary line that further endangered their business.  New York claimed that under its 
colonial charter all of the waters of the Hudson, up to the New Jersey shoreline.  Thus, 
New York insisted that its grant to Livingston and Fulton included the waters outside the 
towns of Elizabeth, New Brunswick, Hoboken, and the Amboys.  New Jersey, in 
response, claimed up to the center of the Hudson.  The dispute became quite rancorous.  
New York state officials took their claim so far that they would occasionally serve 
warrants upon those standing on docks in New Jersey!  Little wonder, then, that Stevens 
had eventually moved his business to the friendlier waters of the Delaware.61   
Encouraged by the prospect of a successful challenge to the monopolists early in 
1811, competitors to John R. Livingston’s ferry service began to emerge on the New 
Jersey shore.  John Stevens returned to run the Juliana as a ferry from Hoboken to New 
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York City, carrying up to 1,600 passengers per day.62  New Jersey Governor Aaron 
Ogden recognized that the new steam ferries made his “ancient ferry” from Elizabeth 
Town to New York City obsolete.  He contracted with Daniel Dod to secure an engine 
and mount it in the Sea Horse.  In addition, he purchased a stake in the Perseverance 
from the Albany Company and secured Fitch’s old patent rights and an U.S. coasting 
license.63  For once, the monopolists faced an opponent who possessed political 
connections as good as their own.  Ogden also enjoyed the benefit of a January 1811 New 
Jersey law that allowed anyone who had his steamboat seized by New York to have their 
competitor’s boat seized in the waters of New Jersey.64  In retaliation, New York passed a 
statute strengthening the monopoly further by requiring the court to enjoin unlicensed 
boats as they were used, and requiring that they be prohibited from any use of the boats 
before trial.65  Simply by filing a lawsuit, the monopoly could shut down an opposing 
boat for weeks or months. Facing this obstacle, Ogden proved reluctant to try his 
monopoly and instead tried to buy a license from Fulton.  (Livingston had died; control of 
his share passed to his heir, Robert L. Livingston.)66  When Fulton demanded too much 
money, an exasperated Ogden petitioned both the New York and New Jersey legislatures 
for relief. 
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In 1813, New Jersey granted Ogden sole right to navigate by steam in the waters 
of New Jersey.  This measure placed John R. Livingston as much in violation of New 
Jersey law, as Ogden would be in violation of New York law.67  Yet Ogden asked the 
New Jersey legislature for a still more stringent retaliatory provision against the New 
York monopolists.  Simultaneously, he petitioned New York to repeal the 1811 law and 
allow him to fight an injunction through the judicial process, suggesting they might 
exempt the New Jersey ferries from the law.68 
The New York legislative committee that heard Ogden’s petition in February 
1814 received the favorable attention of William A. Duer, a Duchess County Federalist 
assemblyman.  Duer organized the committee meeting and neglected to invite Fulton’s 
lawyers until a few hours before the hearing.  Fulton himself was in New York City and 
not able to attend.  Ogden gave an impressive speech, supported by “some very pretty 
little tin machines and models.”  He defended the technical merits of Fitch and Dod’s 
innovations and disparaged the originality of Fulton’s.  Because Fulton did not invent the 
steamboat, Ogden charged that the legislative grants were defective.  Colden and Emmet 
lacked the knowledge to answer the technical arguments but fiercely defended the 
monopoly with a defense of the legislative power to grant.69   
Ogden’s most powerful argument was the injustice of the 1811 law’s requirement 
of an injunction before trial.  To test the law, he would have to sail his vessel in violation 
of the law, and subject it to injunction before trial.  This, he contended, violated the 
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requirements of procedural justice in the federal Bill of Rights.  By stressing his own 
moderation, and his preference for the judicial process, Ogden was able to gain the 
committee’s support for his request.  Over the objections of Fulton’s lawyers, they 
reported a bill to repeal the confiscatory act, which passed the House (49-42).  Allies of 
the Livingstons, however, mobilized to defeat the bill in the Senate, where it died.70  
Despite this defeat, Ogden could argue that the interests of the people and legal justice 
were served by the destruction of the monopoly  
The following year, John R. Livingston used Ogden’s strategy and appealed to the 
New Jersey Legislature to overturn Ogden’s monopoly so that an NRSC boat could run 
into New Brunswick according to his license.  In the January 1815 hearing, Emmet 
reversed his earlier arguments in favor of monopolies and labeled the New Jersey grant 
“odious in law and justice.”  Fulton, he asserted, deserved rewards and protection of his 
intellectual property, but all Ogden sought was profit.  Ogden’s counsel stressed the duty 
of New Jersey to defend her citizens against the statues of New York.  According to 
Vattel’s doctrine of the law of nations, New Jersey was required to protect its own 
citizens against foreign invasion.  This duty was the basis of the Embargo and non-
importation acts lately passed by congress.  New Jersey, as a state “equally free, 
sovereign, and independent with the state of New York, and her privileges as such 
guaranteed by the federal compact” was bound by the “dictates of common reason and 
common justice” to defend its own citizens.  If New York agreed to follow “reason and 
justice,” and renounce its discriminatory laws, then New Jersey would also agree.  The 
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law of nations required New Jersey to act as a sovereign to protect her natural rights 
against New York: 
The State of New Jersey is equally free, sovereign, and independent with the State of 
New York, and her privileges as such, guaranteed by the federal compact, and susceptible 
of enforcement by the power of the union, and founded on the immutable principles of 
truth, justice, and equality of rights, are not to be sacrificed to the ruin and injury of her 
citizens on the demands of any[one].71 
 
Despite the animosity of New Jersey against her traditional rival, Ogden, a 
Federalist, could not overcome the political obstacles in the legislature.  The Federalists 
were out of power and in decline after the embarrassments suffered during the War of 
1812.  He lost the monopoly by a margin of one vote, with the legislature divided along 
party lines.  Ogden, facing bitter denunciations from his former business partners, needed 
a new base of support, and the monopolists, as always, proved willing to include 
vanquished foes rather than continue costly political and legal battles.  John R. 
Livingston agreed to grant Ogden a license for $600 per annum.72   
Fulton never got another opportunity to defend his monopoly.  On the return trip 
from Trenton in February 1815, Emmet fell through the ice on the Hudson.  Fulton 
managed to rescue Emmet from the freezing water, but died from the exposure himself.  
His widow, Harriet, sold her share of the monopoly for $100,000 to a group of investors 
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headed by Fulton’s personal lawyer, Cadwallader Colden.73  Thus the monopoly 
persevered, despite the loss of Fulton’s genius.  The struggle between New York and 
New Jersey proved a largely political contest, waged by lawyers in state legislative 
committee, rather than by appellant and respondent in the state supreme courts.  Through 
the demise of the New Jersey Federalists and the strength of the Livinstons in the New 
York Senate, the NRSC was able to triumph in this arena.  Nevertheless, the struggle 
demonstrated the need for a “common umpire” to adjudicate constitutional disputes while 
demonstrating New York’s unsuitability to fit that role.   
The Pamphlet War 
 As the clamor against the monopoly grew from New Jersey, Cadwallader Colden, 
as a leader of the North River Steamboat Company (NRSC), sought to defend the 
legislative sovereignty of the state, while beginning to recognize the limits on that 
sovereignty.  The tide began to turn against his position.  Statesmen in New York 
recognized that the security of its liberty, both personal and economic, ultimately 
depended on the security of the Union and its government.  Chancellor Kent had 
proclaimed that, if necessary, New York would submit to duly enacted Congressional 
regulation of commerce.  Now opposition arose from within New York against the 
injustice of the monopoly itself.   
 Despite the death of Fulton and the capitulation of Ogden, Assemblyman William 
Duer personally continued the struggle against the monopoly.  As the Federalist Party fell 
out of favor after the War of 1812, Duer increasingly moved into the democratic camp of 
Martin Van Buren’s Bucktail faction as they made common cause against De Witt 
                                                 




Clinton and his supporters, which included Cadwallader Colden.74  Duer’s critique of 
special privilege increasingly gained the support of the public and business community.  
In New Jersey, town meetings took up the cause of reform.  In New York, businessmen 
were anxious to share in the potential profits of free navigation and repeatedly petitioned 
both New Jersey and New York legislatures for an end to the monopoly.  This public 
coalition challenged the legitimacy of the monopoly and the state laws as a violation of 
new inventors’ property rights, the due process rights of steamboat owners, and the 
public’s right to progress in science.75  In 1817, Cadwallader Colden published a 
biography of Fulton that severely criticized Duer’s handling of the legislative hearing of 
1814.  The Life of Robert Fulton served dual purposes: first, as an extended eulogy for a 
close friend of Colden who had offered a great service to science; second, to justify the 
exclusive grant he had just purchased as the fitting reward for a departed genius.  Duer 
responded with a long and detailed defense of the committee’s actions in A Letter 
Addressed to Cadwallader Colden (1817), which he had distributed, to the state 
legislature.76  Duer deployed his former arguments against the monopoly: first, because 
Fulton did not invent the steamboat, he did not deserve the monopoly; second, it 
concerned matters belonging to Congress under the Constitution.  These arguments were 
familiar themes in the steamboat cases and did not significantly alter the debate.  Duer’s 
contribution consisted in his critique of monopoly laws, and his insistence that legislative 
sovereignty be subject to higher norms of justice.   
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Whereas Ogden had challenged the automatic imposition of an injunction against 
any violator of the monopoly as a violation the federal Bill of Rights, Duer now insisted 
that the people held a natural right of due process that the legislature ought not to take 
from the people.  In A Letter Addressed to Cadwallader D. Colden, Duer retorted, “The 
legislature had no power to barter the natural rights of their constituents, in exchange for 
any public benefit whatsoever, or to reward even Genius—at the expense of the 
constitution.”77  While this argument did not constrain the theoretical sovereignty of the 
state, it challenged what the state, acting prudently in pursuit of justice, ought to do.  He 
convincingly argued that this monopoly was not so much designed to preserve property 
as to promote the accumulation of further wealth.  Even if the state had the power to ban 
a patented item or form a monopoly, the ban should proceed from “motives of general 
policy and the public good.” 78  Government should balance the need to promote 
invention with special grants with the danger of creating too great a cost to future 
generations.   
Duer’s Letter explained that it was the legislature’s responsibility to limit its own 
power to prevent infringements of justice.  If the New York legislature had mistakenly 
granted rights in conflict with those vested by the U.S. Constitution, then it ought to 
declare that that law was not meant to deprive people’s rights.  This admission would not 
change an existing contract with the North River Steamboat Company, but recognize 
through legislative review the limits of its jurisdiction.  If the statutory laws passed in 
1808 and 1811 are “repugnant to the conditions of the constitutional compact, it becomes 
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the duty of the legislature to repeal them.”79  In other words, the legislature itself was the 
proper body to review whether its actions were consistent with the U.S. Constitution.  
Duer believed they were inconsistent and urged the monopoly’s repeal.  Duer diligently 
pursued this course of action, and as a state assemblyman, Duer repeatedly held new 
hearings of petitions for repeal of the monopoly.  In 1817, he secured another bill to open 
the courts to a suit by John Sullivan so that he might challenge the law.  Only the 
Livingstons’ continued influence in the Senate blocked this legislation. 
Colden quickly responded to the threat to his grant with the pamphlet publication of 
Vindication (1818) to answer his critics’ allegations in detail.  First, he answered Ogden’s 
claim that Fitch was the true inventor.  Although Colden’s counter charges against Fitch’s 
genius are unconvincing, Colden persuasively demonstrated that Fulton’s invention 
possessed technical merit, and that the legislature duly rewarded him.  Second, Colden 
challenged that Duer and the assembly committee held a radical egalitarian tendency 
against vested property rights.  The grant of special privilege, moreover, was legitimate 
simply because it had been enacted by the legislature.  While Duer believed the 
legislature’s actions were in need of comparison to principles of justice and higher law, 
Colden insisted that the legislature, acting as a sovereign voice of the people, was 
essentially unconstrained.80 
In answer to Duer’s constitutional argument, Colden mustered the carefully 
reasoned arguments for legislative sovereignty he had used against Van Ingen.  He 
insisted that the right of property found in a federal patent could be distinguished from 
the right of a state to regulate the use of that property.  While an inventor could hold a 
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valid patent, within the jurisdiction of a state, the power of its state legislature was 
supreme.  The legislature did not even need a nuisance or public health reason to exclude 
a patent.81  Colden’s insistence that the state could regulate patents in all cases, answered 
his critics.  And while Duer had argued that the state monopoly was a grant against the 
common law right of navigation, not a municipal regulation of health or safety, Colden 
now countered that the nature of legislative power gave the states power over the federal 
government even in granting exclusive rights of navigation. 
Nevertheless, Colden’s strongest argument rested on precedent and history.  
Based on successful transit of the Steamboat in 1807, the legislature had offered Fulton a 
contract to give the NRSC an exclusive privilege for up to thirty years, if they would risk 
their fortune in a passenger line.  Five state legislatures, councils of revision, and the 
unanimous Court of Errors had supported the grant. Now Fulton had aroused the jealousy 
of out-of-state competitors like Sullivan and Ogden who believed they were entitled to 
challenge him in the courts.  Without legal protection, Fulton would have been 
condemned to “certain ruin…by endless and expensive lawsuits.”  Why should New 
York show generosity to “strangers” at the expense of her own citizens?82 
By shrewdly appealing to the revolutionary and anti- federalist critique of 
concentrated power, Duer’s A Reply to Mr. Colden’s Vindication of the Steamboat 
Monopoly (1819) offered a strong republican response to Colden’s defense of vested 
property and exclusive grants of privilege.  Duer stressed that legislatures, as well as 
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kings, could commit injustice through their actions.  Specifically, he argued that all 
monopolies are “grants against common right, and equally at variance with the principles 
of political economy, and the liberal spirit of the common law.”  They should only be 
created when the public good supports them or a great evil is to be avoided.  He implied 
that the grant to Livingston was, in fact, a special privilege: “Whether conceded to court 
favorites, or obtained by the management of intriguing demagogues; whether their object 
be the private emolument of an iron crowned tyrant, or the gratification of a brawling 
tribune of the people: public utility is equally violated.”83  In this case, the rights of 
navigation and scientific property that New York granted belonged to the people of the 
whole Union.  New York had selfishly claimed these privileges for its own citizens and 
barred other citizens from further innovations.  The people, Duer argued, possessed a 
higher right than the state, grounded in “the solemn agreement of every State of The 
Union—they are supported by a consideration of their mutual forbearance in the exercise 
of the power of legislation among co-ordinate sovereignties,’84  New York had neglected 
its duty to consider the needs of the whole Union.  
The basic constitutional issue, Duer asserted, was not one of precedent, nor what 
former chancellors have argued, but one of property.  Intellectual property was 
acknowledged to be a form of property to which the author was entitled to exclusive 
enjoyment.  Duer acknowledged that Fulton had a just claim to this property right, so 
long as it did not eradicate the rights of others.  To protect the rights of the public, Duer 
challenged Colden’s absolute framework for property rights.  Unlike Colden, Duer 
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repudiated compact theory as the legal foundation of property rights.  This Lockean 
liberal held that property was a natural right, which people had formed societies to 
protect.  The defense of property rights was therefore a primary end of society.  During 
the early Republic, the natural rights of property derived from the state of nature 
remained a fundamental political axiom.  Colden followed this line when he argued that 
the sovereign power of the legislature existed to protect vested rights.85  Duer openly 
“renounced all faith in that ancient speculation; and regard[ed] the ‘state of nature’ as one 
in which the genius and talents of mankind would be forever useless and unprofitable.”  
Thus, according to Duer, property and natural rights were derived from natural, organic 
communities:  
The right of exclusive enjoyment in things, both real and personal, corporeal and 
incorporeal, is the very foundation of property.  It is the creature of civil society, and one 
of the strongest ligaments by which the body politic is bound together.86 
 
Conceptualizing how property rights do not arise from occupying a territory or 
improving it (Locke), but from the needs of society for stability and growth, Duer fully 
supported a liberal policy of patents for inventors as basis for “natural justice,” which 
does not arise out of a social compact or legislative sovereignty, but out of the needs of 
natural, organic communities.  For instance, both inventors and the public benefited when 
the granting of patent rights encouraged innovation.  Yet if an inventor had a perpetual 
right to his intellectual property, then the further progress of science would be heavily 
impaired, and the public would never enjoy the full potential of the new idea.  A limited 
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natural right of intellectual property served the community, while an absolute legislative 
right served the few at the expense of the community.87 
In Duer’s estimation, Colden’s distinction between a national property right held 
through a patent and the right of a state to regulate property was meaningless.  Duer 
believed that both national property rights and state regulation were necessary, but that in 
the case of the NRSC, the latter had obliterated the former.  Because the grant of 
exclusive privilege was really a grant of navigation itself, and not a regulation of it, state 
legislation had unjustly impaired the property rights of those holding other patents.  Duer 
argued that a state grant of exclusive navigation effectively voided the right that other 
businessmen like Sullivan and Ogden had to the exclusive use of patents they held.  The 
extreme length of the state grant would deprive the public of innovations for until the 
thirty years expired.  Duer maintained the need for a balance between federal patent and 
state municipal law and, at the same time, held that the existing monopoly was 
considerably biased toward the grant held by Colden under the municipal law and against 
the rights of the public protected by federal patents.   
Duer seems to have won the public to his opinion.  Evidence of increasing 
skepticism toward the monopoly is demonstrated in the dozens of petitions sent to the 
New York and New Jersey legislatures for an end of the monopolies.  In many cases, 
public appeals were driven by self- interest rather than a consistent theory of political 
economy.  Inventor John Sullivan’s petitions for an end of the monopoly, as an example, 
should not be read as a charge against monopolies in general because he held exclusive 
                                                 




grants from Massachusetts on the Connecticut River.88  The various petitions from 
merchants, traders, and town meetings from New Brunswick (NJ) to New York to 
Albany, however, can be taken as a more representative sample of the increasing pressure 
on state legislatures to open their waters up for free trade and navigation by steam.  The 
people of New Brunswick petitioned the New Jersey Legislature in April of 1820 that 
they were denied those privileges of navigation that the citizens of New York enjoyed in 
the waters of New Jersey.  They asked that the “right of free and unrestrained intercourse 
between the several states,” which the Constitution was supposed to secure, be made 
available to them.  Naturally, they turned to their own legislature, and not the federal 
courts to secure these rights to them.89  But the failure of the states to equitably and 
authoritatively mete out justice to which all parties would submit, began to bring about 
the decline of state sovereignty, and even more so as New Jersey and New York began to 
dispute the validity of the others claims.   
The Intractable Thomas Gibbons (1815-1824) 
In the wake of the 1811 decision against Van Ingen and Kent’s reaffirmation of 
intrastate commerce, the monopolists’ privilege seemed secure.  Yet competition 
continued to grow on the ferry routes into New York City, against the licensees of the 
monopoly.  In particular, a feud arose between Aaron Ogden, who held a license, and 
Thomas Gibbons, who did not.  Initially they argued over their ferry business, but the 
argument spilled over into intensely personal matters.  This dispute was so bitterly 
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contested that Gibbons was determined to destroy his adversary regardless of the cost.  
After more than a decade of successful legal defense, in 1824, the NRSC and 
Cadwallader Colden finally faced a competitor willing to sustain the costly legal battle 
necessary to destroy the monopoly.   
For over a decade, an appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds that Congress 
was supreme over commerce was left untried.  Commerce was largely considered a 
“maritime, coastal, external, and mercantile” function comprised entirely of trade goods 
and not applicable to inter-state passenger service.  If the industrialization and the 
explosion of internal canal and road projects were gradually transforming this 
understanding, the newer idea of commerce as intercourse did not immediately supersede 
the old one.90  Appeals to the Supreme Court were slow to materialize because the NRSC 
preferred to allow competitors into the franchise before risking their lucrative grant 
before the High Court.  Additionally, most competitors were eager to join a profitable 
monopoly when given the opportunity.  Cooperation offered security from the risks of a 
volatile market economy.  When an appeal to the Supreme Court finally came, it arose 
from the pugnacious ire of Thomas Gibbons more in his personal determination to 
destroy his business rival Aaron Ogden rather than from shrewd business calculation.  As 
Gibbons explained: 
I want to gallop my case thru the courts of chancery & errors, and I don’t much care what 
their decisions are.  –My stand must be made in the Supreme Court of the United States 
and I must get there as soon as I can under these circumstances.91   
 
Gibbons intransigence, and not the consolidating will of the nation-state, carried the case 
through to the Supreme Court, and provided the arena for the contest between state 
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legislative sovereignty and federal commerce power to be fully explored.  Marshall’s 
defense of commerce as intercourse placed it under Congressional regulatory authority, 
sealed the fate of the monopoly, and for a time led to the decline of state sovereignty in 
New York. 
In 1803, Georgia planter Thomas Gibbons had purchased a share of a salt 
meadow in Elizabeth Town that was suitable for a ferry landing.92  Gibbons gradually 
increased his business and financial investments in New Jersey, largely in real estate, and 
he became a partner with Ogden in the “ancient ferry” to New York City.  By 1813, 
Gibbons resided in Elizabeth Town during the summer to manage his investments there 
and soon thereafter granted the salt meadow as a trust to his daughter Ann Trumbull, 
which he managed together with his family and political allies.  When Ogden petitioned 
the New Jersey Legislature for protection from the Livingston monopoly, Ogden 
presented the ferry as something he owned in his own right.93  Gibbons quickly took 
offense, and the trust began to squabble with Ogden over its share of the property’s rent 
and profits.  Consequently, when Ogden lost his monopoly before the partisan state New 
Jersey legislature in 1815, the trust tried both to re-negotiate their agreement and then to 
buy the ferry outright.94  As Gibbons and Ogden proved unable to agree on terms, in July 
1815, the trust offered to either buy Ogden’s share of the ferry or sell its own share if 
Ogden would name a price.  Before an agreement could be reached, Ogden discovered 
that Gibbons had opposed his 1814 petition to the New Jersey legislature and sent 
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Gibbons an extensive list of his complaints against Gibbon’s interference with his 
personal property.  As the dispute escalated, Gibbons petitioned the New Jersey State 
Legislature to destroy Ogden’s property rights in the ferry landing, while Ogden helped 
pressure Gibbons’ wife into filing for divorce.95 
This ended any hope for peaceful cooperation on the ferry between Gibbons and 
Ogden.  On July 26, 1816, Gibbons stalked the half-mile to Ogden’s house to challenge 
him to a duel.  Because Ogden was not at home (some suggest he fled out the back door), 
Gibbons posted a steamboat handbill to his door, challenging his “wanton interference in 
a case so delicate” and asking him to arrange the time and place of their duel with his 
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 Gibbons' family gradually began to side with Ogden against him.  His son-in-law, John Trumbull 
wrote that Ogden believed “you have even contrived to hunt him, apparently with a desire to crush him.  He 
said your current views, were, without a doubt, to destroy the ferry & break up the monopoly which 
constituted value of the estate.” William was the exception, remaining steadfastly loyal.  Upon his father’s 
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second Col. Jonathan Dayton.96  Fortunately, the social climate had turned against duels 
so that Ogden did not feel obligated to appear.  Gibbons was able to intimidate his family 
into submission by threatening to distribute a libelous pamphlet against them.  Horrified, 
his wife gave up the idea of divorce.97   
As soon as he could affect a temporary reconciliation with his family, Gibbons 
turned his energy toward damaging Ogden financially by destroying NRSC’s monopoly.  
When the monopolists applied for a Congressional extension of Fulton’s patent in the 
name of his widow (she still held an interest in the monopoly), Gibbons wrote to John 
Randolph of Virginia to expose their greed.  The petition for extension, Gibbons 
explained to Randolph, had not been requested for any public purpose, but was “a tax on 
the citizens of the state” for the personal enrichment of Livingston and Ogden.  Like 
Duer, he stressed the monopoly was for private enrichment and not the public good.98 
Gibbons took great care to cultivate good relations with other stage and steamboat 
operators as he planned his operation.  A fragmentary record of a meeting with John R. 
Livingston in October 1816, indicated they believed they could co-operate against 
Ogden.  Gibbons would run his own ferry from Halsted’s Point (NJ) to New York to 
avoid conflict with Livingston’s line to New Brunswick (NJ).  Livingston, in turn, agreed 
not to “disturb” Gibbons with litigation.99  In the following season (1817), Gibbons 
attempted to extend business alliances to former New York Governor D.D. Tompkins and 
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began using Tompkin’s base in Staten Island. Later, Gibbons conveniently argued that he 
was operating on the strength of Tompkin’s license from John R. Livingston.  But 
Tompkins clearly did not believe that Gibbons had the necessary authority and grew 
alarmed when Gibbons began operating from Halstead’s Point (NJ—near Elizabeth Town 
and consequently outside Livingston’s grant).  In an attempt to open negotiations for a 
license from the steamboat company, Tompkin’s gave William Gibbons a letter of 
introduction to Edward P. Livingston (one of Robert’s heirs) and proceeded to warn 
Livingston that Gibbons intended to run his boat in “opposition to the New York grant 
with a view of bringing the question of the validity of the New York Law before the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”  Tompkins himself (running from Staten Island to 
New York City) would not be immediately threatened, but believed it was better for all 
concerned under the grant if the issue never reached federal courts, where legal costs 
would mount quickly and the monopoly could be overturned.  He urged Livingston to 
work out a deal privately.100 
By mid 1818, Gibbons was running the Bellona across the Hudson under the 
charge of a young captain, Cornelius Vanderbilt.  Vanderbilt succeeded marvelously, 
displaying the competitive edge and business sense that would later make his fortune as a 
railroad tycoon.  By October, Ogden’s profits were suffering heavily.  He filed a bill of 
complaint for an injunction in Chancery Court under Chancellor Kent.101  Gibbons 
immediately shifted his boat to a new line from New Brunswick to Elizabeth Town, 
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though additional injunctions against Gibbons suggest that Vanderbilt was running into 
New York harbor when he could.  Gibbons even arranged a deal with Tompkins to carry 
Gibbons’ passengers on to New York City.102 
Gibbons left Vanderbilt to manage the details of the steamboat operation and 
focused on preparing the case.  Gibbons' letters to his lawyers stress fine distinctions in 
the route between New York and New Jersey that his counsel warned him would not be 
sustained.  Gibbons also railed against the “subtlety” and villainy of his adversary.  By 
this point, Gibbons was quite ill (probably dying slowly of diabetes) and had to be 
satisfied with micro-managing his New York City lawyer from the other side of the 
Hudson.103   
By 1819, Gibbons sole aim was to bring his case before the Supreme Court; he 
had lost interest in financial compromise.  His determination is evident in his reply to an 
offer from John R. Livingston for an agreement between them, presumably on sharing 
New Brunswick.  Gibbons replied bluntly (and deceitfully) that his boat now ran solely in 
New Jersey waters under an U.S. coasting license.  “I shall not, in any case violate your 
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rights,” he wrote, “I will defend my own.”104  Faced with debilitating illness, mounting 
legal bills, economic panic, and offers of conciliation from the monopolists, Gibbons 
maintained his course when so many of his competitors had joined with the 
monopolists.105 
Gibbons was sustained, in part, by public support, particularly in coastal New 
Jersey, but also among New York City businessmen and fellow steamboat operators.  
John Sullivan, operating steam tugboats on the Connecticut, also planned to break into 
the New York market through a litigation strategy.  Working in concert with William 
Duer, he had repeatedly tried to break the monopoly in the legislature but was frustrated 
by the Livingstons’ power in the state senate.  Sullivan now needed financial support to 
form a company, so that he would have the resources to “assert my rights in New 
York.”106  When legal setbacks came, Gibbons received letters of advice hoping that he 
would expand his services in New Jersey.  One correspondent encouraged him that the 
“friends of state rights” in Trenton hoped he would use the occasion of a legal setback to 
shift his route to South Amboy, New Jersey.  These letters must have encouraged 
Gibbons that his supporters were also working to sustain their rights against the 
monopoly.  Powerful business and political enemies of the Livingston faction were 
gathering in support of Gibbons, preparing to enjoy the spoils.107 
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Gibbon’s bill in August 1819 to the Chancery Court displays the confidence of his 
supporters.  Because he did not have any rights of patent, patent law never entered the 
case.  He relied instead upon two separate arguments: first, that he held a federal coasting 
license entitling him to an interstate route, and second, an extensive argument that his 
route and landing (Halstead’s Point) did not interfere with the grant held by Ogden.  As 
Gibbon’s lawyer had predicted, Kent pointed out that Gibbons only used the latter 
argument to avoid an injunction against the Bellona; Kent quickly ruled that Gibbons had 
no right under New York law.  Ironically, Kent used an expanded definition of commerce 
to justify his argument.  The monopoly granted to the NRSC “was intended to 
comprehend the entire benefit of all the travelers and passengers going to and from 
Elizabethtown and New York.  It meant to embrace the whole stream of intercourse 
between those two places.”  Thus, Gibbons could not claim that the law did not apply to 
him because his route was not identical to Ogden's.  Each was in the “stream of 
intercourse” between an area over which New York claimed regulatory control.  
Generously, the Chancellor did not order the seizure and forfeiture of the Bellona.  And 
while Kent did not accept Gibbons’ claim to operate under the monopoly, he accepted 
Gibbons good faith pledge that he had scrupulously obeyed the law as he understood it.108  
On the question of commerce and the federal coasting license, Kent cited the 
precedent of Livingston v. Van Ingen to argue that New York could subject property to 
laws governing its “use and employment” while the only United States government could 
regulate the national character of transportation: 
There is no collision between the act of Congress and the acts of this state, creating the 
steam boat monopoly.  The one requires all vessels to be licensed, to entitle them to the 
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privileges of American vessels, and the others confer on particular individuals, the 
exclusive right to navigate steam boast, without, however, interfering with, or 
questioning the requisitions of the license.  The license is admitted to be as essential to 
those boats as to any others.  …  The suggestion that the laws of the two Governments 
are repugnant to each other upon this point, appears to be new and without foundation. 109 
 
On the issue of the coasting license, Kent ruled, it gave the Bellona an American 
character before the customs collector, but that a federal license did not give the Gibbons 
a right of property superior to the monopoly holders.  
As in his 1811 opinion, Kent supported the state again in 1819.  He asserted that 
only when Congress made the laws more specific would federal supremacy would 
inevitably defeat the state law.  If Congress were to pass a law granting vessels with a 
coasting license a liberty to navigate anywhere, then that law would be valid (if 
constitutional).  “But,” Kent opined, “at present, we have no such case, and there is no 
ground to infer such supremacy or intention, from the act regulating the coasting 
trade.”110  Until there was a direct collision, the concurrent power of the state stands. 
Gibbons had no illusions about the outcome of the case in the 1820 session of the 
Court of Errors.  He wrote to secure the services of Daniel Webster and William Wirt 
before the Supreme Court.  “This section of the Union,” he entreated, “is extremely 
agitated, from the imposition … of that proud state, New York.”111  Probably at Gibbons' 
influence, a wave of petitions issued from Elizabeth town and New Brunswick, 
complaining that their constitutional right of “free and unrestrained intercourse between 
the several states” had been impaired.  New Brunswick wanted their state to prohibit all 
steamboats, until New York should repeal its monopoly.  Although this measure was 
                                                 








regarded as too extreme, New Jersey moved to secure Gibbon’s legal position. Entitled, 
“A Law for maintaining the rightful jurisdiction of this State,” the legislation allowed 
persons who had their boats seized to obtain retaliatory injunctions against the monopoly 
and seize the monopolists boats.  The law apparently succeeded, for in 1821, the ferriage 
rates dropped one quarter and the New Jersey boats again had free access.112 
Meanwhile, Gibbons suffered his expected defeat in the Court of Errors.  Having 
averted the forfeiture of the Bellona, Gibbons abandoned his claim that he had been 
operating in good faith.  Instead, he focused on the absolute destruction of that monopoly.  
Gibbon’s 1820 appeal to the Court of Errors had stressed that the coasting license was a 
“direct collision” between the federal commerce power and the state monopoly.  (The 
commerce argument had been previously employed in the steamboat cases by John 
Stevens against Livingston and by the Albany Company in Livingston v. Van Ingen, but 
had yet to be tried in federal court).  In his reply, counsel for Ogden argued that Gibbons 
was not engaged in the coasting trade, and that this issue was a distraction.  The real 
issue, argued counsel for Ogden, was the power of the state to promote science and 
invention through the special privilege of grant or monopoly.  The state could also 
regulate property through municipal law.  Counsel for Gibbons replied that most 
municipal regulation was legitimate; however, the interdiction of another state’s 
steamboat exceeded New York’s authority.  As expected, the state affirmed Kent’s 
Chancery court decision. The Court of Errors supported the theoretical power of 
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Congress, but failed to find an actual conflict between the 1793 Coasting Act and 
steamboat law in New York.113 
Gibbons immediately appealed the case to the Supreme Court, but was surprised 
to have the case dismissed for want of jurisdiction in March of 1821.  An error in 
paperwork meant that his appeal did not comply with the Judiciary Act of 1789, so he 
began the process of re-filing.  Desperate to halt the threat to their privileges, the 
monopolists tried to quash the threat on all fronts.  James Allaire, a New York City 
manufacturer of steam engines, reported that the monopoly had threatened him with an 
injunction if he constructed boats for the New Jersey trade.  Aaron Ogden tried to 
mediate the territorial dispute over the Hudson in the New York legislature to diffuse 
tension over the injunctions.114  None was more anxious to prevent financial loss than 
John R. Livingston.  First, he petitioned the Legislature to sustain his contract with the 
state in the face of a wave of hostile petitions:   
From the time the boat called the Bellona was built to the present, little or no peace has 
taken place, petition after petition, lawsuits and bills in chancery have followed rapidly 
upon each other and the Honorable Legislature of New Jersey have been induced to pass 
almost every session new laws said to be in retaliation of those of New York.115 
 
Now, Livingston claimed, he was forced to run at a loss against two or three other 
boats out of New Jersey.  If the legislature should overturn the monopoly, or if the 
Supreme Court should overturn it, use of the steamboat would immediately “be claimed 
as a right” by Vermont, Connecticut, and Canada, and his vast investment would be in 
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114 “Petition of James P. Allaire to the New York State Legis.,” [1822]; “Petition of the of the Shipbuilders 
of the City of New York,” February 7, 1822; “Of New Brunswick, New Jersey on steam boat laws to New 
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jeopardy.  In any event, Livingston expressed himself perfectly willing to sell out to the 
legislature, if they would pay his losses and buy his boats.  Livingston sensed that the 
public tide was turning against the monopoly and hoped to cash out while his investment 
was still valuable.116  The monopolists tried to convince Gibbons to back down from his 
injunctions against them.  Ogden approached Gibbons in 1822.  Walter Livingston 
approached him on behalf of the monopoly as late as February 1824, but their efforts 
were to no avail.117  National events were moving against the monopolists.  By 1824, the 
Supreme Court had already sustained federal power against the states in McColloch v. 
Maryland (1819) and Cohens v. Virginia (1819).  Astute observers knew that the 
Marshall Court might well destroy the entire monopoly.   
When the Supreme Court finally heard the case in February 1824, each of the 
arguments paid careful attention to the question of state sovereignty, and how far it 
covered the rights of property and commerce.  Even Daniel Webster allowed that the 
state opinions of Chancellor Kent were “justly entitled to respect and deference,” but 
these lofty sentiments only softened the blow of his forensic oratory.118  Webster focused 
his attention exclusively on the question of the commerce clause.  In his view, the 
“extreme belligerent” legislation of the state119 was in clear violation of the complete and 
entire power that Congress held over commerce.  To remedy this violation, Webster 
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117 William Gibbons note.  On Meeting with Walter Livingston [1824].  (DUA 3:9)  Aaron Ogden to TG 
March 22, 1822; TG to Aaron Ogden, March 30, 1822.  Ogden hoped that Gibbons would desist from 
pressing New Jersey injunctions against him as a monopolist.  Gibbons replied, “It is my intention to 
continue in force the injunction you refer to [from New Jersey] and to enjoin as many of the steamboats 
belonging to the monopolists as are required to navigate the waters between the states of New Jersey and 
New York.” (DUA, copybook). 
 
118 Webster’s phrase, Gibbons v. Ogden (22 US1 (1824)), 3. See also pp. 187-188 for Marshall’s view. 
 




asked the Court to repudiate the doctrine of concurrent powers.  If a power was granted to 
Congress, then Congress had complete sovereignty toward the exercise of those ends.  
Consequently, the state would have complete sovereignty over its municipal law although 
the lines must be strictly drawn to retain the federal structure of the Union.  Webster 
explained that the doctrine of concurrent powers would grant the Federal government 
power over “a vast scope of internal legislation, which no one has heretofore supposed to 
be within its powers.”120  This power was not unlimited.  To prevent the complete loss of 
state legislative power to the supremacy of the federal government, Webster argued, the 
Constitution established strict boundaries between state and federal jurisdiction.  Yet 
New York had clearly exceeded its authority, not through municipal regulation of 
navigation, which properly belonged to states, but through its claim to hold a sovereign 
and unlimited power to grant monopolies.  Webster recognized that a sovereign power to 
grant exclusive privileges was theoretically unlimited if the Constitution did not control 
it.  But the Constitution had, in fact, limited New York.  To protect the rights of the 
people, New York had acceded to the Constitution, and consequently, the national 
government should protect rights of New Yorkers by exercising its complete power over 
commerce.121 
William Wirt, also arguing for Gibbons, stressed the exclusive power of Congress 
over commerce and patents.  He was willing to concede that states might have a 
concurrent power, but even if they did, the collision between the federal patent power and 
the grant by the state obviously subverted the authority of the federal government.  U.S. 
patent law reserved the right of exclusive use to an inventor for fourteen years, and then 
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surrendered the right to the American people as a whole.  The state, in contrast, granted a 
right of exclusive use for thirty years, and claimed that it could extend the grant 
indefinitely under its sovereign power: “If this be not repugnance, direct and palpable, we 
must have a new vocabulary for the definition of the word.”122  In terms of the commerce 
power, the collision was between the coasting license and the monopoly.  Congress’s 
power to regulate commerce was “entire, regular, and uniform.”123  Before 1787, 
commerce was protected imperfectly by international law as the jus commune of nations.  
The turbulence of the Confederation period illustrated just how imperfect that protection 
was.  Congress’s power to regulate commerce, then, includes passengers conveyed by 
steam.  In answer to the contention of the respondents that commerce was traffic, Writ 
insisted that commerce “always implies intercommunication and intercourse.”124   
Deploying both natural and statutory law, as well as arguments from the general 
structure of government, Wirt and Webster appealed to the court to exercise its 
jurisdiction and proclaim that a collision between state and federal law was manifest.  
Wirt appealed directly to the duty of the court: 
Here are three states [New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York] almost on the eve of war.  
It is the high province of the Court to interpose its benign and mediatorial influence…. If 
you do not interpose your friendly hand, and extirpate the seeds of anarchy which New 
York has sown, you will have civil war.  The war of legislation which has already 
commenced, will, according to its usual course, become a war of blows.  Your country 
will be shaken with civil strife.  Your constitution will fail.  The last hope of nations will 
be gone.125 
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The situation in the waters around New York had grown progressively worse, and despite 
Wirt’s hyperbole, seriously threatened the peace and prosperity of the region. 
 The counsel for Ogden, Thomas J. Oakley and Thomas Emmet, did not believe 
the Union was in crisis.  In fact, they insisted that the legal issues be settled by 
established convention.  Their arguments on the patent and commerce powers mirror 
those offered in the state courts, particularly in Livingston v. Van Ingen.  In summary, 
existing precedent emphasized that the states held concurrent power over commerce and 
power to promote the progress of science in so far as a specific federal law did not 
overrule state laws.  States exercised this power by virtue of their original, residual 
sovereignty.  However, the introduction of the case into federal court, impelled their 
argument toward new directions.126  Because their argument ultimately rested on the 
states’ sovereign power to grant the monopoly and strengthen it, the lawyers took greater 
care to develop the argument for sovereignty.  Oakely argued that the state possessed 
‘supreme legislative power’ by virtue of the Declaration of Independence.  In contrast, 
the grant of power to Congress was limited to the enumerated powers, which, he insisted, 
must be construed strictly.  The state must exercise powers like taxation concurrently 
with the federal government as an essential portion of its sovereignty.127  Through the 
original sovereign power that the states possessed over the public domain, New York 
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acted to grant a special privilege to Livingston and Fulton in 1807, which Emmet stressed 
had been a wise decision.128  The state contracted for a valuable improvement in 
exchange for grant of the public domain that it had the sovereign power to make.   
 To undermine the appellant’s argument that the coasting license constituted a 
collision with the monopoly, Oakely offered a definition of commerce as the 
“transportation and sale of commodities”; consequently, Gibbons use of the coasting 
license, because it was employed for a passenger ferry, was a “fraud upon the state 
law.”129  Emmet also contended that travel of passengers on a private holiday was 
certainly a local matter, not subject to the laws of Congress.130 
 As Oakely stressed the sovereignty of the state, Emmet waxed eloquently on the 
wisdom of the federal principle as “only safe and practicable rule of conduct, and the true 
constitutional rule” in the United States:  
…the peculiar nature and principles of our free and federative society make the existence 
of such subordinate [commercial] legislation … prudent and politic.  There must be, even 
in respect to foreign commerce, local interests and details, which cannot be well 
presented to the view of Congress, and can be, at least, better provided by the state 
legislatures, emanating from the very people to whom they relate. 
 
 Prudently, the Framers did not try to limit state authority, but only marked out the 
clearest cases in which the states should not act.  To guard against a potential abuse, they 
granted Congress “the paramount and controlling power over the whole matter.”131  But 
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no one really believed that Congress’s power was intended to control all the details.  
Otherwise the Erie Canal would be a matter for the federal government to fund and profit 
from, not New York.  Citing examples of slave importation, quarantine, local piloting, or 
lighthouse legislation, Emmet stressed that federalism wisely preserved the authority of 
states over domestic commerce.132  Despite their confidence in federalism and limited 
view of commerce, Oakley’s and Emmet’s arguments revealed their apprehension that 
they might not only lose the case, but the whole of the monopoly as well.  Both stressed 
that, even if a part of the monopoly should be overturned, most of the laws could stand.  
Oakley, in particular, tried to preserve the right of the state to regulate internal 
navigation, even if they should lose the power over ferry to New Jersey.133   
 Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion first addressed the respondent’s claim that 
the states still possessed original sovereignty.  If this claim was true, than the right of 
monopoly flowed logically from it.  Marshall, furthermore, conceded that the states had 
been sovereign and independent under the Articles of Confederation.  Yet their status, 
Marshall countered, must be understood in light of the Constitution: “But, when these 
allied sovereigns converted their league into a government … the whole character in 
which the States appear, underwent a change.”  This change must not be determined by 
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stand” (Ibid., 127-128). 
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the nature of government before the change, but rather by a study of the instrument that 
changed them or, as Marshall expressed it, “the words in their natural sense.”134   
 Taking up the text of the Constitution, Marshall then addressed the meaning of 
“commerce” on which the case would hang.  He ruled in favor of Wirt’s definition over 
Oakley’s stating that “Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but is something more: it is 
intercourse.”135  Marshall argued that it included navigation as well.  Yet Congress’ 
power over commerce did not extend as far as Webster suggested.  Marshall accepted 
Oakley’s careful distinction between internal and external commerce, although he 
insisted that commerce “cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, but may 
be introduced into the interior.”136 Only purely internal commerce could not be touched 
by Congress.   
 Regarding the doctrine of concurrent power asserted by the monopolists, Marshall 
addressed Webster’s argument that the sovereignty of Congress was unlimited when in 
pursuit of the enumerated powers. 137  Marshall’s opinion vindicating federal power over 
interstate commerce is usually compared with Webster’s sweeping argument to federal 
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constituents possess at elections, are, in this … the sole restraints on which they have relied to secure them 




authority over all commerce.138  In fact, Marshall responded carefully to each of the oral 
arguments and, while drawing upon Webster’s ideas, took care to address the concerns of 
Emmet and Oakely about concurrent authority.  For instance, the state power to tax, 
strictly speaking, was not even concurrent with the federal taxing power because the 
taxing power of the states and of Congress are not identical.  Congress had the power to 
tax for national purposes, while the states tax for local purposes.  Regarding commerce, 
Marshall stressed that all the power over commerce among the states lies in Congress.139  
And regarding those powers left to the states, Marshall pointed to  
that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything not surrendered to the 
general government: all of which can be most advantageously exercised by the States 
themselves.  Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every general description, 
as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect 
turnpike roads, ferries, &c. are component parts of this mass.140 
 
Finally, Marshall turned to the federal coasting license and affirmed Webster and 
Emmet’s contention that the state law was in direct collision with it.  Because commerce 
includes the navigation of passengers, and the coasting license confers the power to carry 
on the coasting trade, Gibbons was engaged in commerce between two states.  Marshall 
agreed that the state grant of monopoly was in violation of the Constitution. 
 Marshall’s opinion eviscerated New York’s claims of sovereign legislative 
authority over commerce.  Federal power over interstate commerce required that New 
York submit to the federal regulation of steamboats, and any other vessel in transit 
between the states.  However, Marshall did not destroy state power altogether.  New 
York still held state rights to regulate municipal health and nuisance concerns, but it 
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could not claim to hold sovereignty concurrently with national sovereignty in an arena 
where the people had clearly granted that authority to Congress in the text of the 
Constitution.141   
 The Marshall Court’s subsequent decisions on state sovereignty and the 
commerce clause emphasize that the power and authority it found in the federal 
commerce power were balanced by the reserved power of the states.  Wilson v. Blackbird 
Creek Marsh Co. (1829) established that in the absence of congressional legislation the 
states could regulate their waterways.  At the end of his career, Marshall’s opinion in 
Baron v. Baltimore (1833) affirmed the cities right to divert local streams and lower the 
water around Baron’s wharf.  Furthermore, the court explicitly renounced the idea 
(advocated by Chancellor Lansing in Van Ingen) that federal rights could be applied to 
the states through the privileges and immunities clause.  The impact of Gibbons v. Ogden 
on New York’s claim of sovereignty is impressive, but it should not be extended so far as 
to claim that the federal commerce power destroyed the state police power.  Not until the 
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Lochner Era did the commerce clause become the favored judicial weapon in striking 
down state legislative authority. 142   
Gibbons' victory at law brought him little personal benefit, however.  He died 
shortly thereafter, and his son William pursued the more genteel interests of real estate 
and horse breeding.  Ogden was completely ruined by the decision.  Imprisoned for debt 
in New York City, he was eventually released under a law that released Revolutionary 
War veterans from debtors’ prison.  He survived on the munificence of his state as the 
customs collector of Jersey City.143 John Stevens continued as a successful steamboat 
manager, and eventually became an early promoter of the railroad.144  The remains of the 
Livingston-Fulton monopoly perished in 1825.  John R. Livingston, emboldened by the 
decision began to run his ferries to Albany after stopping in New Jersey to establish an 
inter-state route.  Livingston’s franchise had only granted him rights to a ferry from New 
York to New Jersey, to the lucrative Albany route.  When the steamboat company sought 
an injunction against Livingston, a new pro-property chancellor refused them.  Then the 
state government turned against the remnants of the monopoly.  Attorney General Talcott 
reported to the Assembly that steamboats operating under a coasting license were entirely 
under federal protection: “The state legislature have no power directly to interfere with it 
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… and thus render the right useless, or prevent its excuse.”145  Before the Chancery court, 
Emmet offered the contradictory opinion:   
If some of the principles of Gibbons v. Ogden are not overruled within twenty years, the 
Constitution will before then have verged towards a form of government which many 
good men dread…. 
     It is upon state rights that we stand and state rights are state liberty.  They are more; 
they are in this land the bulwarks of individual and personal liberty; they are the outposts 
of the Constitution.  While they are preserved entire, our federative Union will stand the 
shocks of time and the approaches of despotism.  …  Consolidation will be the 
euthanasia of our constitution.146 
 
But the Court of Errors, sitting together with the Senate, supported the authority of 
Congress over inter-state commerce.  Upon appeal, the Chief Justice and twenty-one 
senators gave a very broad reading to Marshall’s opinion and struck down the monopoly 
as a violation of federal power.  The minority (two Judges and seven senators) did not 
contest the Supreme Court decision, but merely asserted that Livingston’s stop in New 
Jersey was a ploy and did not create inter-state commerce.147   
 Marshall’s decision fundamentally altered over two decades of New York’s 
exercise of sovereign power over commerce.  New York willingly submitted to the 
court's opinion once federal power had been decisively asserted.  As the minority opinion 
in NRSC v. Livingston suggests, the state could have justified the monopoly north of New 
York City as an exercise of intra-state commerce.  By 1825, the political climate had 
turned decisively against the monopoly and the deluge of petitions submitted to Albany 
in the 1820s certainly testifies to this position.  Moreover, the defenders of the monopoly, 
from Colden to Robert R. Livingston had always stressed that under the concurrent 
powers doctrine, federal power duly exercised was paramount.  Kent’s original opinion in 
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Livingston v. Van Ingen had promised that if the Court or Congress had presented clear 
direction, then the state would comply.  The state’s legal and political elite understood 
that, ultimately, a strong Union would benefit all of the states, including New York.   
New York acquiesced in the repudiation of its state sovereignty, in part, because it 
recognized the state monopoly power had long stifled economic development.  Having 
worked for a generation to establish the dominance of legislative sovereignty over the 
common law rights of jus publicum, New York recognized that special privilege had 
benefited the NRSC at the expense of the public good.  Federal courts increasingly 
assumed the legal task of preventing undue interference with the commercial and 
intellectual property rights of U.S. citizens, which to some extent, had been the original 
purpose of the commerce clause.  As Madison explained, it “was intended as a negative 
and preventive provision against injustice among the states themselves, rather than as a 
power to be used for the positive purposes of government….”148  State sovereignty was 
defeated and repudiated because of the protection of certain economic rights was 
understood to be so important that they had been delegated by the people to the national 
government under the Constitution. 
The states’ acquiescence in the legitimate judicial role of the U.S. Supreme Court 
over the state legislatures did not mean that they had completely subjugated state 
legislative rights to the federal judiciary.  In the case of transportation, New York 
accepted that Congress had power to regulate interstate commerce, and the Supreme 
Court likewise had the power to adjudicate those cases.  New York continued to actively 
assert its over authority over the reserved power through municipal law.  It accepted that 
disputes would continue to arise over the division of the powers of government under the 
                                                 




Constitution.  Now the North accepted that the Supreme Court would be the “common 
umpire” over the disputes.  As one newspaper editor explained,  
…it was wisely provided by the Constitution of the United States that questions of this 
nature should be finally settled by a tribunal removed from the influence of those state 
and private interests which gave rise to them.  Thus every year unfolds new relations 
growing out of our Federative and republican government.  It will take many years to 
settle the boundary line between State and Federative rights.149 
 
The deference their leaders had shown to the Supreme Court, as well as the 
increasing patriotism of the “Era of Good Feelings,” produced a different brand of state 
rights that respected the legitimate judicial authority of the Supreme Court while 
continuing to insist on their own legislative rights.  Over the next decade, under the 
leadership of Martin Van Buren, New York would again become the most vociferous 
defender of state rights in the North.  State legislative resistance, association, and 
constitutional theorizing continued to play a central role in antebellum politics as state 
legislatures insisted that they had a right to declare what the Constitution meant.
                                                 





Chapter 5:  “The Sacred Cause of State Rights” 
 
Even at this critical emergency in our public affairs, when so much discredit is 
apprehended to the sacred cause of State rights from the excesses of South Carolina, the 
confidence of the Committee in the correctness of that cause is strengthened by the 
exemplary conduct of her sister States. 
  -Martin Van Buren. “Report.” New York Legislature. 1833.1 
 
No event reveals the fractured character of American political thought on 
federalism better than the nullification debate during the winter of 1832-33.  Each of the 
constitutional deliberators—Congress, the individual state legislatures, Andrew Jackson, 
John C. Calhoun, and the South Carolina government—asserted its own vision of the 
federal Union.  Fierce disputes raged over the meaning of the reserved powers, the nature 
of sovereignty, federal rights of coercion, state rights of constitutional construction, and 
the locus of final political authority.  The crisis proved again the fundamental loyalty of 
Americans to a national Union of strictly limited powers.  Yet the debate further 
undermined Americans’ consensus on the extent of national power.  Strong positions 
staked out in the national political culture by John C. Calhoun, Andrew Jackson, and 
Daniel Webster eroded the Madisonian middle ground that the Union was a “partly 
national and partly federal” association for preserving liberty under law.  Although the 
state legislatures acted as deliberators on constitutional meaning during the crisis, their 
voice was decisively overshadowed by Jackson’s policy of confrontation, and by the 
Congressional compromise.   
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Thus far, the analysis of this dissertation has stressed the legislative authority of 
the states, especially Northern states, to construe how the Constitution ought to apply to 
them.  Between 1789 and 1830, the pattern of state review was evident across the 
country; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Maryland, Ohio, Virginia, Kentucky, and Georgia individually 
claimed that their authority over constitutional meaning was superior to that of the federal 
government.  They sought to secure their construction as the proper understanding of the 
Constitution before the courts, public opinion, and the tribunal of the collective state 
legislatures. State legislatures were not so much defending their sovereignty as they were 
asserting their rights to apply the Constitution to their own laws and citizens.  They 
accepted that sovereignty had been divided, and endeavored to exercise only the 
sovereignty that had been reserved to the states.  For instance, Pennsylvania, in 1809, 
claimed it was simply defending its citizens from the excesses of judicial power.  While 
New York acquiesced in the power of the Supreme Court in 1824, they continued to 
assert the right of their legislature to speak where the High Court was silent.  Northern 
states still insisted on the importance and necessity of state rights, particularly their rights 
to determine constitutional meaning.  Yet, by 1832, Northern states were increasingly 
accepting the idea that the constitutional authority of the national government over all of 
the people was paramount.2  
                                                 
2 Virginia and Kentucky advanced state rights positions between 1798 and 1800 in response to the Alien 
and Sedition Acts of 1798.  Georgia took a strong stand even earlier against the Supreme Court’s course of 
action in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419 (1793).  Similarly, New Hampshire challenged the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54 (1795), although they were more amenable to the final 
jurisdiction of the High Court.  Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Delaware took strong action against the 
Embargo of 1807, while Connecticut opposed the enforcement act of 1809.  Pennsylvania’s actions against 
the government during the Olmsted crisis have already been treated in detail by this dissertation.  During 
the War of 1812, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont resisted federal control over the 




How did the Northern states come to embrace a union of one national people?  
The answer lies less in the North than in new ideas arising from the South.  In pursuit of 
an expansive vision of state sovereignty, John C. Calhoun and South Carolina triggered a 
national debate on the nature of the Union that gradually polarized the broad spectrum of 
political thought on the nature of the Union along sectional lines and into nationalist and 
state sovereignty positions. Many Northern states were already accepting federal 
authority in national matters like admiralty jurisdiction, the regulation of commerce, use 
of the tariff for revenue, and the Bank.  Yet they still jealously guarded the powers 
reserved to the states.  However, the Nullification Crisis would weaken the tactic of state 
review as a legitimate exercise of constitutional deliberation because South Carolina’s 
claims linked state constitutional deliberation with treason and disloyalty.  Martin Van 
Buren was wise to fear that the “sacred cause of state rights” was being discredited by the 
radical theories of Calhoun.  The Madisonian middle ground, which allowed that the 
essential constitutional actors in the American system were both the several states and the 
national government, was eroded as Jacksonian nationalists and Southern particularists 
staked out increasingly polarized positions.   
This chapter focuses on the rights claimed by state legislatures to construct 
constitutional meaning and the challenge posed to this idea by nationalist voices during 
                                                                                                                                                 
took an active role in opposing the National Bank of the United States.  (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheaton 316 (1819), and Osborne v. Bank U.S., 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).  Kentucky again took a strident 
position against the power of the federal judiciary between 1821-1825 in the controversy surrounding 
Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (1823). Finally, Georgia again resisted national policy on the Cherokee 
Indians, and Jackson feared that Alabama would take a similar course against the Creek.   
 The best treatment of antebellum federal-state conflicts can be found in Forrest McDonald’s State 
Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 1776-1876, (Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 2000).  
Unfortunately, McDonald’s first-rate scholarship focuses on the events in the Capitol to the neglect of the 
actions of the state legislatures.  Because so few scholars have examined the conflict from the perspective 
of the states, a rich collection of primary sources provides the best starting point.  An old but excellent 





the crisis.  First, it examines John C. Cahoun’s perspective on the nature of the Union and 
the way that South Carolina implemented his theory of nullification.  South Carolina 
believed that the “sacred distribution” of powers in the Union reserved to them sufficient 
sovereignty to nullify federal law.  Nullification proved a departure from the Framers’ 
design for a constitutional republic and from the ideas of nullification and interposition as 
developed in Virginia and Kentucky and exercised by Northern Republicans.  
Nevertheless, South Carolina’s doctrines associated disunion with the idea of state 
constitutional theorizing in the minds of the Northern public.  Nullification began to 
discredit the defense of the federal principle.  Second, the chapter treats the several states’ 
repudiation of nullification through the constitutional voice of their state legislatures.  
Third, it examines Andrew Jackson’s response to the Nullification Crisis.  Andrew 
Jackson reinforced the power and influence of the national idea through his own 
speculative theory of the Union and his militant posturing.  The chapter also analyzes 
Martin Van Buren’s attempts to preserve the Madisonian middle ground—what he called 
“the sacred cause of state rights”—in response to both Calhoun and Jackson.  Finally, it 
considers the fate of state rights in 1833 as the crisis was mediated through the 
Congressional compromise. 
John C. Calhoun’s “Sacred Distribution” 
Because South Carolina had a long history of nationalism, its sudden adoption of 
state sovereignty in the 1820s requires explanation.3  The historiography of the 
                                                 
3 South Carolina, ironically, was one of the few states that had not actively pursued a policy of interposition 
before 1830.  A Federalist hotbed during the early Republic, South Carolina shifted its loyalty to the pro-
war National Republican party between 1800 and 1828.  Prominent Congressmen John C. Calhoun and 
George McDuffie were vociferous in their support of war with England in 1812.  South Carolina further 




Nullification Crisis, as well as the rhetoric of South Carolina’s politicians, offer an 
explanation for nullification centered on the tariff.  The gradually increasing rates, from 
twenty percent in 1816 to sixty percent in 1832, devastated South Carolina's ability to 
import foreign manufactures at a time when the price of cotton had fallen by half and the 
cultivation of cotton was rapidly expanding throughout the Southwest. Increasing 
industrialization and immigration in the North altered the balance of sectional power after 
two generations of relative economic prosperity in the South. William Freehling also 
emphasizes developing concerns over slavery, slave revolt, and abolition as the critical 
factor in the Palmetto State’s turn toward state sovereignty.  Other explanations 
emphasize the role of a disaffected planter class which dominated state politics in the 
small homogenous republic. Ambitious planters found themselves financially trapped by 
plans they had financed on credit during the boom years of 1816-1819, before the panic 
tightened international credit.  When that elite group turned against the national 
government, the whole state quickly followed in support. 4 
                                                                                                                                                 
South Carolina had supported the tariff bill of 1816 as a just measure designed to repay the national debt 
and to promote infrastructure development.  Calhoun himself dismissed the constitutional objections of the 
strict constructionists: “Let it not be said that internal improvement may be wholly left to the enterprise of 
states and individuals.” (John C. Calhoun, Annals of Congress, 14th Cong., 2nd sess., 851-858, (February 
4, 1817)).  Politically, South Carolina stood in the nationalist wing of the National Republican Party against 
particularists among New England Federalists and Southern state rights supporters like William Crawford 
(GA). See McDuffie’s 1821 speech denouncing William Crawford for his advocacy of a state veto power. 
(Quoted in The Nullification Era: A Documentary Record, William W. Freehling, ed. (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1967) 5-7).  In December 1824, the South Carolina House asserted that “the people have conferred 
power upon their state legislatures to impugn the acts of the federal government or the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”  Their resolution adopted a very limited role for state constitutional 
review; the states even lacked the power to propose amendments to the Constitution; the sole constitutional 
power of the states was the right to petition Congress for a “convention of the people.” (South Carolina, 
House of Representatives, December, 1824, State Documents on Federal Relations: The States and the 
United States, ed. Herman V. Ames (New York, Da Capo, 1970), 138-139). 
 
4 The best literature on the Nullification Crisis can be found in Keith Whittington, Constitutional 
Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1999), ch. 3; Richard Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights and the Nullification 
Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The 




The crisis engendered a sectional debate about the constitutional rights and 
responsibilities of the Southern states within a constitutional union. South Carolinians’ 
themselves often used the language of class conflict.  As the sentiment of South 
Carolinians turned against the tariff, the anger of local politicians quickly moved beyond 
their national leaders.  These agitators painted the conflict in starkly sectional terms.  
Thomas Cooper identified a new national tendency to “sacrifice the South to the North,” 
to by draining the South of revenue to subsidize Northeastern manufactures.5  “Brutus” 
compared their own lack of free trade to the oppressive bondage of slavery and demanded 
protections for their liberty.  “The Government, therefore, which places on that 
commerce any restraint … RIVITED THE CHAINS around the neck and the feet of Southern 
industry.”6  However, while tariff rates and anxieties about slavery proved to be catalysts 
for dispute, they were not the final cause of the crisis.   
 Historians have so focused their analysis on the racial and economic conflict that 
they have neglected the importance that constitutional theory played in the debate.  South 
Carolina’s principal grievances were constitutional.  Other South Carolinians complained 
                                                                                                                                                 
David F. Ericson, The Shaping of American Liberalism: The Debates over Nullification and Slavery 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993); and Chauncey Samuel Boucher, The Nullification 
Controversy in South Carolina (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916).  The weakness of 
Whittington’s analysis of the Nullification Crisis lies in its extensive focus on the tariff.  Whittington does 
not sufficiently explain that the fundamental disagreement was over the right to construe the constitution 
itself, not over what the Constitution said about the tariff.  It if were otherwise, than South Carolina would 
have readily accepted the 1833 modification of the tariff with no further ado.  But instead they called 
another convention and re-asserted their rights by repealing the nullification of the Tariff of 1828 and 
nullifying the Force Bill. 
 
5 “James Hamilton Jr.’s Speech at Walterborogh, October 21, 1828,” and “Thomas Cooper’s ‘Value of the 
Union’ Speech, July 2, 1827,” The Nullification Era, 10-29, 48-61. 
 
6 “Brutus,” “The Crisis” [Trumbull] (1827), The Nullification Era, 37.  Brutus understood that political 
recourse had been closed to them because demographic trends had reduced South Carolina to permanent 
minority status.  “The more national, and the less federal, the government becomes, the more certainly will 
the interest of the great majority of the states be promoted, but with the same certainty, will the interests of 
the South be depressed and destroyed" (27).  South Carolina believed that they were already under an 




that the Revolutionary guarantees of liberty that should have protected minority rights 
were ceasing to function.  James Hamilton explained that the Constitution was almost 
beyond recovery. 
‘The very blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity’ [are placed] in such awful 
peril by the unmeasured strides of a government which has already passed the very 
banner of the Constitution to which it owes its existence, and which now lies at the mercy 
of a majority who seem to acknowledge no other canons for its interpretation than their 
own selfish …interests.7 
 
Two feasible options lay open to South Carolina.  First, they could pursue the 
course laid out by the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.  In Madison’s words, the states 
could and were “in duty bound to interpose,” or as Jefferson explained it,  “A 
nullification by those sovereignties is the rightful remedy.”8 When Hamilton began to 
appeal to an idea of a state veto, he presented it as a measure to preserve the Union.  
Hamilton demonstrated his faith in a constitutional solution with the toast: “The 
Constitution of the United States-‘Whilst there is life there is hope.’  Let us not abandon 
this work of our fathers until the only alternative is to abandon it or liberty itself.”9  
Second, South Carolina could pursue secession.  Cooper posed the choice as one of 
“submission or separation.”  “We shall ‘ere long be compelled to calculate the value of 
union; and to inquire of what use to us is this most unequal alliance?”10 
 As the most prominent statesman from South Carolina, John C. Calhoun struggled 
to balance his nationalist principles with the radical opposition of his political base to the 
tariff.  While serving as Vice President during John Quincy Adams’ administration, 
                                                 
7 James Hamilton, “Speech at Waterborogh” (1828), The Nullification Era, 49. See chapter one for an 
analysis of normative constitutionalism.   
 
8 Ibid.  Quoting the doctrines of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and Reports. 
 
9 Hamilton, The Nullification Era, 61. 
 




Calhoun ambition was to succeed Adams as President.  When Calhoun failed to muster 
enough political support and the 1828 “tariff of abominations” outraged the South, 
Calhoun persuaded his state to vote for Jackson in the hope that Jackson would support 
tariff reform.  For his support, Calhoun was again given the Vice Presidency.  To ascend 
to the Presidency itself, Calhoun would need to balance his increasingly angry base in the 
Deep South, with support from the pro-tariff Northern and Western states.  
Unfortunately, for Calhoun, Jackson was equally torn by his need to balance both wings 
of his party.  Jackson took no action on tariff reform.11   
In the summer of 1831, Jackson decisively broke with Calhoun and chose Martin 
Van Buren as his heir apparent.  Now that he was freed to develop openly the doctrine of 
nullification, Calhoun published his “Fort Hill Address” in the Pendleton Messenger, 
from whence it was rapidly distributed across the Union.  Because he was not constrained 
by a legislative format or political pressure, Calhoun was able to use his full powers of 
political analysis and rhetorical force on behalf of his cause.  The 1830 state elections had 
given the State Rights party a majority, but they lacked the two-thirds majority they 
needed to call a constitutional convention.  His major task was to convince South 
Carolinian moderates that Nullification was a safe and just course of action.  Calhoun 
then presented nullification to the South as a conservative, Union-saving measure.   
 The “Fort Hill Address” rests on a metaphysical analysis of the Union—that is, it 
seeks to understand the federal Union by understanding what kind of thing “union” is.  
                                                 
11 Furthermore, Calhoun was much damaged by a personal fallout with Jackson over the “Peggy Eaton 
Affair.”  The final break came when Jackson discovered Calhoun had opposed Jackson’s military conduct 
in Florida, when Calhoun had been Secretary of War and Jackson was a senior Army commander.  The 
final break with Jackson destroyed Calhoun’s national ambitions and freed him to attend to his rebellious 
political base in South Carolina.  Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, 186-192.  For an account that focuses on 




The argument does not come from a textual analysis of the Constitution, but from 
historical reflection on the circumstances of its creation.  In his explication of the 
principles of revolutionary union and the constitutional convention, Calhoun exceeded all 
of his contemporaries with his depth of insight. 12  He conceded that the nature of the 
Constitution was a disputed thing.  Even at the Convention, “while the Constitution was 
struggling into existence, there were two parties, as to what the relation should be, whose 
different sentiments, constituted no small impediment in forming that instrument.”13  
Despite the fierce political debate over the nature of the Constitution that characterized 
both the convention and the early Republic, the state rights, Jeffersonian vision embodied 
in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions prevailed with Jefferson’s victory in 1800. 
Calhoun assumed that, by 1831, the principles of state rights provided the authorized 
commentary on constitutional meaning.   
Calhoun laid out his key assumptions in clear, forceful language: 
General government emanated from the people of the states, forming distinct political 
communities, and acting in their sovereign capacity, and not from the people forming one 
aggregate community; that the Constitution of the United States is in fact a compact, to which 
each state is a party, in the character already described; and that the several states or parties have a 
right to judge of its infractions, and in all cases of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of 
its power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language of the Virginia 
resolutions, “to interpose for arresting the progress of evil, and for maintaining within their 
respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.”14 
 
Calhoun started with the presuppositions that the people of the separate states formed 
distinct, sovereign political communities, that these communities had formed the Union, 
                                                 
12 The best treatment of Calhoun’s roots in revolutionary republican ideas can be found in David Ericsons’ 
The Shaping of American Liberalism, 75-89, and in Lee Cheek’s Calhoun and Popular Rule: The Political 
Theory of the Disquisition and Discourse (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001). 
 
13 John C. Calhoun, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Clyde N. Wilson ed. (Columbia, South Carolina:  
University of South Carolina Press, 1978), 11:414. 
 




that they had formed the Constitution as a compact, and that the states were still the 
sovereign parties of that compact.  Calhoun was able to draw upon the common 
revolutionary idea of compact and association to argue that the states sill held their rights, 
as the sovereign parties, to determine if the contract had been violated.  Furthermore, a 
violation of contract would not necessarily dissolve the compact and return the parties to 
a state of nature.  States could, in the last resort, interpose to protect their Union and to 
try to force mediation between the states to solve a dispute.  Nullification, far from a 
radical measure, was a “fundamental principle of our system.”15  
 In practice, the idea that state legislatures could review the constitutionality of 
federal action was an established part of the political constitution.  As political actors, the 
states could select senators who shared their views, could organize to support specific 
causes, or even petition Congress for a constitutional convention.  Historically, many 
states believed their constitutional pronouncements would be decisive, if they could get 
most of the states to agree with them.  Calhoun went beyond this tradition of state rights 
as it had been practiced in the North.  At its essence, his principle of nullification did not 
depend on a collective state review.  Nullification was premised on the idea that a 
Congressional majority had already determined a course of action (i.e. the tariff of 
abominations) to be constitutional and just.  Calhoun sought to provide a constitutional 
mechanism for the minority to protect its own state rights. 
 To justify nullification, Calhoun began to develop what would, in his 
Disquisition, be identified as the theory of the concurrent majority.16  At the heart of this 
                                                 
15 For more evidence, look at the Hamilton letter.  Calhoun presented the argument that “the people of the 
United States have been united as forming political communities, not as individuals” (11:614). 
 




argument is the Revolutionary idea of consent: individuals, and by analogy sovereign 
states possessed a fundamental right to consent to their government.  Consent, then, is a 
natural right, which according to Revolutionary theory, civil governments were created to 
protect.  Majorities, of course, possessed the right to govern, but this right was a civil 
right, granted to them by the terms of the compact; it was not a natural right.  The 
purpose of a constitution was to provide a government of laws that ensured the equal 
application of the law.  Calhoun argued that sound constitutional theory dictated that 
minorities should have constitutional mechanisms to protect them from abuse by 
majorities.  Here Calhoun offered solid historical examples.  In the ancient Spartan and 
Roman constitutions, each of the estates represented distinct interests who were given a 
unique political voice and a “negative on the acts of the co-estates.”17  England had 
achieved a stable republican government by giving the Crown, Lords, and Commons a 
necessary role in making law.  In America, Calhoun contended, the interests were 
represented not by class but by geographical sections.  To ensure the perfection of the 
Union, Calhoun argued,  
we must view the central government and the states as a whole, each in its proper sphere sovereign and 
independent, each perfectly adopted to their respective objects; … to preserve this sacred distribution, 
as originally settled, by coercing each to move in its prescribed orb, is the great and difficult problem, 
and on the solution of which, the duration of our Constitution, of our Union, and in all probability, our 
liberty depends.18  
 
By securing the constitutional right of consent for the minority, Calhoun hoped to 
preserve the “sacred distribution” of powers that ultimately protected American liberty. 
While the occasion for nullification was Congress’ unconstitutional use of the 
taxing power, Calhoun believed the ultimate threat to the constitutional liberty of the 
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minority lay in the practice of giving final interpretative authority to the Federal 
government.  He posited that granting to one power the sole authority to construe the 
Constitution would ensure that that authority would consolidate all power to itself.19  In 
particular, the judiciary was not “a safe depository of that power.”   Calhoun posed a 
stark dichotomy of either using nullification, or acquiescing in  
the novel, the hazardous, and … fatal project of giving the government the sole and final right of 
interpreting the Constitution, …  making that instrument the creature of its will, instead of a rule of 
action impressed on it at its creation, and annihilating in fact the authority which imposed it, and from 
which the government itself defines its existence.20 
 
Drawing upon the Revolutionary constitution of suspicion—that power tends toward 
corruption—Calhoun insisted that the states must have power to resist the tendency 
toward consolidation inherent in the constitutional design.  In order to limit abuses by a 
single state, he proposed that the other states, collectively, should hold them accountable 
on the principle that three quarters of the states already held the power to amend the 
Constitution and could prevent a state from egregious acts of interposition.21 
For South Carolinians who refused to countenance secession, nullification 
provided an attractive political alternative to disunion.  Calhoun contended that, “far from 
anarchical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe [nullification] to be, the only solid 
foundation of our system, and of the Union itself.”22  The Union was at stake.  The 
                                                 
19 Every government that has ever existed either preserved the rights of the minority or quickly fell into 
tyranny.  Calhoun implied in his letter to Hamilton that the Union was quickly failing and only by 
construing the Constitution to include the principle of the concurrent majority could any government 
endure.  “There is not … a single free state whose institutions were not based on the principle of the 
concurring majority—not one in which the community was not regarded in reference to its different 
political interests, and which did not, in some form or other, take the assent of each in the operation of 
government.”  (Ibid., 11:641). 
 
20 Ibid., 11:421. 
 
21 Ibid., 11:420. 
 




surplus generated by the tariff was already corrupting government.  “As the disease will 
not, then, heal itself, we are brought to the question, can a remedy be applied, and if so, 
what ought it to be?”23  Nullification would help to keep the government within its limits.  
It could guard against the assumption of new powers “under the colour of construction” 
by Congress, and so preserve the Union against its greatest peril.24  
In additional public letters, Calhoun explained the practical details of 
implementing nullification.  Before the 1832 elections, the State’s Rights party contrived 
to publish a letter from Calhoun to Governor Hamilton that would soothe the voters’ fears 
that nullification would lead to treason and civil war.  Calhoun again recounted the 
argument that the people of the United States formed that government in distinct 
communities, and not as one people.  The Government of the United States, Calhoun 
argued, does not have power over its citizens except through the states:  “The union is a 
union of states, as communities not as individuals.”25  The terms of the Constitution do 
did not authorize the federal government to coerce, veto or exercise judicial power 
directly over the states.  Because of these provisions, the federal government was limited 
as to how it can respond to state nullification.26   
Calhoun instructed Governor Hamilton on exactly how to proceed to avoid a 
conflict.  The key was to amend the state constitution by ordinance to require all citizens 
of the state to accept the ordinance’s definition of constitutionality.  Juries, judges, 
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24 Calhoun, “Letter to Hamilton,” Papers, 11:630-35. 
 
25 Ibid., 11:616. 
 
26 Calhoun could point to the Eleventh Amendment and the early tradition of state resistance to Chisholm v. 
Georgia and the Alien and Sedition Acts.  Nationalists, however, could respond with citations to the 
constitutional text: the supremacy clause, the preamble, and the specific restrictions on state power in Art. 




attorneys, and anyone who held South Carolina citizenship would be bound by state law 
as the “highest” authority.   
It would be impossible for the General Government, within the limits of the State, to execute, legally, 
the act nullified, or any other passed with a view to enforce it; while on the other hand, the State would 
be able to enforce, legally and peaceably, its declaration of nullification.27  
 
Everything was calculated to force a political solution upon the general government.  The 
state legislature could, as the final sovereign, design the laws so that resistance to the 
tariff would be required by state law.  Insurrection, rebellion, treason, or justification 
would be avoided by legally defining the obligation of state citizens, so that they were 
required as jurors and judges to sustain nullification in the courts.  
[T]he declaration of Nullification would be obligatory on the citizens of the State, as 
much so in fact, as its declaration ratifying the Constitution, resting as it does, on the 
same basis.  It would to them be the highest possible evidence, that the power contested 
was not granted, and, or course, that the act of the General Government was 
unconstitutional.  They would be bound in all relations of life, private and political, to 
respect and obey it; and, when called upon, as Jurymen, or render their verdict 
accordingly, or as Judges, to pronounce judgment, in conformity to it.28 
 
Treason by force would be prevented so that the federal government would lack a 
compelling justification under existing law to call out the militia. It must either repeal its 
unconstitutional law or use coercion against the state.  Any plan for coercion would be 
exceedingly difficult for the government to enforce and would arouse the ire of other 
Southern states.  “It will be a legal and constitutional contest, a contest of morals, and not 
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physical force—a trial of constitutional, not military power.”29  Even John Marshall, 
boasted Calhoun, would not use force beyond the Constitution.30 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 11:628. 
 
30 Ibid., 11:628-29. Calhoun recognized that the President might try to force the issue as a maritime dispute, 
in which South Carolina would not maintain sovereignty.  Yet the government’s rights to blockade or 
abolish a port were extreme measures and would be seen by the other states as belligerent actions of 
coercion.  Calhoun was proved correct on this very point by Jackson.  The President supported a measure to 
shift the collection of tariffs from the port to the harbor aboard federal ships.  Calhoun’s broader point on 
the weakness of a federal coercive power also proved correct.  Jackson’s request for the Force Bill in 
January 1833 demonstrated that the public did not believe that he already possessed clear constitutional 
authority to coerce citizens obeying state law.  Jackson hoped that the Congress would construe the 
Constitution to support his exercise of force.   
 My own analysis of Calhoun follows:  The Constitution does give a check to the states, collectively, 
against the federal government.  The states can call a constitutional convention (the ultimate power of 
constitutional construction) without Congress under Article V.  However, this power was not given to the 
states individually.  This is to fall into the error of the medieval Polish constitution, which required 
unanimity for action.  The partition of Poland in the late 18th century exposed the flaw in this constitutional 
model, as did the Articles of Confederation.  Yet Calhoun advocated precisely this theory.  He wanted a 
return to the Articles of Confederation.  His theoretical approach appealed to the authority of the states 
under the Revolutionary political grammar.  However, association, even during the Revolution, was 
understood to be multi-leveled, not unitary.  The states shared the use of sovereign power with the 
Continental Congress.  In addition, the Constitution of 1787 did not simply replicate the Revolutionary 
forms of government.  Calhoun’s attention to the normative and metaphysical character of a constitution 
obscures his neglect for the actual provisions of the Constitution.  In fairness, Calhoun believed that 
judicial review was not provided for in the Constitution—the Constitution would have to mandate state 
review.  Without judicial review, a functional Constitution might be said to require individual state review, 
at least initially, as a precursor to joint action.  However, the Constitution disclosed, through the text and 
the structural needs of the early Republic, that it was supreme over the states, and that the judiciary was 
given final authority over cases in law and equity.   
 Calhoun placed much emphasis on developing a balanced construction, with an equilibrium between 
the powers.  Perhaps he believed that rapid industrialization and population growth had unbalanced the 
existing constitution.  In terms of classical and revolutionary theory, Calhoun was right, in that the orders 
of society ought to be balanced.  In point of law and emerging Jacksonian democracy, however, the powers 
of the state did not extend this far.  They did extend to the rights of the states to remonstrate.  States could 
convincingly argue that they had rights to interpret the Constitution as important branches of government, 
as long as they recognized the Constitution as supreme law.  Calhoun went beyond this.  Calhoun’s 
doctrine set South Carolina’s ordinance up as supreme law and in direct opposition to the constitutional 
authority of the President and Congress.  If judicial review required that disputes were to be handled by the 
courts in “matters of law and equity” (9:635-637), then Calhoun and the states could persuasively argue 
that they could adjudicate constitutional disputes.  The judiciary’s role was then limited to applying the 
Constitution to particular cases.  In this approach, judges would not necessarily be able to say finally what 
the Constitution said.  They would just be the proper body to apply that law to legal disputes. 
 Calhoun’s theory was carried before the constitutional tribunal of the American people through 
elections, other state legislatures, Congress, and Jackson as the only constitutional representative of the 
whole people.  They ultimately accepted the idea that judicial review is implicit in the principles of the 
Constitution.  Judges, at least, had the power to interpret the Constitution for the judiciary.  During the 
1820s and 30s the people retained the idea that the states had a constitutional role in remonstrating and 




As Election Day approached, Calhoun grew confident that the State Rights party 
would win a decisive victory.  His private correspondence reveals that while he hoped to 
preserve the Union, he did not believe it could be preserved under the present system.  
The old constitution was finished.  “We have run nearly fifty years on the first track.  It 
was a wonderful run; but it is time to bring up the reckoning, in order to take a fresh 
departure.”  Calhoun’s strategic goal was to provoke a constitutional crisis that would 
only be resolved by “a general convention of all the states, in order to adjust all 
constitutional differences and thusly restore general harmony.”31  Given the state of 
discontent over the tariff, and the force of his ideas, Calhoun believed he could re- found 
the Union on the principle of the concurrent majority.   
South Carolina clearly disowned the agrarian, state rights Democratic coalition of 
Jefferson and Jackson for a more militant theory of absolute state sovereignty.  Choosing 
not to support either Jackson’s theory or the broad construction of his opponent Henry 
Clay they cast their electoral votes in 1832 for John Floyd of Virginia.  When the State 
Rights party defeated the Unionists in early October, Calhoun began to draft 
proclamations for the state convention.  Governor Hamilton immediately called a special 
session of the state legislature for October 22nd, which in turn called a state convention 
for November 19th.  The State Rights party so dominated these elections that nullification 
was a foregone conclusion.  Calhoun himself did not participate since he still held office 
as Vice President.  Together Hayne and McDuffie persuaded the convention to endorse 
secession immediately if Jackson used force against the state.  More cautious delegates 
staved off an immediate confrontation by suspending the ordinance until February 1, 
                                                 




1833, to give Congress time to respond.  The final vote, taken on November 24, endorsed 
nullification by a 136-26 margin.32 
The Ordinance of Nullification endorsed the basic theories of Calhoun but staked 
out even more radical claims for the power of the state to nullify, finally, unconstitutional 
laws of the central government.  It claimed,  
that the states have the right, in the same sovereign capacity in which they adopted the federal 
constitution, to pronounce, in the last resort authoritative judgment on the usurpations of the federal 
government, and to adopt such measures as they may deem necessary and expedient, to arrest the 
operation of the unconstitutional acts of that government.33 
 
Claiming these rights, South Carolina repudiated any higher constitutional authority.  
Following Calhoun’s 1832 letter to Governor Hamilton, they revised their state law to 
prevent the federal government from enforcing the Tariff of 1828 or 1832 within the 
state.  A Replevin Law was passed to allow the state to legally restore to any citizen 
goods which the federal customs agents had seized for non-payment of the tariff.  As a 
condition of active political office and jury service, citizens were required to swear an 
oath that they would uphold the ordinance and the state’s interpretation of nullification.  
Appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court in cases questioning the legality of the Ordinance 
were forbidden.  The Convention hoped that these provisions would prevent any marshal, 
juror, judge, or even customs official from acting to enforce the Tariff of 1828 or offering 
an opinion on whether nullification had any constitutional merit.  Due to the 
                                                 
32 Prominent party leaders met in committee to draft the necessary documents and put them to the 
convention for a vote.  Senator Hayne drafted the ordinance itself, while McDuffie edited Calhoun’s 
“Address to the People of the United States.”  See Calhoun’s initial draft of the “Address to the People of 
the United States,” November 1, 1833, in Papers, 11:669-681.  For a narrative of events in South Carolina 
during the fall of 1833, see Ellis, 74-76. Unionist opposition was largely disorganized.  What little 
leadership that existed was provided by Joel Poinsett in Charlestown, who by virtue of his correspondence 
with Jackson, was able to exert some influence. 
 
33 South Carolina, “Address to the People of United States,” State Papers, 60, Emphasis mine. Calhoun 




overwhelming support within the state for nullification, delegates believed that if they 
could silence the Unionists with the oath, no successful challenge could be brought 
against the Ordinance.34   
 Even though the doctrine was theoretically separate from the doctrines of 
secession and revolution, other state legislatures might not make this distinction.  South 
Carolina’s ultimate goals—the vindication of state sovereignty and the repeal of the 
tariff—would depend on the constitutional reaction of the other state legislatures.  While 
they hoped that Southern states, angered by the tariff and the presence of Native 
American peoples within their boundaries, would embrace nullification, their ultimate 
success would require concession from Northern states.   Nullification could anger 
Northern states if it was perceived as a threat of revolution, or it might overawe them into 
acquiescence.  If Northerners were convinced that low tariffs were the price of Union and 
that South Carolina meant to secede if their demands were not met, they might be more 
likely to co-operate.  The convention believed that, for the North, mere “pecuniary 
interest, connected with no shadow of right” was at stake.  But for their state,  
it is a question of our most sacred rights—those which our common ancestors left to us as 
a common inheritance … consecrated in their blood.  It is a question of liberty on the one 
hand, and slavery on the other.   
     We would infinitely prefer that the territory of the state should be the cemetery of 
freemen than the habitation of slaves.  Activated by these principles, and animated by 
these sentiments, we will cling to the pillars of the temple of our liberties, and if it must 
fall, we will perish among the ruins.35 
 
The Convention assured the American people that the “sacred rights” of South Carolina 
to freedom from exorbitant taxation without consent were so essential that it would not 
surrender them, no matter what the risk.  They expressed confidence that, faced with such 
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resolution, the other states and the national government would relent. According to the 
influential theory of Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the states’ response would be 
critical.  Overwhelming resolutions of state support for South Carolina would establish 
nullification as a legitimate check on federal power.  If the states, as parties to the federal 
compact, refused to accept the interpretation, then it would practically and theoretically 
doom any theory that a single state could set constitutional meaning for itself. 
State Legislative Response 
As I argued in chapter one, much of the history of state rights and federalism 
before the Civil War has been portrayed as a battle between the polar forces of 
nationalism and state sovereignty.  The extensive state responses to the Nullification 
Crisis did not fit neatly into either the nationalist model or the state sovereignty model.  
Three different kinds of reactions can be found.  First, Southern resolutions portrayed a 
complex blend of fidelity to the Constitution, rejection of nullification, and pursuit of 
tariff reform. Second, a few Northern legislatures, especially on the Atlantic seaboard, 
staked out strong nationalist positions, challenging South Carolina’s vision of a union of 
sovereign states with their own vision of a perpetual union of one people.  Third, the 
majority of Northern states avoided the “speculative” conflict of the “nature and objects 
of our political system” in favor of a “practical view” of the actual construction and 
powers of government.  Primarily, they restricted their debate to the content of the 
constitution itself.  They believed that the crisis should be framed “not in accordance with 




a limitation of action of the federal government to the powers expressly delegated to it by 
the Constitution…”36  
Of the three responses, those from the Southern states reacted to South Carolina 
first.37 Like South Carolina, Southern legislators denounced the tariff as unjust and anti-
constitutional.  Alabama insisted that it contradicted the Framers’ intentions, Mississippi 
charged that the tariff violated the spirit of the Constitution, and North Carolina 
contended it was directly unconstitutional.  No state directly sanctioned nullification as a 
legitimate political course.  State legislatures labeled the doctrine “revolutionary,” 
“heresy,” and “disunion by force.”38  In Georgia and Virginia, minority factions were 
able to produce strong support for nullification, requiring more moderate language from 
the legislature.  Virginia did not denounce nullification outright, but insisted that 
“doctrines of State Sovereignty and State Rights” did not “sanction” South Carolina’s 
version of nullification.39  Georgia’s legislature produced resolutions condemning the 
minority of Georgians who supported the “rash and revolutionary measures” of the 
Ordinance.40  
                                                 
36 Maine, House of Representatives, “Resolves,” February 18, 1833, State Papers, 108. Maryland too 
supported a strong government within the limits of the constitutional powers given to it.  It “wishe[d] every 
delegated power to be exerted that has a tendency to strengthen the bonds that unite us, and to fortify the 
hope that the union will be perpetual.”  Maryland, House of Delegates, “Resolves,” February 9, 1833, State 
Papers, 290-291. 
 
37 For the best treatment of the Southern state’s reaction to the Nullification Crisis, see Ellis, 102-140. 
 
38 North Carolina, General Assembly, “Resolves,”  January 5, 1833, State Papers, 201-202; Georgia, House 
of Representatives, “Resolves,” November 29, 1832, State Papers, 271-274; Alabama, “Report” and 
“Resolves,” January 12, 1833, State Papers, 219-223; and Mississippi, Legislature, “Report” and 
“Resolves,” State Papers, 229-231. 
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implemented it.  Virginia posed as the defender of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions against their 
misapplication by South Carolina.  See Ellis, Ch. 6. 
 




 Other Southern legislatures agreed in rejecting both the tariff and nullification; 
they disagreed over how their grievances should be redressed.  Their moderate position 
stressed the need for patriotic sacrifice and conciliation.  The Southern states did not 
assume the identity of authoritative constitutional actors in a constitutional crisis.  
Alternately, treating the situation as a political crisis, they urged that the injured parties 
exercise conciliation and restraint.  Virginia took the lead in appointing a state 
commissioner to mediate between South Carolina and the general government.  Both 
sides, Virginia believed, ought to pursue a political solution and renounce force.  South 
Carolina should rescind their Ordinance and Congress should lower the tariff. Alabama 
counseled “patriotism, forbearance, and virtue” while Mississippi urged South Carolina 
to heed to Jackson’s “Proclamation” against nullification.41 
 Georgia, while rejecting nullification, advanced a unique solution.  Only a 
constitutional convention could resolve the debate over how to construe the Constitution; 
neither the states nor the Supreme Court could speak with finality.  Pragmatically, South 
Carolina must recognize that nullification would fail and weaken the cause of tariff 
reform.  A constitutional convention had the advantage of settling all of the issues at 
once; it would set limits on the tariff, curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and 
create a new tribunal to settle disputes between the national government and the states.  
Disputed questions of federalism, banking, internal improvements, the surplus, and other 
                                                 






limits of the delegated powers would be decisively settled by the authoritative 
constitutional voice: a convention of the states.42 
  While South Carolina failed to garner sufficient support for nullification among 
the Southern states, it triggered a debate in the South on the nature of the Union that 
strengthened the authority of the states.  In 1833, Virginia defended the picture of state 
authority described in the Virginia Resolution of 1798 as the true interpretation of the 
Constitution.  Alabama recognized that instead of venerating the Constitution, “no 
inconsiderable portion of the South have begun to estimate its value; and to contemplate 
even disunion itself, as an evil less formidable than submission to the extractions of the 
government.”43  Mississippi promised that it would “never stop to calculate [the worth of 
the Union], holding it as our fathers held it, precious above price.”  Yet, “she prizes that 
union less than liberty alone.”44  While the South refused to accept nullification as a 
                                                 
42 Other states recognized that a constitutional convention would create opportunity for further 
disagreement, not consensus.  Mississippi took a strong anti-convention position in response of Georgia.  
The Constitution was “the great charter of our national liberties, our independence and union.”  If a 
convention were called it would cement the prevailing “wild and latitudinarian construction” of the 
Constitution into the text.  Eighteen of twenty-four states had actually supported the tariff.  Why did 
Georgia believe that a convention would restore strict construction?  A new constitution would endanger 
the liberties that were at least protected by the current text.  The Constitution of 1787 was the best that 
could be hoped for.  A political strategy gave the South a better chance of success because the existing 
balance of power protected small states’ independence and autonomy through the Senate. (Mississippi, 
“Report” and “Resolves,” State Papers, 277-280).  Massachusetts opposed Georgia’s call for a convention 
for different reasons.  Massachusetts insisted that the people were sovereign, and not the states.  They 
interpreted the Constitution in such a way as to grant the Supreme Court the power to decide finally what 
the Constitution said.  They opposed a convention, not because it would actually resolve the crisis, but 
because it would create more confusion.  Massachusetts, like Mississippi, stood by the existing 
constitution.  Ohio opposed a convention as “inexpedient;” Connecticut explained that “much would be 
hazarded, and nothing valuable gained.” South Carolina alone supported Georgia’s call for a convention.  
(Massachusetts, Senate, “Report in Part” and “Resolves,” March 18, 1833, State Papers, 244-257; Ohio, 
“Resolves,” February 25, 1833, State Papers, 205-207; Connecticut, General Assembly, “Resolves,” State 
Papers, 285; and South Carolina,  Senate, December 19th 1832,  “Preamble and Resolutions,” State 
Papers, 237). 
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legitimate constitutional strategy, they began to apprehend the Constitution as separable 
from and inferior to their liberty. 
 Northern nationalists, like Southern particularists, found their theoretical 
differences intensified by the crisis.  While the Nullification Crisis helped to make the 
South more resolute in support of state sovereignty (not simply state rights), it rallied 
several prominent Northern legislatures behind a nationalist reading of the Constitution. 
These states consisted of large industrializing states on the East Coast, the large states of 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, and smaller states like New Jersey and Delaware.  
Larger states were motivated by the desire for a projectionist tariff, while the smaller 
states had traditionally supported a strong general government to protect them from the 
powerful states that surrounded them.  Each of these states distinctly opposed the idea of 
state sovereignty. 
If the general government be one, established by the people of the United States, then 
they owe to it allegiance, and may be guilty of treason towards it.  Its laws are supreme; 
no portion of the people [i.e. a state] can abrogate them.  The state governments are 
competent but subordinate parts of the system.45 
 
Many of these states had been suspicious of Jackson’s tariff policy, but they moved to 
support him in defending the nation.  Unlike the Southern resolutions, the Northern 
nationalist responses made only a brief mention of the tariff.  Delaware insisted that 
South Carolina had “no constitutional complaint” while New Jersey defended the positive 
right of the general government to enact a tariff for protecting manufactures.46   
What characterized the nationalists was their detailed critique of state sovereignty 
as a flawed theory of the Union.  They drew upon both history and constitutional texts to 
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challenge the Southern history of the Union.  Massachusetts had insisted that the states 
lacked independence in the 1780s.  This Union was created by a social compact of the 
people and embodied in a real government of limited powers, not a league.  The rights of 
the parties to the compact should be determined by the text of that agreement, the 
Constitution.  The text gave to the U. S. Supreme Court, “The great business of 
interpreting the Constitution and the laws, and of performing the high office of Arbiter in 
the last resort, of all questions of disputed power…”47 As New Jersey insisted, “The 
sacred charter of our liberties never contemplated that each state reserved to itself an 
ultimate appeal to its own citizens in their sovereign capacity.”48 
 The key nationalist position was the idea that the nation was formed by one 
people who created a constitutional government that protected their rights through 
national citizenship.  These ties were above all fraternal and patriotic; they were not an 
artificial product of the compact.  New Jersey praised, “our common country, cemented 
by the blood of our common ancestors.”49  Nullification directly contradicted the essence 
of the nation itself, “tending to rend asunder those ties of common interest and fraternal 
regard, of mutual dependence and reciprocal obligation… which have proclaimed us to 
the world a united people.”50 
 The nationalist resolutions recognized a legitimate but limited constitutional role 
for the states.  All agreed that South Carolina should “desist from the irregular, violent, 
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and unconstitutional attempt to gain redress”51 and pursue the peaceful political and 
constitutional options it still had. Disputes about the proper authority of a state could be 
brought before the judicial tribunals.  New Jersey stressed that South Carolina should 
seek the remedy of a constitutional amendment.  Even Massachusetts recognized that 
South Carolina had a legitimate constitutional voice.  South Carolina’s convention, 
instead of assuming a militant tone, should propose changes that contain “the precise 
points wherein existing provisions of the system were supposed to be doubtful or 
insufficient, and the nature and extent of the correction proposed to be applied.”  
Nationalists held that South Carolina was uninterested in genuine reform.  The real intent 
of South Carolina was not to work within the political system, but to veto existing laws 
and trigger a constitutional convention in “the office of umpire and sit in judgment on 
certain disputes, which are alleged to exist between a state and states, and that nation.” If 
South Carolina would express its grievances legitimately, then the nation could address 
them.52  
 In contrast to the nationalists’ focus on political theory, the majority of the 
Northern states Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Maryland, Ohio, and Indiana 
avoided detailed theories of the Union.  Like the nationalists, they placed the Union 
beyond all calculation of worth.  Ohio spoke of union as the “first and paramount object 
of a free people,” while Indiana stressed its own obligation “by interest and honor to that 
Confederacy into which they voluntarily entered, and from which they will never 
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willingly be severed.”53 Unlike the Eastern manufacturing states, these states believed the 
tariff to be “impolicy and oppression,”54 though none labeled it unconstitutional.  Ohio 
and Maryland stressed that the duties ought to be reduced or redistributed so that income 
did not greatly exceed expenditures and that all states fairly shared the tax burden.  Those 
states that laid out a moderate theory of union carefully distinguished their position from 
both the nationalists and the nullifiers.  They maintained that the Union had been formed 
by a compact of the people and that the people were organized in the several states.  The 
Union, then, bound both the states and the people from secession or violations of 
compact.55 
What bound the Union together?  These defenders of moderate state rights largely 
agreed with the nationalists in that the ultimate bonds of union were virtuous and 
voluntary associations.  They believed that the other states were bound to South Carolina, 
not simply by compact, but by trade and “national attachment.”56  South Carolina, though 
it had legitimate grievances, should make a virtuous and “patriotic sacrifice to the 
cause.”57  The course of nullification violated not only the nature of the Union and text of 
the Constitution, but also the traditional habits of association exhibited in the American 
Revolution.  Maine assailed South Carolina’s policy as “inconsistent with the spirit of 
forbearance in which our union had its origin and by a preservation in which it can alone 
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be maintained.”58  This spirit of virtuous association required that the states support the 
President in the preservation of the Union.  They were also bound to mediate the crisis 
through their state legislature.  As Maine explained, its task was to “interpose the voice of 
this state for conciliation and forbearance” to promote “peaceful and lawful redress.”59 
Northern states shared a consensus with all the states that nullification itself 
violated the Constitution.60  To refuse to obey the federal tariff, within the boundary of a 
state, was to resist duly constituted authority.  It “must inevitably lead to consequences 
most disastrous, and ruinous to the peace, prosperity and happiness of our common 
country.”61  The “heresy” of nullification, Indiana resolved, contained “internal evidence 
of … impracticality, absurdity, and treasonable tendency.”62  These states stressed their 
support of Jackson’s long defense of state rights within a vigorous union.  They agreed 
that the “Union must be preserved” and that Jackson was bound to uphold his oath to the 
Union; however, none of the “state rights” Northern legislatures endorsed Jackson’s 
request for a Force Bill (as had many nationalist states).  Instead, they preferred to use 
their influence on Congress.  Indiana sought to “express through their representatives, a 
firm and unwavering determination to protect the ‘ark of their political safety’ from the 
hand of violence” while continuing their support of the President.63  This summarizes the 
approach of most northern states: eschew theoretical debates in order to support the 
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President in his constitutional duty while pursuing a reduction of the tariff through the 
political branches.  Above all, they used their voice as states to “interpose” for mutual 
forbearance to protect the Union from violence. 
Jackson’s “Sacred Duty” 
As the state legislatures rejected the political theory of nullification, Andrew 
Jackson wrestled with the threat of violent resistance in South Carolina.  In South 
Carolina, Calhoun had privately assured Governor Hamilton that Jackson would be 
legally and political constrained from bringing force to bear against the legally 
constituted authority of the state.  South Carolina used the full extent of its legislative 
authority to mandate how its citizens would interpret and implement the U.S. 
Constitution.  Many in South Carolina looked to Old Hickory, to support the cause of 
tariff reduction, state sovereignty, and strict construction.  They chose to focus on his 
long support of Indian withdrawal and his persistent opposition to the “American system” 
of expansive federal spending on national infrastructure.64 
Despite Jackson’s reputed hostility to the general government, South Carolina 
eventually turned against him because he espoused a different brand of state rights.  
Jackson’s approach was essentially agrarian and democratic.  It held in suspicion all 
special privilege, monopoly, or large spending projects.  Above all, Jackson sought to 
make government more responsive to the will of the whole people.  Power should be 
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6 Peters 515 (1832)), Andrew Jackson continued to support Georgia  (Robert V. Remni, The Life of Andrew 




removed from the national government to empower the people as farmers and 
businessmen, not just state governments.65  South Carolina, in contrast, sought to defend 
the sovereign state power that the planters effectively controlled.  Calhoun’s doctrines 
emphasized autonomy and protection for South Carolina as a minority.  Jackson was 
concerned not so much with minorities, as with vigorously wielding the power of the 
executive to combat special privilege on behalf of the whole people.  Jackson understood 
that his constitutional duty required him to enforce the law.  He proved unsympathetic to 
South Carolina’s claims for its own special privilege. 
Jackson’s “State of the Union Address” 
Jackson’s initial response to the crisis fit this pattern. Jackson first discussed the 
crisis in his December 4, 1832, State of the Union Address. Given the potential for 
widespread resistance to federal authority, Jackson’s chosen successor and close political 
advisor, Martin Van Buren, had counseled Jackson to limit his response “as strictly as 
possible.”66  At first, Jackson followed this advice.  His response was muted in tone and 
animated by the guiding principle of commercial agrarian democracy—that the federal 
government should be limited to its minimal functions so that individual landowners 
could guide the prosperity of the country.  As the federal debt had almost been repaid, 
Jackson stressed that both spending and taxation should be reduced “with the hope of 
reducing the General Government to that simple machine which the Constitution 
created.”  Its function should be restricted to the strict limits of the Constitution: 
preserving the peace, reducing debt, and providing a uniform currency and a stable 
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environment for the enforcement of contracts.  These “superintending functions” should 
be fulfilled with a minimal obligation and interference with state and private liberty.67   
Jackson’s speech genuinely embraced limited government.  He denounced 
monopoly, corruption and concentrations of wealth as unhealthy for the republic.  He 
sought to divest the government of private stock, to limit new internal improvements to 
genuinely national projects, to prefer local taxation to national taxation, and to sell off the 
Western lands at prices barely sufficient to cover the cost of sale.  These policies pleased 
the agrarian Democratic base and fulfilled several election promises. 
Jackson’s description of South Carolina’s Ordinance deftly ignored the potential 
for disunion in South Carolina.  Instead, he urged the whole nation to avoid the “evils” of 
“a spirit of discontent and jealousy” that threatened the entire Union.  On the issue of the 
tariff, Jackson stressed that it should be reduced.68  Because revenue should be spent 
solely on national purposes, once the debt was paid off, a protectionist tariff could only 
be justified if it benefited the whole national interest. “A large portion of the people in 
one section of the Republic declares it not only inexpedient… but as disturbing the equal 
relations of property by legislation, and therefore unconstitutional and unjust.”  Tariffs 
should be reduced so that they matched the tariffs of other nations, and promoted free 
trade except in “those articles of manufacture essential to the national independence and 
safety in time of war.” Without declaring the tariff unconstitutional, Jackson suggested 
                                                 
67 Jackson, “State of the Union Address,” December 4, 1832, Register of Debates, 22nd Cong., 2nd sess., 
Appendix, 5.  
 
68 “The soundest maxims of public policy and the principles upon which our republican institutions are 
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that it was no longer necessary.  A downward revision of tariff rates would satisfy its 
critics. 
Jackson addressed the problem in South Carolina itself indirectly, in only one 
paragraph.   
It is my painful duty to state that in one quarter of the United States opposition to the 
revenue laws has arisen to a height which threatens to thwart their execution, if not to 
endanger the integrity of the Union.  Whatever obstructions may be thrown in the way of 
the judicial authorities of the General Government, it is hoped they will be able peaceably 
to overcome them by the prudence of their own officers and the patriotism of the people.   
 
Should these virtues fail, Jackson assured Congress, the laws were “fully adequate” to 
deal with any “obstructions.”69  
Jackson’s “Proclamation” 
Jackson decided that the State of the Union address did not sufficiently address 
the threat of nullification.  Six days later he released a “Proclamation” dealing with 
nullification specifically.   As President and leader of the Democratic Party, Jackson 
seized personal control of the debate and recast it in terms of treason and personal loyalty 
to the Union.  He first acknowledged the natural right to resist an unconstitutional act.  
After all, the American justification for the Declaration of Independence had rested on 
natural rights.  But he refused to grant to a single state or to the states collectively the 
right to nullify an act.  The states were bound by their place in the Union.  If individual 
states could determine which laws they would obey, then as Jackson later wrote, the 
Union was a mere “rope of sand.”70  
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Jackson believed that while the states played a significant and even a dominant 
role, within the American Union, they were not completely sovereign.  “No one,” he 
promised, “has a higher reverence for the reserved rights of the states, than the magistrate 
who now addresses you.”  Equal care, however, must be taken for the “rights … vested in 
the nation.”71  The constitutional design had delegated critical aspects of sovereignty to 
the federal government.  
What shows conclusively that the States cannot be said to have reserved an undivided 
sovereignty, is, that they expressly ceded the right to punish treason—not treason against 
their separate power—but treason against the United States.  Treason is an offense 
against sovereignty, and sovereignty must reside within the power to punish it.72  
 
Jackson readily conceded that the tariff was unwise, unequal, and “must necessarily be 
removed.”  He exercised his constructional obligation to advise Congress in the State of 
the Union that the “inequality” of the tariff “must necessarily be removed.”73  However, 
Jackson understood that the dispute was more than a dispute between constitutional 
deliberators (Jackson, Congress, South Carolina, or the states collectively in their 
legislatures) over whether the Constitution permitted a tariff.  It even transcended the 
difficult interpretive issue of whether the states, as the original parties to that compact 
and functioning as the people in their highest sovereign capacity, could collectively 
construe the Constitution under the logic of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.  
Jackson focused the debate on the loyalty of South Carolina to the Union.  Neither 
prudent statesmanship nor patriotic citizenship permitted the course of action South 
Carolina had taken.  “Their object is disunion; be not deceived by names; disunion by 
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armed force is treason.”74  Having encouraged Congress to take the necessary political 
steps to avert a crisis, Jackson focused on his duty to “execute the Office of President” 
and “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.”75 
If Jackson had defended his actions in terms of his oath of office alone, he would 
have won the approbation of state rights Democrats as well as nationalists.  Yet Jackson 
felt Calhoun’s inquiry into the nature of the Union and its origins required a forceful 
refutation.  To counter Calhoun’s claims, Jackson offered a theory based on his own 
history of the Union.  His theory held that the Union was in its essence “a government, 
not a league.”  Its historical character was that of a compact, created by the whole people, 
not the states, for the purpose of perfecting and guaranteeing their Union into 
perpetuity.76   The whole people had elected him as President and bound him to enforce 
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 Jackson believed the Union must be perpetual because it was an essential component of a secure and 
happy society. “It is a confederal perpetual union, first made by the people in their sovereign capacities, 
upon which we the people of the United States made a more perfect Union, which can only be dissolved by 
the people who formed it, and in the way pointed out in the instrument, or by Revolution.”  (Jackson to Van 
Buren, December 25, 1832, Correspondence, 4:505-506).  As he explained to a South Carolina Unionist, 
“… perpetuity is stamped upon the Constitution by the blood of the Founders—by those who achieved as 
well as those who improved our system of free government.  For this purpose was the principle of 
amendment inserted in the Constitution which all have sworn to support and in violation of which no state 
or states have the right to secede, much less to dissolve the union.”  (Jackson to Poinsett, December 2, 
1832, Correspondence, 4:493-494).  The perpetual character of the union has been addressed by Kenneth 
M. Stampp’s “The Concept of a Perpetual Union,” Journal of American History 65 (1978): 5-33.  Stampp 
stresses that American nationalists offered a historical argument on the origins of the Union based on a 
selective reading of the Constitution and the writings of the Founders.  As Stampp demonstrates, during the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 and ratification debates the nature of the union and its perpetuity were 
hotly contested.  Even ardent nationalists like Washington believed that the union could fail.  Stamp 
explains that “as a matter of logic,” the historical debate over the nature of the union before 1787 was 
“pointless” because the supreme law created by the convention made it irrelevant.  (7) Stampp’s point 
mirrors Chipman’s own reliance on law over history in analyzing the Constitution.  He suggests that the 




legitimate statutory law and the Constitutional provision against treason.77  Unlike 
Calhoun, Jackson did not believe the disagreement should be mediated through a 
constitutional or legal crisis.  The nature of the Union was already clear.  If the 
government should exceed constitutional limits, then “the remedy is with the people” 
through the “peaceful and reasonable course and submitting the whole matter to them at 
their elections.”  Because the whole people were the highest sovereigns, and not the 
states, the people held the final responsibility to determine constitutional meaning.  They, 
and not South Carolina, had the authority to unmake the Union.78  Because South 
Carolina was not sovereign, Jackson believed it had no possible justification for any 
                                                                                                                                                 
begin.  Yet, for the Founders, while one form of civil compact was replaced by another, they believed that 
their social union remained unbroken despite their political change.   
 Additionally, Stampp seems to imply that because the questions of secession and perpetuity were so 
hotly contested, the idea of a perpetual union rested more on the victory of nationalists in the civil war, than 
on any question of theory.  Historically speaking, Stampp is right that the victory of perpetual union was 
resolved “at the cannon’s mouth” (33).  In point of philosophy, however, a successful battle or war cannot 
logically establish the truth or falsity of the theory of perpetual union. That a person’s view did not prevail 
in a trial by combat does not mean it was philosophically flawed.  Neither does it mean that the ideas at 
stake were recent inventions.  Antebellum theorists’ deeply held political beliefs on the perpetuity of the 
union were not invented out of whole cloth. Jackson did not believe that perpetual union was a recent 
innovation or doctrine.  Rather, he understood that the founders had taken a perpetual confederation (the 
Articles of Confederation) and made it “more perfect.”  Jackson did not look to or plan for the collapse of 
the Union, but focused on the duty that the Constitution disclosed to him.  In this belief, he stood within a 
fifty-year tradition of Revolutionary association that emphasized the binding character of social and civil 
compacts.   
 
77 Jackson made much of his own authority as the repository of the popular will.  By constitutional design, 
however, the states determined the mode of elections to the Electoral College.  Initially, the selection had 
been made by state legislatures in a fashion similar to the choice of senators.  The selection of the President 
then might be said to be the choice of all the states together rather than the people.  By 1830, extensive 
revisions to state constitutions had made their government more democratic and had given the choice of 
presidential electors to the people.  For more on the state constitutional convention documents see 
Democracy, Liberty, and Property: The State Constitutional Conventions of the 1820’s, ed. Merrill D. 
Peterson (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). 
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resistance by force.  If the “nullies” formed an army to support their ordinance, Jackson 
insisted that that was treason and “an act of levying war.”79   
Locating sovereignty directly in the people placed Jackson in opposition to the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.  Because the states were not individually sovereign, 
they could not act alone; they could only act in concert, and then through the political 
process. As Jackson explained in a private letter to Martin Van Buren,  
The absurdity of the Virginia doctrine is too plain to need much comment.  If they would 
say, that the state had the right to fight, and if she has the power, to revolution it would be 
a right, but at the same time it must be acknowledged, that the other states have equal 
rights, and the right to preserve the union. …80 
 
Jackson’s “Second Inaugural” 
 Jackson’s repudiation of the “Virginia doctrine” and his insistence that the whole 
people were the sovereign party to the constitutional contract confused many political 
observers.  Both Jackson’s contemporaries and modern scholars have identified real 
tension between the nationalism of the Proclamation and the state rights policies of the 
State of the Union Address.81  As Henry Clay explained, “One short week produced the 
                                                 




81 Richard Ellis’s work contains the best treatment on the reaction to the speech.  In particular, Ellis 
emphasizes the favorable reaction of Northern nationalist leaders and details the horror Jackson elicited 
from the South because of his willingness to use force and his repudiation of state sovereignty (Ellis, 81-
91).  Most scholars recognize that Jackson’s efforts to balance consolidation and state sovereignty were at 
least intellectually consistent.  Andrew Lenner compares Jackson’s moderation to Madison’s defense of a 
national compact that imposed binding obligation on the parties (Lenner, 178).  Lerner’s analysis of federal 
politics is quite astute.  In this instance, however, he misapprehends the degree of agreement between 
Jackson and Madison.  Both, it is true, espoused a doctrine of divided sovereignty.  However Jackson’s 
defense of the whole people as the sovereign parties was an ultra-nationalist argument of the kind used by 
James Wilson or Joseph Story.  Madison, in his letter to Edward Everett printed in the North American 
Review (October 1830) (quoted in Nathaniel Chipman, Principles of Government, a treatise on free 
institutions, including the Constitution of the United States (Burlington, Vt.: E. Smith, 1833; New York: Da 
Capo, 1970), 323-330) insisted that the people were sovereign, but only as they acted in the several states.  
They did not form a consolidated whole.   
 William Freehling argues “there was no intellectual inconsistency in believing, on the one hand, that 




message and the proclamation—the former ultra on the side of State Rights—the later 
ultra, on the side of Consolidation.”82  The New York Courier and Enquirer labeled the 
proclamation “ultra federal” and “anti-Jeffersonian.”  At a minimum, the patriotic and 
emotional support that Jackson gave to the cause of the nation aided the expanded 
national vision of Webster and Clay more than the cause of state rights.  Senator George 
Dallas wrote to Jackson that even those who had opposed his re-election now supported 
him and condemned South Carolina’s Ordinance and Address.83  Even Webster praised 
Jackson’s proclamation at Faneuil Hall and adopted a closer relationship with the White 
House84   
While Jackson’s own political allies rallied to support his defense of the Union, 
they were quietly alarmed at his nationalist theory of that Union.  One prominent 
Democrat blamed the “Montesquieu of the Cabinet” (probably Edward Livingston) for 
the “speculative arguments and specious opinions about the origin of the confederation.”  
“The broad errors in doctrine on some fundamental principles of the Constitution which 
ornament the Proclamation, [called] forth the unbounded approbation of every ultra 
federalist from Maine to Louisiana.”85  Martin Van Buren sent Jackson a carefully 
                                                                                                                                                 
national government could legitimately exercise very few powers.  Still the emotional nationalism Jackson 
did so much to further could lead to economic nationalism.”  (Freehling, Prelude to Disunion, 294).  What 
Freehling misjudges is the degree to which Jackson’s idea of union, and not simply his “emotional 
nationalism,” would support the theory that Webster was advancing and that Story would later perfect in 
his Commentaries on the Constitution. 
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worded letter urging further caution.  Van Buren feared that Jackson’s doctrinal points 
would undoubtedly bring him into “collision” with the Virginia legislature; Jackson 
would need the support of the Southern states to defeat South Carolina. Van Buren 
therefore counseled Jackson to avoid divisive arguments on the nature of the Union and 
focus future messages to Congress on his constitutional duty.  “…I would confine my 
request, as strictly as possible, to the employment of forces granted by them to the 
exigencies which render its exercise indispensable to the due execution of the laws.”  
Further theorizing by the President, Van Buren privately feared, would weaken the 
agrarian, state rights wing of the Democratic Party.86    
While Jackson’s erstwhile allies viewed his political theory with suspicion or as 
so much heresy, Jackson believed his oath of office required him to consistently support 
the Founders’ balance between the federal and national ideas—that the nation had been 
given constitutional form in a federal Union of limited powers.  Jackson firmly believed 
national unity to be absolutely essential to the prosperity of both the parts (state liberty) 
and the whole (the federal rights of the whole people).  Therefore, Jackson’s approach 
was more consistent than his contemporaries appreciated. 
Jackson’s reverence for the legitimate power of the states mirrored South 
Carolina’s defense of the “sacred distribution” and New York’s eloquent apologia for the 
“sacred cause of state rights.”  Yet he valued his constitutional duty above all.  In his 
“Second Inaugural Address,” Jackson carefully delineated his dual obligations to limited 
government and national union.  His whole domestic agenda turned on these two primary 
ends, “the rights of the several states, and the integrity of the union.”  Rather than seeing 
these as mutually opposing ends, Jackson believed a strong Union and state liberty were 
                                                 




complementary.  They “could only be attained by an enlightened exercise of the power of 
each within its appropriate sphere in conformity with the public will constitutionally 
expressed.”87  State control over local concerns prevented the corruption of the central 
government.  Excessive state control, however, would lead to rivalry, revolution, 
anarchy, and finally military despotism.  The prudent statesman would balance these 
tensions, respecting state rights as essential components of a strong and vigorous union.  
Jackson pledged himself personally to the task of restraining federal spending and 
“arresting” any new measure that might lead to consolidation.  “But of equal importance 
and indeed incalculable importance is the union of these states, and the sacred duty of all 
to contribute to its preservation by a liberal support of the general government in the 
exercise of its just powers.”88  As Washington had challenged them, Americans must 
always consider the Union as the “Palladium of your political safety and prosperity.” 89 
Nullification violated the fundamental law.  It claimed for a state the authority to 
declare finally how the law would apply to it.  If every state adopted this practice, it 
would destroy the Union.  As Jackson explained to Van Buren, “this abominable doctrine 
that strikes at the root of our government and the social compact, and reduces everything 
to anarchy, must be met and put down or our union is gone and our liberties with it 
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forever.”90  South Carolina had committed itself to resistance on February 1 if Congress 
would not reduce the tariff.  In response, Jackson declared that he must enforce the law 
regardless.  Because a single state was not sovereign, it could not be permitted to impede 
the enforcement of federal statutes.  Beyond the Union lay division, not liberty.  War 
between the states would follow, resembling the centuries of warfare among the small 
states of Europe.  Taxation would increase to support standing armies.  Personal liberty 
would perish under the ruin of constant warfare.  “The loss of liberty, of all good 
government, must inevitably follow a dissolution of the Union.” 
Further, the oath of office bound Jackson to the support of constitutional limits on 
both state and federal power.  Jackson believed himself obligated to “maintain the just 
powers of the Constitution and to transmit unimpaired to posterity the blessings of federal 
union.”  The “sacred duty” bound him to promote the good of all classes and interests, to 
“inculcate by my official acts the necessity of exercising by the general government those 
powers only that are clearly delegated.”91 
As the representative of the whole people in the national executive, Jackson was 
ultimately responsible for collecting and enforcing the “tariff of abominations” in South 
Carolina.  He understood the constitutional duty of the executive branch to interpret and 
then enforce the Constitution be at least as important, if not more important, than the 
policy making decisions of Congress, and the judicial power of the Supreme Court.   
The duty of faithful constitutional construction did not belong to Jackson alone, 
but to all citizens.  Each branch of government was bound to enforce the construction for 
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its branch.  The people, ultimately, were responsible in the selection of these branches to 
make sure that their representatives maintained the constitutional balance.  “It is a 
confederal perpetual union, first made by the people in their sovereign capacities, upon 
which, we the people of these United States made a more perfect union, ….”92  Jackson’s 
“sacred duty” to the perpetual federal Union guided him as he pursued a confrontation 
with South Carolina. 
Jackson’s Policy of Confrontation  
As February 1—the date South Carolina had set for nullification—drew near, 
Jackson determined to fulfill his presidential obligations to the whole Union.  During the 
crisis, Jackson knew his administration was in a precarious position.  If he supported the 
abolition of the tariff, then the manufacturing interests in the East might also “secede or 
nullify. …I have to look at both ends of the Union to preserve it.”93  Jackson was still 
uncertain about how the individual states would respond.  Virginia was a hotbed of 
nullification and was liable to defend South Carolina’s actions with support from North 
Carolina and Georgia. South Carolina could have allied with Alabama to support 
squatters on Creek lands.  As part of his strategy, then, Jackson looked to loyal state 
legislatures for support, particularly in New York.94  When the state legislatures 
repudiated nullification as a theory, they strengthened Jackson’s own constitutional 
position, even though many states found Jackson’s theory to be overly speculative.   
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Jackson believed that South Carolina’s approach must be met with force.  He 
explained to Van Buren his resolve to “act with all the forbearance to do my duty, and 
extend that protection to our good citizens and the officers of our government in the 
South who are charged with the execution of the laws.…”  To allow South Carolina to 
persecute or hang those who sought to obey the law would promote disunion everywhere.  
“No my friend, the crisis must now be met with firmness, our citizens protected and the 
modern doctrine of nullification and secession put down forever.”  He planned to ask 
Congress for authorization to use force against the state.  Jackson needed Congress.  If 
Jackson acted independently, he recognized that he would be “branded with the epithet, 
tyrant.”  To convince the nation that South Carolina was the threat, Jackson proposed to 
wait for violence to erupt in South Carolina.  Unionists and nullificationists were arming 
their factions in preparation for violent confrontation.  South Carolina had raised 12,000 
volunteers in defense of the Ordinance.  If the Unionists were assaulted by the state 
militia, then Jackson could charge the state with the treasonable act of levying war on the 
Union and bring in militia from the North to arrest them.95 Jackson’s letter to 
Charlestown Unionists urged them to be brave and steadfast in defense of the Union.  
When insurrection and war came, the other states would exercise their rights to protect 
loyal citizens.96  
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96 Jackson offered arms and legal assistance to Poinsett.  But from the White House, he recognized that the 
local unionists would have to take the initiative.  He wrote: “The Union must be preserved; and its laws 
duly executed, but by the proper means. … [W]e must perform our duties without suspecting that there are 
those around us desiring to tempt us to do wrong.  We must act as the instruments of law and if force is 
offered to us in that capacity, even should we fall as individuals, that the friends of liberty and union will 
still be strong enough to prostrate their enemies.  …” 
 “Your union men should act in Concert: their designation as unionists should teach them to be 




While Jackson publicly threatened force, he privately assured the South Carolina 
Unionist leader, Joel Poinsett, that the crisis would be resolved without violence.  The 
rhetoric of force was primarily designed to array the forces of law and government 
against faction and rebellion.  Continued military preparations by the State Rights party 
would expose their ultimate plans for secession and disunion.  Jackson himself believed 
that the national response would over-awe the South and prevent a widespread 
rebellion.97  Others did not share Jackson’s confidence.  Daniel Webster wrote to Levi 
Lincoln that a conflict of arms was assured.  South Carolina could not back down from its 
extreme position; Jackson, having framed the issue as a matter of constitutional duty, was 
similarly bound by his promises to Poinsett and the Unionists.98  Jackson tried to retain 
political control over the crisis.  While preparing for confrontation in Charlestown and 
using Democratic political networks to urge the states not to approve the Ordinance, 
Jackson attempted to arrange a political resolution to the crisis by supporting the lower 
tariff rates of the Verplank Bill.99  At the same time, Jackson expected Congress to 
support his policy of confrontation with South Carolina. By January 16, he requested a 
collection bill that would allow him to collect the duties off-shore in the harbor rather 
                                                                                                                                                 
be thrown in the way of the laws of their Constitution, whose cause is not only their cause but that of free 
institutions throughout the world.” (Jackson to Poinsett, December 2, 1832, Correspondence, 4:493-494). 
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than in custom houses. Finally, Jackson asked Congress for the authorization to use the 
militia, army and navy to enforce federal law in South Carolina.100  
 In fact, by late January, events were spiraling out of Jackson’s control.  Northern 
Jacksonians were dissatisfied with the Verplank bill, and Northeastern nationalists like 
Webster were openly pledged to defeat it.  At any rate, Jackson loyalists like Senator 
Wright of New York did not believe that a tariff reduction would satisfy South Carolina.  
The South might be mollified, but Hayne, Calhoun, and Hamilton would still need to be 
met with force.  Both the Force Bill and the Verplank tariff faced certain defeat by early 
February.  The South would not support the use of force, and the North would not support 
a reduction in the tariff.101 Jackson complained to Van Buren that “many nullifiers are 
here [in Washington] in disguise.”  They would save Calhoun while disgracing Jackson 
and “their country.”102 
Jackson also faced reversals in his effort to sustain the spirit and militancy of the 
South Carolina Unionists. The laws of South Carolina had been artfully constructed so 
that it would be difficult to prosecute state officials who enforced the Ordinance.  Joel 
Poinsett reported that the Union party in Charleston was unwilling to “join in mortal 
conflict” against so many of their own sons and brothers in the State Rights party.  
Jackson had hoped that an internal crisis would spark a clear justification for intervention.  
Poinsett informed Jackson that his best course was to seek a certificate from the federal 
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judge that his administration could not enforce the law in South Carolina.  The President 
could then send the militia into Charlestown, where he would enjoy local support.  But 
the President had formed his strategy in order to pose himself as the defender of the 
Constitution, and not as the invader of a sovereign state.103  With a Congress that was 
unwilling to support Jackson’s legislation and Unionists who were reluctant to play their 
necessary role, Jackson increasingly became isolated and ineffective. 
Van Buren and the “Sacred Cause of State Rights” 
Torn between the threat of Southern secession and Northern demands for 
protectionism, Jackson required the political support of his loyal allies in the state 
legislatures.  While most state legislatures had denounced nullification, their personal 
support of Jackson’s Proclamation varied widely.  New York’s response to the Ordinance 
assumed special importance because the state was managed by Vice President-elect 
Martin Van Buren through the political machine of the Albany Regency.  Initially, 
Jackson aggressively entreated Van Buren for his support.  Jackson’s own strident 
position had been set forth in the Proclamation and was re-iterated in his letters.   
It will not do now to temporize or falter, … when by crushing this wicked faction in its 
bed, you strengthen our republican government, both at home and abroad… Let me hear 
from you soon give me your opinion of the plan I have charted to execute the laws and 
put down nullification, rebellion and secession …104 
 
Van Buren found himself unable to readily support the President.  Scholars of both state 
politics and nullification emphasize the crisis of 1833 as the first major open feud within 
the heretofore stalwart Albany Regency.  Van Buren, representing the agrarian 
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Democrats, was sympathetic to the state rights claims of the South and no doubt sought to 
protect his presidential aspirations by demonstrating his loyalty to state rights.  But as 
New York had industrialized, down-state politicians increasingly supported a 
protectionist tariff as necessary for the economic success of the state.  The manufacturing 
and finance wing of the Regency was led by prominent wool speculator William Knowler 
and supported by his son in law, Governor Marcy. Van Buren was convinced that the 
national interest required tariff reduction, and he worked hard to bring the party machine 
to bear on dissenters.  However, Marcy’s influence delayed Van Buren’s plans.  In his 
annual message to the state in January, Marcy exposed the tense position of the Regency.  
On the one hand, he denounced nullification sternly.  But on the other hand, he supported 
tariff reform weakly by promising support for reform that provided “substantial relief to 
every real grievance.”  In effect, his speech supported Knowler’s faction and 
protectionism.105 
 As Van Buren replied to Jackson’s plea for aid, he perceived that Jackson’s 
position had seriously undermined Jacksonian political support in the South, particularly 
in Virginia. Van Buren gently chided the President for focusing attention on the doctrinal 
theory of a national union rather than on his duty to uphold the law.  Van Buren pointedly 
failed to approve of all of the Proclamation, citing “honest differences of opinion, upon 
points which men are so apt to disagree as to the theory and proper operation of our 
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peculiar system of government.” Jackson’s theory of federalism, Van Buren argued, had 
opened the administration to opposition from erstwhile allies.106 
 The debate over New York’s response to Jackson and South Carolina came to a 
head on January 24th.  William Knowler called a public meeting at the Albany City Hall 
that proposed pro-tariff resolutions.  Van Buren organized a heavy turnout of agrarian 
Democrats at the meeting.  When Regency loyalist John A. Dix proposed alternative 
resolutions calling for tariff reduction, the meeting dissolved in chaos.  The majority of 
attendees retired to the capital building, where they passed Dix’s resolutions.  Van Buren 
then drafted a lengthy report justifying Dix’s resolutions on traditional state right 
principles.107 
 Jackson, unaware of the obstacles facing Van Buren, wrote urgently to Van 
Buren, “Why is your legislature silent at this eventful crisis?  Friendship, with candor, 
compels me to say to you, that your friends are astonished at the silence of your 
legislatures… The state of Newyork [sic] has not come forth in her majesty and strength 
at this eventful moment.”108  Finally, Van Buren secured the support of enough 
Democrats in the state legislature to secure the eventual support of his resolutions, though 
his political opponents (manufacturing Democrats, Anti-Masons, and National 
Republicans) managed to delay the final passage of the resolutions until late February.109 
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Most portrayals of Van Buren focus on his reputation for partisan genius in 
building the Albany Regency and assembling the Jackson coalition. Van Buren has been 
so frequently characterized as the “Little Magician” that it is tempting to analyze the New 
York Report as an expedient effort to secure support for Jackson’s agenda and Van 
Buren’s own Presidential aspirations.  A close reading of the Report reveals that Van 
Buren took great personal risks to defend the cause of state rights against the “speculative 
theories” of both the Proclamation and the Ordinance.  In an exercise of the high 
constitutional politics of statesmanship, Van Buren employed the legislative voice of his 
state to defend the “Virginia Doctrine” against new and seditious theories of the Union. 
Jackson had appealed to all citizens, and especially to Van Buren, to fulfill their 
duty to the Union by preserving and protecting the federal government.  In response, New 
York accepted its duty to the government, but recognized a higher duty to the Union.  
The Union contained the balance between the central and state governments; duty to the 
Union, as it ought to be, superseded but did not negate duty to the existing general 
government.  It was essential that the Union be maintained upon proper principles.  The 
Committee of the New York legislature that approved Van Buren’s report stressed “their 
duty to vindicate and explain the political principles which are entertained by themselves 
and as they believe by a majority of the good people of the state.”110  Above all, Van 
Buren sought to defend and reassert the theory of limited government by the people of 
the sovereign states.  For political reasons, he downplayed his differences with Jackson’s 
nationalist Proclamation, and pointedly condemned South Carolina’s Ordinance as 
secessionist in tendency.  But the tone of New York’s report was moderate.  It sought to 
mediate the crisis by supporting tariff reduction for the good of the Union.   
                                                 




South Carolina’s Ordinance had advanced new “assumptions of right” that Van 
Buren felt he must critique.  The people, within the states, and not the President were the 
only parties who could really refute the Ordinances.  Yet the people were tragically 
divided.  While disclaiming any need to choose sides in the partisan debate, Van Buren 
enlisted New York to defend the traditional practice of state rights.  Political orthodoxy 
was endangered and with it the Union.  “[S]o much discredit is apprehended to the sacred 
cause of State rights from the excesses of South Carolina…”111 that the states must rise 
up in defense of the cause.  His defense of the old Republican doctrines of state rights in 
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions revisited the increasing tension between the 
national and federal principles in American politics.  Because Calhoun used the old 
Republican principles to justify secession, it was imperative that the connection between 
nullification and the legitimate constitutional role of the state be refuted.  This was no 
less than their “service to the Republic.”112 
New York’s report, then, emerges as a Madisonian constitutional gloss on the 
nature of the Union and the power of the states as constitutional actors within the Union.  
It provides evidence of a persistent Northern belief in the constitutional authority and 
limited sovereignty of the states.  The primary purpose of the report was to articulate a 
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legitimate sphere of state constitutional action.  Addressing South Carolina’s doctrines 
was a secondary concern, 
The Committee are advocates for the reserved rights of the States, and a strict construction of the 
Constitution of the United States.  Experience has, they think, fully demonstrated the wisdom of 
the determination of the Convention to commit to the Federal Government the management of 
such concerns only, as appertain to the relations of the States with each other, and with foreign 
nations and certain other matters particularly enumerated in the Constitution: leaving the great 
mass of the business of the people, relating as it does mainly to their domestic concerns, to the 
legislation of the States.113  
 
Wisely, the people vested these powers in the states, for the safety of liberty.  “The great 
diversity in the interests and conditions of the different states” meant that most political 
decisions were best made at the state and local level.  In the present crisis, the states had 
proved perfectly capable of rising above their petty differences to support the Union. 
Van Buren rooted the principle of state support for a constitutional union in the 
language of Jefferson.  The states were bound to preserve “the general government in its 
whole constitutional vigor”; good citizens would be loyal to both the states and the 
general government.114  The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions themselves did not 
justify secession, Van Buren insisted; they were written in response to real 
encroachments of citizens’ liberty.  Virginia and Kentucky advanced the position that the 
central government had been created by a compact to which the states were parties.  The 
states were then duty bound to interpose against violations of that compact as a defense 
of the constitution and union.  States did not presume to act alone, but they looked to 
other states to support their resistance.  While the other states refused the right of 
interposition as an unconstitutional assumption of authority, Madison and Jefferson 
maintained their theories.  Madison’s articulation of his position in the Virginia Report of 
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1800, New York believed, led to the vindication of the principles in Jefferson’s election 
victory of 1800.  These principles became the foundation of orthodox constitutional 
theory.  “[T]he future operations of our political institutions are dependent upon the 
continued respect and confidence of the people in them.”115 
Recognizing Madison as the authoritative voice on state constitutional action, Van 
Buren appealed to “that great man” to settle the controversy.  In particular, Van Buren 
quoted Madison’s letters to prominent citizens against state and local factionalism.  
Madison had emphasized that any local disturbance should be channeled through its 
representatives in Congress.  In response to talk of secession in New England, Madison 
had written to Elbridge Gerry that in cases of disunion, “a government like ours should be 
slow in believing [talk of rebellion], should put forth its whole might when necessary to 
suppress it, and promptly return to the paths of reconciliation.”116  Because the sphere of 
republican government had been extended to the national level, the other states were 
justified in acting through the Union to quell a local rebellion and preserve the peace of 
the Union.   
Madison granted the states a significant role in constitutional deliberation; he did 
not seek to replace them with calls for a “common umpire.”   
[W]here is the common umpire to decide ultimately between [the state and general 
government]?  In cases of little importance or urgency, the prudence of both parties will keep 
them aloof from the questionable ground; but if it can neither be avoided or compromised, a 
convention of the States must be called, to ascribe the doubtful power to that department 
which they may think best.  You will perceive by these details that we have not yet so far 
perfected our Constitutions as to venture to make them unchangeable.  But still, in their 
present state, we consider them not otherwise changeable than by the authority of the people, 
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on a special election of representatives for that purpose expressly: They are until then the lex 
legum.117 
 
Because the Constitution had been ratified by all of the people in the several states, 
change must arise from all of the people.  Democratic constitutional politics provided the 
solution to the dangers of consolidation and usurpation.  The civil revolutions of 1800 
and 1828 had functioned to restore the constitution to its intended limits.118  Naturally, 
the people best exercised this political power through the actions of the state, over which 
they exhibited a tighter control.  Although the Report refrained from direct criticism of 
Jackson’s proclamation on this point, it implicitly repudiated any suggestion that the 
Union was composed of one consolidated body of the people.  Jackson had subtly 
undermined republican orthodoxy by stressing national power to the neglect of state 
rights.  Constitutional authority ultimately lay in either state legislatures or in 
constitutional conventions.  The relative importance given to the states did not diminish 
the long respect that New York had maintained for the constitutionally mandated 
authority of the general government.  Within its proper sphere, the judiciary was the 
“exclusive expositor of the Constitution, in cases submitted to its judgment, in the last 
resort.”119  The judicial power bound the other departments of the government, respecting 
cases before the courts, but “not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional 
compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments hold their delegated 
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trusts.”120  Other constitutional actors retained their right to construe the meaning of the 
Constitution.   
During the Sedition Act Crisis, Virginia was justified in declaring the Sedition 
Act unconstitutional and in sending that pronouncement to the states. It required their 
support in adopting “necessary and proper measures in each, for co-operating with her in 
maintaining unimpaired the authorities, rights, and liberties reserved in the States 
respectively, or to the people.”121  Van Buren carefully explained that ‘necessary and 
proper’ in this instance, had not included state resistance to federal law, disobedience to 
the judiciary, or plans for revolution. Virginia merely suggested that the states use their 
constitutional power to force a constitutional convention.  Two thirds of the states, he 
explained, held the power to call Congress to account for its actions.  The resistance of 
the states to this idea, however, prevented state review from becoming an established 
principle of constitutional law.  Instead, victory was secured by the civil revolution of 
1800.  
 The united action of the states against South Carolina, particularly in the South 
where they also suffered under the tariff, demonstrated that the states could rise above 
local interest.   
[N]ot a single instance has occurred in which the resistance of a single state, to the 
measures of the Federal Government, has excited sufficient sympathy or countenance 
from her sister States, to afford cause for a well grounded apprehension of detriment to 
the Union, but an improper combination amongst its members.122 
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“Who can doubt that now, as in the late war, the federal arm, in the hour of greatest peril, 
will be upheld by the State authorities?”123  State action not only helped to maintain the 
safety of the Union through the right ordering of constitutional principles, but states also 
used their political power to ensure that the government enacts policies on the Bank, 
tariff, and internal improvements that support the constitutional principles.  Van Buren 
quoted Jackson approvingly in affirming that state governments, in their everyday 
political affairs, provide the “surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies” by 
keeping the exercise of power close to the people.124   
In tone, the New York Report was highly supportive of the President.  By 
stressing the “obvious and imperative” constitutional duty of the President to enforce the 
law within the bounds of South Carolina, New York could justify every action the 
President had taken to prepare for conflict.125  The Committee maintained a critical 
silence on Jackson’s request for Congressional authorization to use force.  They 
downplayed significant disagreement with Jackson’s theory of the Union. The question of 
who formed the Constitution figured centrally in Van Buren’s analysis, so he could not 
afford to wholly avoid significant differences with the President.  Van Buren’s analysis of 
the Constitution depended heavily upon the role that the states played both as 
constitutional deliberators and as the wielders of sovereign political power.  It mattered a 
great deal whether the people or the states were sovereign.126   If the people were a 
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wholly consolidated sovereign, and not the states, then New York had no real business 
debating the meaning of the Constitution.  In fact, it made Jackson’s own request for New 
York’s resolutions unnecessary. Jackson had insisted that the whole people formed the 
Union, drawing upon the preamble as his authority that “We the people” were the parties 
to the Union.  Van Buren eluded a direct disagreement with Jackson by defining the 
states as “the people composing their societies in their highest sovereign capacities.”  
This allowed the people, through the states, to be the parties to the compact, while 
preserving the states as constituents of the Union.  Thus, “the preamble is reconciled with 
facts, and that is a Constitution established by ‘the people of the United States,’ not as 
one consolidated body, but as members of separate and independent communities, each 
acting for itself, without regard to their comparative members.”127   
To cover any potential disagreement, the Report took great care to praise the 
strong points of Jackson’s leadership.  New York praised his attention to the public, his 
opposition to unconstitutional schemes, his fiscal discipline, his resistance to monopolies, 
his devotion to republican government, and his determination to interpret the constitution 
as it was framed.   
Having devoted such a large portion of the Report to defending the reserved 
sovereignty of the states, Van Buren was at pains to explain how sovereignty did not 
necessarily permit secession.  The sovereignty that resided in the states was not 
unqualified, because the Union was not “a mere confederacy of free and sovereign 
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states.”128 The people in the several states, working through their several political 
institutions, or through accepted constitutional channels, held the highest political power. 
New York did not countenance the idea of secession because they accepted the primacy 
of the people.  The Union they formed was not a simple league. “Though founded on a 
compact, [It] is nevertheless a government which is made by that compact sovereign and 
independent as to the powers granted to it, in the same manner as the States are sovereign 
and independent as to powers not granted.”129  To grant to one state the power to leave or 
dissolve the Union would be to deny that the people had ever formed the government.  
Even if the constitution was violated, a dissenting state should seek redress, and remain in 
the Union out of patriotic devotion.   
 Van Buren carefully defended secession as a resort to the original right of self-
preservation.  However, the natural right of secession and revolution must be limited by 
existing rights guaranteed to the states by the civil compact.  The people had created the 
government, and the states must maintain it perpetually.  If a state should insist upon its 
natural right to independence, the other states would collectively decide whether to 
release it from its perpetually binding obligation, or to insist on the “preservation of the 
Union as it is.”130  The states’ collective right to decide the fate of the Union was the 
essence of republican government.   
Strip the states of this right, and a system which but yesterday excited the respect and 
admiration of the world, must soon, very soon, serve only as an additional argument in 
the mouths of monarchists and absolutists against the capacity of man for self-
government.131 
                                                 











New York agreed with Jackson that nullification was an absurd violation of the very 
notion of self-government.   
 Finally, the report took a moderate position on the tariff.  It echoed Governor 
Marcy’s disdain for any action by which New York might “aggrandize herself at the 
expense of her sister states, or pervert to local purposes a system of government intended 
for the common benefit of all.”132  The tariff was undoubtedly constitutional; the 
Constitution clearly granted Congress the power for regulating commerce through a 
tariff.  Yet the excess of revenue over expenditures and the tariff’s function as class 
legislation to promote manufactures at the expense of southern agriculture suggested that 
the tariff should be reduced.  New York supported the reduction of the tariff as the 
prudent course of action. 
Congress 
When a treasonable confrontation between South Carolina and the U.S. failed to 
materialize and state legislatures had repudiated nullification, the task of negotiating a 
political settlement fell to Congress.  Despite the support of the administration and 
Jackson loyalists, the reform Verplank tariff bill failed to gain sufficient support.  
Southerners opposed it because the bill did not completely abandon protectionism.  In the 
North, Jacksonians and National Republicans opposed it as too drastic a reduction.133  
Jackson had turned to Congress on January 16, to ask for a Force Bill to authorize his 
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military preparations against South Carolina.  Calhoun, now appointed to the U.S. Senate, 
seized upon the possibility of military coercion to rally the South behind his cause.   
 Calhoun consistently attempted to shift the issue from the tariff and coercion to 
the broader nature and purpose of the federal Union.  He posed his positions directly 
against Jackson’s request for force, and conveniently ignored the moderate state rights 
position of Old Republicans like Van Buren.  “The great question at issue is,” stressed 
Calhoun, “where is the paramount power?  Where [is] the sovereignty in this complex, 
but beautiful and admirable system … lodged?”134  Jackson lacked any real authority, 
Calhoun charged, either to coerce the states, or to operate a tariff for the purpose of 
raising revenue.  Calhoun shifted the Congressional debate back to the constitutional 
question by proposing resolutions that would recognize the states as the sovereign parties 
to the Constitution:  
Resolved, that the people of the several states composing these United States are united 
as parties to a constitutional compact, to which each state acceded as a separate 
sovereign community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification; and that of the 
Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a union between the states ratifying the 
same.135 
 
The Senate took up Calhoun’s propositions and debated them vigorously.  In early 
February, Calhoun wrote in anticipation to William C. Preston that the South, particularly 
Virginia and Alabama, was coming over to his position.  Calhoun recommended that all 
conflict with federal authority in South Carolina should be postponed.  “To take issue 
now, would be to play into the hands of the administration.”136   
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 In the debate on the Force Bill, Calhoun posed two starkly opposed political 
theories as alternatives.  According to Calhoun, sovereignty was indivisible.  So either the 
states were absolutely sovereign, or the federal government was absolutely sovereign.  
Calhoun framed the choice of political theory as one of global civilizations: either Asiatic 
despotism or European federalism.  Any suggestion that sovereignty was vested in the 
whole people led inexorably to total national sovereignty and to the end of minority 
rights.  With no limits on the power of the majority, “faction would take the place of 
patriotism; and with the loss of patriotism, corruption must necessarily follow, and in its 
train anarchy, despotism, or the establishment of absolute power in a single individual, as 
a means of arresting the conflicts of hostile interests.”  The American government faced 
this fate.  “Our government for many years has been verging to Consolidation; that the 
Constitution has gradually become a dead letter; and that all restrictions upon the power 
of government have been virtually removed, so as to practically convert the General 
Government into a government of an absolute majority….”  Interposition and 
nullification, Calhoun argued, could prevent this slide into anarchy by checking the 
power of the majority.  It would provide, “the strongest cement” for the Union by 
keeping the constitution within established limits. 137  As Calhoun intended, his rhetoric 
began to rally the South.  It also strengthened the influence of the nationalists in the 
North who could persuasively argue the opposite position against Calhoun. 
 The crisis was eventually resolved at the intervention of Jackson’s enemy Henry 
Clay.  As with so many antebellum compromises, the parties did not agree on the form or 
style of the Constitution, but on the political terms of their continued existence together.  
Clay arranged a compromise by which the tariff would gradually be reduced to a level of 
                                                 




twenty percent over a decade and by which protectionism was refuted as a political 
principle.  More importantly, the Force Bill was passed, giving Jackson a symbolic 
victory.  South Carolina then met in convention to repeal its nullification of the tariffs of 
1828 and 1832, but maintained its principles by nullifying the Force Bill.  As Ellis 
suggests, the compromise created embarrassment for Jackson, while vindicating  the 
power of Henry Clay and the opponents of the Tariff.138 
 In a broader perspective, the victors in the North were the nationalists.  Daniel 
Webster rose to prominence as the spokesman of the North.  Webster, as the next chapter 
will argue, astutely looked for opportunities to pose his nationalism against the heterodox 
approach of Calhoun.139  After Calhoun spent two days on the floor of the Senate 
defending the cause of South Carolina against the Force Bill (February 14th and 15th), it 
was Webster who rose to refute him in a speech he hoped would be greater than his 
Second Reply to Hayne.140  In the titanic struggle between Clay and Jackson, and 
between Webster and Calhoun, it was Van Buren who lost.  The sacred cause of state 
rights, that he sought so earnestly to defend, had indeed been brought into discredit by 
nullification.  As the revolutionary consensus—a nation embodied in a voluntary federal 
union—fragmented, few participants noticed that the whole nature of the debate had 
shifted. 
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 Madison noticed.  In the Nullification Crisis, the aging statesman consciously 
aligned himself against nullification.  He advocated a moderate state rights that retained 
real authority for the states..  After the debate on the Force Bill, Madison wrote to 
Webster praising Webster’s rejection of nullification, but insisted that Webster’s Union 
of the whole people went beyond the text of the Constitution.  “The undisputed fact is, 
that the Constitution was made by the people, but as embodied in the several states, who 
were parties to it; and therefore made by the states in their highest authoritative 
capacity.”141  The people could have made their Confederacy into a “mere league or 
treaty” or even created one popular sovereign body.  But in fact, Madison suggested, they 
“did by a mixed form make them one people, nation or sovereignty, for certain purposes, 
and not so for others.”  Because the Constitution had been created by a competent 
authority, the sovereign people, the focus of constitutional deliberation should focus on 
the constitution itself, on what kind of entity it is, rather than a speculative inquiry into 
who constituted it.  The Constitution disclosed a division of powers between state and 
federal authorities in which supremacy was vested in the federal government.   
Whilst the constitutional compact remains undissolved, it must be executed according to 
the forms and provisions specified in the compact.  It must not be forgotten that compact, 
expressed or implied, is the vital principle of free governments as contradistinguished 
from government not free; and that a revolt against this principle leaves no choice 
between anarchy and despotism … 
     Such is the Constitution of the United States de jure & de facto; and the name 
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The Nullification Crisis fundamentally altered the cause of state rights.  
Previously, disputes over the boundary between federal and state powers were argued 
through a detailed examination of the text of the Constitution in order to determine which 
powers are necessary and proper, which powers are delegated, and which powers are 
reserved.  The steamboat cases had been argued in both federal and state courts in this 
manner.  The Madisonian position contended that, whatever the original constitutional 
actors might have been, they were now governed by the compact as created in 1787.  The 
Madisonian institutional analysis was increasingly replaced by a doctrinal analysis of 
sovereignty, nationalism, and popular will that polarized constitutional construction 
between national and state sovereignty.  The new approach further eroded association, 
institutions, and textual analysis as the basis of a “partly national-partly federal” analysis 
that transcended sectional theories. 
Finally, the congressional debate revealed deep ambiguities in Americans’ loyalty 
to a union of compromises between the federal and national principle.  While suffering a 
tactical defeat over nullification, Calhoun successfully shifted the terms of the debate 
from a contest between nullification and union (in which he was in a small minority) to 
one of state sovereignty versus consolidated nationhood.  Over the next decade, Jackson’s 
constitutional argument that the collective political association of one people had formed 
the nation would provide the most effective rhetoric for statesmen trying to counter 
Calhoun’s claims. The crisis helped to persuade many Northerners that an excessive 
focus on state sovereignty by the South could best be answered by an Jackson’s 




by Jackson’s decision to answer Calhoun’s speculative theory of the Union with his own 
nationalist theory.  A pure state rights analysis would have rested on the content of the 
Constitution, and not who the parties to the compact were.  Madison’s insistence on 
maintaining the Union of 1787—with state rights secured by constitutional restrictions—
was marginalized by the ascendancy of Jackson and Calhoun. 
After 1833, the debate on the federal question acquired a predominantly sectional 
character.  The middle ground of Madison and Van Buren had depended on an inter-
sectional consensus that the nation had been embodied in a federal union.  Moderates had 
stressed that the constitutional balance between the states and central government was 
instrumental for liberty.  After 1833, sectional leaders were able to persuade their regions 
that liberty depended upon a strong sovereign nation or upon strong sovereign states 
more than on a careful division of power.  Calhoun garnered the support of many 
Southerners for his assertions of individual state sovereignty.  It was left to Webster and 
Northern nationalists to justify the need for national supremacy.  This is the subject of the 




Chapter 6:  “The Great Primeval Compact”: Constitutional 
Commentators and the Rise of American Nationalism 
 
 
The most prolific outpouring of antebellum nationalist theories of the Union arose 
in response to the nullification crisis (1828-1833).  Between the Founding and the crisis, 
state legislatures, judicial tribunals, and the partisan press produced the bulk of 
constitutional commentary for immediate political and legal business. As a part of the 
rising professionalization of American law, professors of law in Northern universities, 
James Wilson (1790), then Nathan Dane (1823-34) and James Kent (1826-1830) 
produced major commentaries on American law. Finally, Joseph Story produced the 
Commentaries on the Constitution (1833) that systemized constitutional scholarship and 
provided the standard reference on the Constitution for a generation.1  These 
commentaries opened new opportunities for more abstract speculation about the Union in 
a way that the political debates in the Olmsted Crisis and the Steamboat Cases had not 
permitted.  Political actors like Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay naturally concerned 
themselves with immediate outcomes and gaining a partisan advantage, and so did not 
undertake the careful deliberation that occasioned the production and publication of the 
treatises.  State and United States Supreme Court opinions were frequently more 
theoretical than Congress or the President, but they were still limited by the cases that 
appeared before the judiciary; they could not offer the kind of systematic treatment that 
law lectures and commentaries provided.  The treatises also had the advantage of 
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addressing the philosophical questions at the heart of the American polity: who were the 
parties to the Union?  How was it formed?  What were the purposes of Union?  How does 
the Constitution function in relationship to the Union?   
 Because of the unfolding crisis of union, authors of treatises addressed their topics 
in earnest.  In the midst of uncertainty, they were acutely aware that “political instruction 
was necessary to liberty. … Without such knowledge … our happy republic would 
pursue the same melancholy career which had led to the ruin of free nations of antiquity.”  
The survival of free government required that the public be well informed.  Advocates of 
a particular doctrine turned not only to politics; they tried to educate the public toward 
their way of thinking in order to best preserve the republic in crisis.2  
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an exegesis of the nationalist 
doctrine as it developed in constitutional treatises and writings in response to the 
nullification crisis.  The early nationalists, James Wilson and Nathaniel Chipman, 
exercised a decisive role in the formulation of nationalist doctrine.  Although St. George 
Tucker wrote from a distinctly Southern, Jeffersonian perspective, many of the Northern 
commentators wrote in the shadow of Tucker’s exposition of the Jeffersonian doctrine, 
and so his ideas will also be carefully considered.  One of the most important of these 
texts, Webster’s “Second Reply to Hayne” in January of 1830, is not a treatise, but it was 
based on the seasoned reflection of an established constitutional lawyer as he sought to 
advance the policy of New England.  Joseph Story’s magisterial Commentaries on the 
Constitution (1833) surpassed all the other nationalist treatises in its comprehensive 
exegesis of the nature of the Union and the Constitutional text.  Together, Webster and 
Story aided the dichotomization of theories of the Union into pro-nation and pro-state 
                                                 




camps. The middle ground of theorists who more accurately captured the character of the 
Constitution as a product of compromise was blurred. 
Early Nationalists 
In the early Republic, statesmen like James Wilson and Nathaniel Chipman 
emphasized that the creation of the Union involved the establishment of a real 
government, which arose from the needs of the people during the Revolution.  As 
witnesses to the Founding, the early commentators were aware that the Constitution 
instituted novel political structures and ideals.  The people created and established it for 
their own purposes.  Americans viewed it as a decisive break with the past, and not the 
product of a long evolution from customary English rights.  The revolutionary 
substitution of the Constitution for the Articles of Confederation without violence proved 
the genius of the American people.  Wilson rejoiced in: 
the revolution principle—that the sovereign power residing in the people, they may 
change their constitution and government whenever they please—is not a principle 
of discord, rancour, or war: it is a principle of melioration, contentment and peace. 
… [The principle was] not recommended merely by a flattering theory [but] … 
recommended by happy experience.3  
 
He praised these people for their “warm and keen sense of independence and freedom.”4  
                                                 
3 James Wilson, “Of the Study of Law in the United States,” (1790), Selected Political Essays of James 
Wilson, ed. Randolph Greenfield Adams (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1930), 199.  Revolution for the Early 
Nationalists meant the sovereignty of the people over a change of government.  They praised, “a scene, 
hitherto unparalleled, which America now exhibits to the world,--a gentle, a peaceful, a voluntary transition 
from one constitution of government to another.  In other parts of the world, the idea of revolutions in 
government is by a mournful and indissoluble association, connection with the idea of wars…” (Wilson, 
“Speech in Pennsylvania Convention, November 24, 1787”, Selected Political Essays, 179.  For more on 
Wilson’s political philosophy see Mark David Hall, The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson, 
1742-1798 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997). 
 




Wilson was a nationalist because he believed that liberty was a national cause, 
which could only be achieved through an association of states and people in a civil 
compact.  It was a 
Constitution that would produce the advantages of good, and prevent the inconveniences 
of bad government—a constitution whose beneficence and energy would pervade the 
whole union, and bind and embrace the interests of every part—a constitution that would 
ensure peace, freedom, and happiness to the states and people of America.5 
 
The early nationalists were acutely aware of the ‘partly national, partly federal’ character 
of the Union.  Wilson was famous for his emphasis on the people as the source of union.  
The nation was formed by a social contract of the people to protect the liberty of 
individual members.  Yet the states also played a decisive role in nation formation.  
During the Pennsylvania ratification debates, Wilson suggested that the Union would, 
“resign to the national government that part and that part only of their political liberty, 
which placed in that government, will produce more good to the whole, than if it 
remained in the several states.”6  In his law lectures, Wilson suggested that the states 
would be subject to the authority of the federal government, but that disputes between 
states might be resolved by international law (as would befit sovereigns and not 
subsidiary units).  Wilson’s initial suggestion that states might retain their sovereignty 
with respect to each other reflects the ambiguity of the “partly national, partly federal” 
compromise of the convention.7   
If James Wilson stressed the people as the formative element in the Union in 
building a nation, Nathaniel Chipman emphasized the importance of the legal instrument.  
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By creating a government of national scope, the Constitution bound the states for a 
common and national purpose.  The legal character of that Constitution bound them in 
respect to the general government in national affairs, just as the general government was 
bound to respect the states in their area of authority.  In contrast to Wilson’s emphasis on 
who made the Union, Chipman focused his analysis on how the supreme law functioned 
and bound the parties after it was made.8   
Chipman and Wilson understood that the federal government placed significant 
limitations on the states in order to better protect liberty.  Constitutional limitations on the 
states (popular authority and supreme law) would play an important role in the 
development of a nationalist doctrine of the Union.  Because the people held the superior 
and ultimate authority to make fundamental law, they could divide the use of sovereignty 
as they chose and could make that division obligatory on the state and federal 
governments.  Drawing from the experiences of the American Revolution, the early 
nationalists thought in terms of a social contract.  Having experienced the creation of the 
federal republic in a constitutional “moment,” they found it difficult to consider the idea 
that the government might have evolved.  In order to secure their liberty, the people, 
acting through statesmen guided by right reason, deliberately created spheres of operation 
and set limits for state and federal governments.  Reason, and not the historical process, 
was their guide. 
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Jefferson’s presidential victory of 1800 vindicated the state rights theories of the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.  During his presidency, both the states and the 
federal government interpreted the Constitution to be a compact between the states.  
Necessarily, the states were recognized to have a significant role in constitutional 
deliberation.9  Social contract theory, strict construction, and a strong bias in favor of the 
states in disputed matters composed the key elements in Jeffersonian constitutional 
theorizing. 
The early particularists focused on developing the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions and Jefferson’s habits of strict construction into a fully articulated 
constitutional theory.  Exemplified by St. George Tucker, Jeffersonian commentators 
focused heavily on the authority and sovereignty of the states. Tucker’s own commentary 
on Blackstone’s commentaries on the English law heavily influenced the particularists.  
Because the English common law still provided a firm basis for state law, and potentially 
federal law, Blackstone offered an essential source for American lawyers.10  In particular 
his doctrine of sovereignty exerted a subtle effect on the interpretation of constitutional 
law.  Blackstone’s defense of absolute parliamentary sovereignty was supported by a 
long tradition of parliamentary struggle on behalf of the people against the crown.  
However, the American Revolution had been waged against Parliament’s declaration of 
                                                 
9 The nationalist reading of Wilson and Chipman remained influential, particularly among Federalists and 
the legal profession.  As chapter two argued, strong, partisan factions within the states took positions on 
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agents of the constitution. 
 
10 Until the Supreme Court resolved the issue in favor of statutory law, nationalists hoped that federal 
power might be expanded by the inclusion of English common law into federal law.  The issue was finally 




its own unchecked sovereignty.  It was highly unlikely that the states would claim for 
their own legislatures the absolute sovereignty they had denied to the English.  As Tucker 
wrestled with the problem of sovereignty, he redefined it for the American polity. 
The Revolution, for Tucker, provided the real basis for sovereignty.  “All 
authority, among us, is derived [from] the people.”  This trust can be delegated, through 
solemn compact, but final authority still rests in the people.   
[W]hen the constitution is founded in voluntary compact and consent, and imposes limits 
to the efficient force of the government; or administrative authority, the people are sill the 
sovereign; the government still the mere creature of this will; and those who administer it 
are their agents and servants. 
 
Governments date from the creation of civil society.  They are coeval with the social 
compact and are themselves created by compact.  Tucker was careful, like many of his 
contemporaries, to distinguish civil society from government.  A successful revolution 
might end a government’s authority, but civil society remained.  Individuals obligations 
to respect their mutual rights were not dissolved.11   
Rather than turning to the specific terms of the Union (i.e. the constitutions) to 
determine the exact limits on the Union, Tucker drew his argument from the nature of 
confederal governments. He reasoned that this type of union must distribute power in 
certain ways.  Regarding the American Union, Tucker emphasized that in all 
confederations the government vests some of the supreme civil power into a “system of 
states” united by a common bond.  The states reserve to themselves “all their former 
powers, which are not delegated to the United States by the common bond of their 
Union.”12     
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12 Tucker, 65.  “System of states” is Burlamaqui’s term.  Tucker’s use of Burlamaqui suggests that he 




The evidence for Tucker’s theory of the nature of the federal unions came from 
the nature of older confederacies: The Union of Scotland and England in 1707, the 
Achaian Confederacy, the Helvetic Confederacy, and the United Provinces.  Tucker’s 
evidence for these principles arose from the history of older confederal unions, not from 
the newer Philadelphia system of a partly federal, partly national government.  In 
consequence, he reasoned from the premise that the Union consisted of allied sovereign 
states, even though he stated that sovereignty was, in fact, based in popular consent and 
might not be entirely consolidated in state governments.   
For many in the antebellum South, the critical theoretical question about the 
nature of the Union concerned the rights of resistance that states had against 
centralization.  Tucker embraced the possibility of secession because, historically, that 
was how confederacies had dissolved.  “The dissolution of these systems happens, when 
all the confederates by mutual consent, or some of them, voluntarily abandon the 
confederacy and govern their own states apart.”  The Articles of Confederation were 
dismantled by the mutual abandonment of the states that were the first to ratify the new 
Constitution.  Although the obligations of the Articles of Confederation remained, by 
ratifying the constitution, “the seceding states subverted the former federal 
government”!13 
                                                                                                                                                 
that rights were reserved to the states, nationalist commentators delighted to point out the ninth and tenth 
amendments reserve these powers to the people as well. 
 
13Tucker, 73.  Nationalist commentators would stress that the end of the Articles of Confederation had the 
consent of the Congress and the whole people.  Tucker perhaps exaggerated the extent to which the 
ratifying states “subverted” the existing government, but he was correct to point out that the last two states 
to ratify, North Carolina and Rhode Island, had constitutional rights under the old system that were 
essentially discarded.  However, Tucker did not really want to defend the rights of North Carolina and 
Rhode Island under the Articles.  His real aim was to support secession;  The right of Delaware or 
Pennsylvania to leave the confederacy was equal to the right of North Carolina and Rhode Island to 




Tucker formulated a statement of state rights based loosely on the form and style 
of the Declaration of Independence but subtly altered.  He cited Vattel’s statement that 
each state must fulfill a duty “to itself and to its citizens by doing whatsoever may best 
contribute to its own happiness and prosperity.”14  Tucker found this duty in the 
Declaration of Independence’s assertion of the right to alter or abolish abusive 
governments.  Because the Articles of Confederation were inadequate to provide for the 
“happiness and prosperity of the state,” the states had a right to alter their government.   
The Declaration of Independence stressed the need for prudence in making 
difficult decisions about secession, and stressed not only that the royal government was 
“inadequate,” but abusive and tyrannical.  Tucker subtly shifted the justification for 
revolutionary secession away from constitutional abuse to the imperfection of an existing 
government.  In his re- formulation of the principles of revolution in the Declaration, 
“governments long established,” (i.e Great Britain) became “governments established by 
compact” (i.e. United States).  Whereas the Declaration had opposed a “design to reduce 
them [the people] to absolute despotism,” Tucker now justified revolution against a  
design to invade their [the states’] sovereignty, and extend their own 
power beyond the terms of the compact, to the detriment of the states 
respectively, and to reduce them into a state of obedience, and finally to 
establish themselves in a permanent state of superiority, than it 
becomes not only their right, but the duty of the states respectively to 
throw off such governments… 
 
State sovereignty, therefore, became the basis of liberty and the grounds for 
revolution.  In contrast, Jefferson had justified revolution on the invasion of natural rights 
by the Crown.  In Tucker’s argument, Sovereignty was ultimately transferred from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
preserve the present constitution, is not greater than their former obligations were, to adhere to the articles 
of the confederation; each state possessing the same right of withdrawing itself from the confederacy 
without the consent of the rest, as any number of them do, or ever did possess.” (75). 
 




right of a people to a revolution to protect their natural rights against tyranny, to the right 
of a state to revolution in the form of secession to protect its sovereignty.  In 
consequence, Tucker’s conception of the American Union emphasized a compact 
between the states that was entirely federal in character.  To a certain extent, he admitted 
that the Union was rooted in a social compact that operated on individuals, but his 
admission was balanced by his emphasis the federal principle.  Above all, the 
constitutional character of a federal and social compact meant that it should be strictly 
construed regarding “the antecedent rights of a state” as well as the personal liberty and 
freedom that played an integral part in the ends of Union.15   
Tucker’s commentary developed the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions into the 
predominant school of constitutional theory.  Emphasis on state sovereignty and 
justifiable secession were adapted and supported by fellow Virginian John Taylor of 
Caroline and Thomas Cooper of South Carolina.16  Under the influence of Tucker, 
Taylor, and Cooper, the doctrines of state rights in the South focused increasingly on the 
sovereign authority of the state to the exclusion of the national principle.  By 1833, John 
Marshall would despair that “the word ‘state rights,’ as expounded by the resolutions of 
’98 and the report of ’99, construed by our legislature, has a charm against which all 
reasoning is vain.” The doctrine had become “the creed of every politician who hopes to 
rise in Virginia. … [E]ven to adopt the construction given by their author [Jefferson] is 
deemed political sacrilege.”17 
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16 Elizabeth Kelley Bauer, Commentaries on the Constitution, 1790-1860 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1952), 168-169. 
 
17 John Marshall to Joseph Story, July 31, 1833, William Story, ed., Life and Letters of Joseph Story 




The Rise of Nationalism 
As this dissertation has argued, the doctrine of state rights was not a peculiarly 
Southern way of thinking about the Union. While the majority of the nation favored a 
Jeffersonian platform of limited government and strict construction, the South in 
particular was the nationalist section of the country from 1800 to 1815.  Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and Pennsylvania acquired reputations for advancing theories of secession 
and nullification.  After the War of 1812, however, this reputation began to shift.  
Northern constitutional theorists, especially commentators from New England adopted 
more nationalistic views.  Many nationalists were former Federalists; even those who 
were not, such as Joseph Story, mistrusted the tendencies of Jeffersonian thought.  These 
commentators and theorists, particularly Kent, Dane, Story, and Webster, drew upon their 
connection to the early work of Wilson and Chipman.  As the idea of a social compact 
passed out of intellectual favor and was increasingly used by proponents of state 
sovereignty, nationalists sought another basis for their constitutional theory. They 
increasingly understood the people to be the integral components of the nation.  The 
people provided the ongoing source of all constitutional authority, not just the initial 
revolutionary consent to an existing constitutional structure.  Nationalists believed further 
that national association proceeded directly from the people and not through the 
intermediate associations of the states.  The people had created a national government for 
national purposes, and so their constitutional voice trumped the constitutional authority of 
intermediate state governments.  Nationalists based their constitutional doctrines on a 




On the national level, the most powerful early opponent of Jeffersonian 
constitutionalism was himself a Virginian.  John Marshall’s tenure as Chief Justice on the 
Supreme Court witnessed the rise of judicial review, the assertion of national 
constitutional supremacy, and the transformation of the contract and commerce clauses 
into restraints upon state legislative action.  In particular, oral arguments before the high 
court provided an arena for advocates to present arguments on the sources of the Union.  
In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), counsel for Maryland contended that because the 
Constitution was an “act of sovereign and independent states,” Maryland held a 
concurrent power to tax.  In contrast, Pinkney’s argument for the Bank of the United 
States stressed the popular sources of national authority.   
…[T]he Constitution acts directly upon the people, by means of powers 
communicated directly from the people.  No state, in its corporate 
capacity ratified it; but it was proposed for adoption to popular 
conventions.  It springs from the people, precisely as the state 
constitutions spring from the people, and acts on them in a similar 
manner.18   
 
Pinkney’s argument countered Maryland’s assertion of sovereignty by placing national 
authority on the same foundation as state authority.  Marshall seized upon the authority of 
the state conventions as the foundation of constitutional authority.  Because the states 
called the ratifying conventions, they indicated their assent to the new Constitution, and 
the people’s ratification obligated the states completely.  Marshall indicated: 
The government of the Union, then … is emphatically and truly a 
government of the people.  In form and substance it emanates from 
them.  Its powers are granted by them and are to be exercised directly 
on them for their benefit. 
 
The popular and national basis of the Constitution, then, conferred legitimacy on the 
claim that it was the supreme law, enforceable by the judiciary against the states.  So 
sweeping was this claim to authority that Spencer Roane referred to it as a “judicial coup 
                                                 




de main.”  He feared a court that could rule in defense of a national, popular Constitution.  
It would undermine the very character of a “confederate republic.”19  As political tensions 
rose in the 1830s and the sectional gulf widened, the competing ideas of state sovereignty 
and national sovereignty would become increasingly exclusive.   
 Marshall’s tenure on the Supreme Court also oversaw a transformation in the 
character of the Constitution as law.  Sylvia Snowiss argues the Constitution originally 
consisted in explicit provisions of fundamental law meant to limit sovereign power.  
After Marbury v. Madison (1803), Marshall used his monopoly on opinion writing and 
the “unprecedented” application of the rules of statutory construction to transform what 
had been higher law concerning sovereign power into supreme ordinary law, which the 
Court oversaw as the adjudicator of disputes about the meaning of the text.  Snowiss 
explains that Marshall, quietly and perhaps unintentionally, showed far less deference to 
legislative constitutional deliberation than the Founders had contemplated or the earlier 
judiciary had practiced.  By focusing on the Constitution as text rather than as an ordering 
of sovereign power, the Marshall Court distanced itself from the “metaphysical” 
speculation that characterized both Jackson and Calhoun’s theories of the Union and 
associated itself with the science of legal analysis.  Natural rights, which had played a 
prominent place in the Revolutionary political grammar, gave way to the positive law of 
the Constitution.20 
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   The shift from the Constitution as a compact ordering the state to a written 
supreme law transformed the character of constitutional deliberation.  As the practice of 
law professionalized, authoritative commentary on the law came increasingly from the 
courts and law schools.  In the Eighteenth Century the authoritative glosses on the 
Constitution were the Federalist Papers, written to influence a political event (the NY 
constitutional convention) and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions (by state 
legislatures).  Neither of these documents were inherently legal.  While the Anti-
Federalists had favored textualism against the broad construction of the Constitution by 
Federalists, both parties had reasoned from their political philosophy of the Union rather 
than from a legal analysis of the text.  In the antebellum period, however, the court 
increasingly issued the authoritative interpretations.   By the time of Dred Scott, even the 
Democratic Party believed they could best make authoritative statements about the nature 
of the Union and Slavery from the high court. 
 As case law came to occupy a central place in the struggle for constitutional 
meaning, constitutional arguments were increasingly made in treatises for scholars and 
law students.  In addition, almanacs, textbooks, and copies of the Constitution appeared 
for popular audiences with legal commentary on the character and nature of the Union.  
As legal analysis superseded institutional and philosophical deliberation, the nationalist 
lawyers of the Northeast, Dane, Webster, and Story, replaced the role that statesmen like 
Van Buren and Madison had played as arbiters of constitutional meaning.  This change in 
the medium of constitutional analysis subtly aided the nationalist cause. 
                                                                                                                                                 
modern form of judicial review than the court had previously exercised.  By relaxing the doubtful case rule, 
which previous courts had instituted to show due deference to legislative constitutional deliberation, 





Several major northern treatises published in the 1820s stressed the themes of 
fundamental law and popular constitutionalism against the Jeffersonian doctrine of the 
Constitution as a compact of the states.  Thomas Sergeant’s Constitutional Law (1822) 
stressed that the Constitution was “ordained and established, not by the States in their 
sovereign capacity, but emphatically, as the preamble pronounces, by the people of the 
United States.”21  The extent of constitutional authority, then, ought to be determined by 
reference to the document.  The people had the original right to set up a government on 
the principles that would best promote their own happiness.  Sergeant recognized that the 
Constitution made different parties competent to decide whether specific provisions of 
the Constitution were violated.  The judiciary had the authority to identify violations of 
the Constitution as “superior and paramount law,” but Congress could identify violations 
of treaties, which also constituted part of the “supreme law of the land.”  This provision 
indicated Sergeant’s preference for judicial determination over either state or 
congressional review.  His footnotes largely cite Supreme Court opinion as the authority 
on the nature of the Constitution, rather than Publius or congressional debate.  The 
Supreme Court was gradually becoming the final word on the Constitution. 
 Of all the commentators writing in the 1820s, Nathan Dane had the greatest 
impact in linking the legal, textual analysis of the Constitution to the national principle.  
The General Abridgement of American Law is not a theoretical work; it is a careful 
distillation of legal knowledge.  Dane deliberately styled his approach on that of Viner’s 
General Abridgement of Law and Equity.  Just as Viner was able to establish the Vinerian 
Chair of law at Oxford made famous by Blackstone, Dane used $15,000 from the 
                                                 




proceeds of his Abridgement to found the Dane Chair of Law at Harvard with the 
provision that Joseph Story should be the first occupant.22   
Securing the placement of Story at Harvard would be enough to guarantee Dane a 
footnote in the development of nationalist thought.  However, the Abridgement deserves 
consideration on its own merits.  In response to the mounting nullification crisis, Dane 
addressed the issue of federalism specifically in an appendix to volume nine of his 
Abridgement.  This document presented several of the key positions of the later 
nationalists, which Story favorably cited.  Dane’s approach so focused on the textual 
analysis of statutory law that he regarded the use of metaphysics in legal analysis with 
scorn.  Dane specifically criticized the corrupting influence of the metaphysical approach 
to political thought on the particularists: “Plato’s school, never in the old or new world, 
however captivating, produced an accurate, close thinking lawyer.”23  Because of his bias 
against the philosophical approach to the law, Dane paid little attention to the problem of 
sovereignty.  His limited treatment of the problem stressed the absolute sovereignty of the 
people as the source of all American government.  Unlike previous nationalist scholars, 
especially Wilson, Dane did not recognize any form of the federal principle.  From the 
moment of Independence, July 4, 1776, Dane insisted that the people had vested the 
general government with all authority and simultaneously created the states as 
subordinate corporations of the general government.  As Dane explained: “These State 
Governments have been, by the people of each state, instituted under and expressly, or 
impliedly, in subordination to the general government, which is expressly recognized by 
                                                 
22 Bauer, 130-131. 
 





all, to [be] supreme law…”24  Previous analysts, like Chipman, had recognized that the 
role the people had played in vesting authority in the government must be ascertained 
before the balance of national and federal principles could be determined.25  Unlike 
Chipman, however, Dane omitted any recognition of the confederal character of the 
American Union.  Associating the federal principle with Jefferson, Dane disparaged the 
particularists:  “It is only a visionary, metaphysical sort of reasoning, that makes a state 
in a union of states, under and subordinate to it, as sovereign as the whole union.”26  
Sovereignty, for Dane, had been solely vested by the people in the central government. 
While Dane’s approach to sovereignty was too extreme for most nationalists, they 
found his critique of compact theory persuasive.27  Dane rejected the idea that the states 
had compacted to form the Union, in part, because the founding documents had clearly 
emphasized the role of the people, not the states.  Dane found the idea of compact itself 
inconsistent with the American example.  The government of the United States “is neither 
a federative compact nor a confederacy, a consolidation or a central government; … the 
whole American system is sui generis.”28  According to Dane, the reliance of the 
particularists on the history of ancient and modern confederacies offered no useful 
insights into the American Constitution.29  Because the American example was unique, it 
was to be analyzed with close attention to the text and not European history or 
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philosophy.  The American Constitution was based in law, and not on metaphysics.  
Thus, Dane broke the ground for Webster and Story to repudiate compact theory and to 
base their theory in the distinctly American ends of constitutional government. 
Daniel Webster 
While Northern nationalist ideas took refuge in law schools and the courts, they 
lacked the broad popular appeal of the Jeffersonian creed.  Nationalists found in Daniel 
Webster a strong adversary of the reigning Jeffersonian paradigm.  Modern scholars have 
proved highly critical of Webster’s role as a nationalist.  The image frequently presented 
is that of the adept conservative politician working to arrest the progress of Jacksonian 
democracy on behalf of his elite, mercantile constituents.  Scholars accuse Webster of 
deliberately provoking a sectional argument in order to gain an advantage for New 
England.  By baiting Hayne with comments against nullification and slavery, Webster 
was able to shift a debate on the Western land revenue into a challenge to the national 
leadership of the South.  Scholars allege that while Webster charged the South with 
calculating the value of union he was actually using nationalist rhetoric in a calculating 
manner to gain political ascendancy for New England as a section.  Webster’s frequent 
uses of history in general and the Pilgrims in particular are portrayed as mere rhetoric 
used to further his political ends.30 
 Webster presents such a complex figure because these charges contain an element 
of truth.  He was a proud conservative, he deliberately painted his ancestors as mythic 
figures, he sought to secure New England’s leadership with himself at the head as 
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President, and he held close personal and financial ties with the business elite of 
Massachusetts.  In his 1830 speech, the “Second Reply to Hayne,” Webster successfully 
blocked a looming sectional alliance between the South and the West and secured for 
himself the role of spokesman for the Northeast.  But his academic critics do not capture 
the full truth about Webster.  His political creed valued the Union above all else, and his 
legal work on behalf of property rights, national legislative power, and corporate rights 
were not simply the corrupt stances of a money-grubbing ambitious politician.  Webster’s 
defense of the Union proved so persuasive to his fellow citizens because it was rooted in 
familiar arguments about the nature and purposes of the Union that many of the people 
themselves believed. 
 Webster’s “Second Reply” sets him apart as the most forceful advocate of 
nationalism during the Nullification Crisis.  The Senate in January of 1830 had been 
engaged in a hotly contested debate over how to disperse federal land in the West.  South 
Carolina Senator Robert Y. Hayne had cast aspersions against New England’s loyalty to 
the Union and against Webster’s own desire to consolidate power in the national 
government.  Webster, first, countered Hayne’s claims.  Webster explained that the 
“consolidation of our union” was the end of the Constitution itself.31  Within 
constitutional limits, “the States are one. … In war and peace, we are one; in commerce, 
one.”32  To the full extent that the general government was empowered, the states were 
already consolidated.  Webster’s voting record and advocacy at the bar reveals that he 
favored an expansive reading of the commerce clause.   The Second Reply made proud 
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mention of his long record of support for internal improvements.33  Webster carefully 
insisted that he did not intend to carry the Union beyond the limits of the Constitution, 
but he proved vague as to where the boundaries lay.34  “The States are, unquestionably, 
sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this supreme law.”35  Clearly, this 
was more than mere lip service to federalism.  Webster believed that nationalism did not 
permit interference with matters of “domestic policy,” like slavery.36  Webster defended a 
genuine federal system with powers reserved to the states and the people, as defined by 
the Constitution.  Nevertheless, the limits on federal power were a minor point in this 
speech. 
 Webster’s rhetorical fire was directed instead against the doctrine of nullification.   
At issue was the theory that the states had an independent right to interpose their 
authority against constitutional violations of the general government.  Hayne himself 
defined this position with reference to the Virginia Resolution, and Webster seized upon 
this admission to make his point.  The Constitution, he argued, was created to control 
state sovereignty, and not to empower it.  Because nullification would lead to assertions 
of state sovereignty backed by force against federal sovereignty backed by force, it would 
inevitably lead to war.  This argument had echoes of the confrontation in Rittenhouse 
Square (detailed in chapter three) and foreshadowed the eventual destruction of Fort 
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Sumner in 1861.  Webster insisted that “to resist by force, the execution of a law, 
generally, is treason.”37  
 Webster, as the faithful son of Massachusetts, faced the difficult task of defending 
his state’s own conduct during the years of Jeffersonian ascendancy.  Massachusetts had 
actively resisted the Embargo of 1807 and had countenanced a separatist movement in 
the Hartford Convention of 1814.  Webster insisted that Massachusetts’s position was 
distinct from South Carolina’s.  Massachusetts did not nullify the federal law itself, but 
memorialized and remonstrated against the embargo to her sister states.  It always 
insisted that judicial tribunals should decide the issue.  Perhaps Massachusetts permitted 
her citizens to disobey unconstitutional law; but, in order to avoid revolution and 
dismemberment, it never took the fateful step of nullification.  Massachusetts had resisted 
federal authority, but it had never claimed that it could act alone as an authoritative 
constitutional interpreter.  Massachusetts, Webster insisted, was faithful to the real 
meaning of the Virginia Resolutions.  It urged state remonstrance and complaint and 
efforts to secure an amendment.  It did not countenance actual nullification, which was a 
radical distortion of Jefferson’s words.38  
 Webster’s defense of New England is vulnerable to critique on nationalist 
grounds.  Massachusetts, if not actively challenging federal law, was certainly 
encouraging its citizens to resist the officials of the Union.  At a minimum, it helped 
citizens avoid the penalties of the embargo and resisted turning the state militia over to 
federal authority.  Webster was eager to denounce the Hartford Convention as disloyal 
and to call upon Hayne to do the same.  Ultimately, his need to defend New England 
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qualified his nationalism by forcing him to recognize a legitimate sphere for state protest 
and agitation within the constitutional limits. 
 Webster recognized that the doctrine of nullification could not be refuted by 
proving that it tended toward treason.  Practically speaking, a sovereign entity could not 
engage in treason toward itself.  State sovereignty advocates believed the greater threat to 
the Union lay in consolidation and would not be so persuaded.  The debate would be 
settled by raising ontological questions about the nature of the thing under debate.  
Asking, “Where is this supposed right of nullification derived?”39  Webster contrasted 
Hayne’s doctrine of a social compact of sovereign states with the nationalist position that 
the government was created by the sovereign people.  
I hold it to be a popular government, erected by the People; those who administer it 
responsible to the people; and itself being capable of being amended and modified, just as 
the people may choose it should be.  It is popular, just as truly emanating from the 
People, as the State Governments. … We are here to administer a Constitution emanating 
immediately from the People, and trusted, by them, to our administration.  It is not the 
creature of the State Governments.40 
  
Even the Senate, appointed by the state legislatures, derived its authority from the 
people’s distribution of powers in the Constitution and from a compact between the 
states.  To determine the nature of the Union, then, Webster reasoned from the text of the 
“People’s Constitution,” and not from the pronouncements of the states.  The people 
created a supreme law expressly to rule the states and to remedy the crisis of the 1780s.  
Because the Constitution was law, at its essence, it was to be studied and treated as law.  
The government created by the Constitution was not a party to the contract; it was a 
government, “vested by it with the powers of deciding and trying doubtful questions.”  
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The people created government and gave to it a fundamental law so that it would 
continue to follow their will. 
The people gave adjudication of that law to an independent judicial power with 
authority to decide all cases under the supreme law.  The authority of the government 
rested on the Constitution's status as law.  Hayne reasoned that because the Constitution 
was a treaty, the states were the signatories of the treaty; they alone could determine 
violations of the treaty.  Webster’s response to Hayne was explicit:  “…[I]t cannot be 
shown, that the Constitution is a compact between State Governments.  The Constitution 
itself, in its very front, refutes that idea: it declares that it is ordained and established by 
the People of the United States.”41 Webster rested his ontological case on the identity of 
the Constitution as law (not a treaty) and the general government as a government (not a 
compact). 
 While Webster derived the nature of the Union from an analysis of the 
Constitution, he based his analysis of the purposes of union on ambiguous references to 
liberty.  In his stirring conclusion, Webster identified the purpose of union as “natural, 
social, and personal happiness.”  In the final phrase, the purpose was “liberty and union.” 
Webster argued that liberty is a transcendent right that was not created by the positive 
law of the legislatures or by the people during the Revolution.  Instead, Webster found 
the meaning of liberty in the ancient and mythic roots of the Union, in what the 
Revolutionaries would have called customary rights or natural rights.  This is not the 
same thing as turning to history.  Webster was not a historicist; he did not believe that 
history revealed how American rights were simply contingent on a particular historical 
                                                 




moment.  Instead, Webster believed a study of American history would reveal the 
transcendent natural principles of liberty and justice as Americans had experienced them. 
 Both Webster and Hayne employed history to buttress their arguments.  Hayne 
eloquently defended South Carolina’s revolutionary patriotism while raising the specter 
of Hartford to cast aspersions on Webster’s credentials.  Webster, for his part, returned a 
blow by blow refutation of the charges against New England.  He treated in detail the 
labor of Nathan Dane against slavery in the Northwest Territories that, in part, proved 
New England’s own love of liberty.  Neither Webster not Hayne took much trouble to 
defend liberty since it could be taken for granted as the purpose of the nation.  While the 
ambiguity inherent in the nature of the Union generated fierce debate, ambiguity over the 
nature of liberty paradoxically created agreement, rather than disagreement, because as 
an abstract value it could be used to unite diverse opinions behind either the national or 
the state rights cause.   
 For Webster, Union was the primary good.  It received far more praise than liberty.  
The sacrifices of the great Revolutionary families of South Carolina and the blood of the 
sons of New England established their political credentials.  Their common strife and 
sacrifice for the Union were the bonds of Union.  Implicit in his praise for the fallen dead 
is praise for the purposes of liberty for which they struggled.42  
 Webster’s profound respect for the American tradition of liberty under law is more 
completely expounded in his 1820 “Plymouth Oration.”  At the bicentennial of the first 
colony in New England the main theme of the celebration was pride in the 
accomplishments of the Pilgrims.   
                                                 




By ascending to an association with our ancestors; by contemplating their example and 
studying their character… we become their contemporaries, live the lives which they 
lived, endure what they endured and partake in the rewards in which they enjoyed.43 
 
Webster sought to uncover the essence of New England character and values for his 
listeners.  He celebrated above all the customary rights of his forebears as the cause of 
their own happiness.  These liberties emerged from the desire for religious liberty, but 
Webster does not present the legacy as an explicitly Calvinist creed.44  Liberty was highly 
political, growing out of a “repugnance of entire submission to the control of British 
legislation.”45  His ancestors participated in the overthrow of James II, for “violating the 
original compact between King and people.”46  As they fled from unjust hierarchy, they 
sought to set up civil governments that would preserve their liberty.  Their system of 
government was based entirely upon their own assent and secured through guarantees of 
property rights, the abolition of primogeniture, and the right to bear arms.  However, 
unlike so many Puritan preachers before him, Webster did not deliver a Jeremiad on a 
distant glorious past.  He believed that the New England way had prospered, spreading 
across “the banks of the Ohio. … Two thousand miles westward from the rock where 
their forefathers landed, may now be found the sons of the pilgrims … cherishing, we 
trust, the patrimonial blessings of wise institutions, of liberty, and religion.” 47  Neither 
did Webster paint a vision of endless progress where the virtues of the past were replaced 
by new and better virtues.  He chastised his listeners for their failure to live up to the 
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moral sentiment of their forebears.  Of the African slave trade, he urged, “let it cease to 
be of New England.”48  Webster understood that New England’s duty to its forebears’ 
project of liberty was not yet realized. 
 Webster’s attitude toward slavery in the Second Reply mirrored his attitude of ten 
years prior.  He denounced domestic slavery as “one of the greatest of evils both moral 
and political,”49 and he praised the wisdom of the Founders, and especially Nathan Dane, 
for excluding slavery from the territories.  However, he recognized that the Union 
protected the existence of slavery in the South.  It even granted the South preference by 
partly counting the slaves for purposes of representation.  Nevertheless, Webster 
advocated no change in the Constitution.  “It is the original bargain—the compact—let it 
stand: let the advantage of it be fully enjoyed.  The Union itself is too full of benefit to be 
hazarded in propositions for changing its original basis.  I go for the Constitution as it is, 
and for the Union as it is.”50  Webster refused to abandon the Constitution and the 
protections that it offered to customary rights for an idyllic pursuit of liberty that 
abolitionists would soon take up.  He believed that liberty needed to be sought with 
prudence.  Yet Webster also assailed the evil of slavery.  He favored the pursuit of natural 
right, under the law of the Union.   
 Webster frequently accused Hayne of “calculating the value of union” while 
rhetorically refusing to consider for himself a world without union.51  Denouncing the 
Hartford convention, he called upon the South to do likewise.  He presented the Union as 
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the only way to reach liberty.  It provided “safety at home, and consideration and dignity 
abroad. .. a copious fountain of natural, social, and personal happiness.”52  With great 
rhetorical flourish, Webster provided the rallying cry for nationalists into the Civil War, 
“Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable.”53 
 In the Senate, Webster’s adversaries reacted with disdain.  Senator Benton 
characterized the speech as “gratuitous aggression,” and a political attempt to break up a 
pending alliance between Southern and Western factions.54  Hayne insisted that he 
labored against consolidation because he wanted to protect liberty under union.55  The 
states, he insisted, were “the people composing these political societies in their highest 
sovereign capacity.”56  Senator John Rowan (KY) added that the people could only act 
“through their constitutional functionaries, or by convention.”57   
Webster’s argument affected the debate on the nature of union.  In the sphere of 
partisan politics, Webster helped to persuade the public that the people were sovereign 
and that the Constitution was law.  He lent nationalism political credibility in the North.  
The National Intelligencer printed forty thousand copies of the speech, and stated that 
twenty other editions were also in circulation.  For a generation, it proved an authoritative 
statement of the relationship between the people and the Union.58 
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The founders, Madison in particular, had sketched out a delicate balance between 
the “partly national, and partly federal” Union through compromise.  In the North 
American Review (1830), Madison adopted many of the same positions as Webster.  He 
denied that the states could decide for themselves whether the Constitution had been 
violated.  At the least, arbitrating constitutional meaning among the states would impair 
the “salutary veneration” for government.  Solving disputes by state negotiation was a 
resort to the law of nations, not the Constitution.  Madison firmly rejected the possibility 
of nullification as a constitutional doctrine.  Yet he just as persistently insisted that the 
Constitution was not framed by the whole people but by the people acting in their 
separate states.  “The supreme powers of government are divided.” Although the states 
could not be trusted with co-ordinate authority in all areas, Madison insisted their power 
was nevertheless essential.59  Moderate positions like Madison’s were displaced by the 
positions of Webster and Dane on the one hand and Calhoun and Tucker on the other.  
The middle ground began to shrink. 
Joseph Story 
The political turmoil surrounding nullification that occasioned Webster’s address 
spurred a new wave of treatises and commentaries on the Constitution.  The most 
prominent and enduring of these treatises was Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the 
Constitution.  Written to serve as a textbook at Harvard and to fulfill his obligations as 
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Dane Professor of Law, Story’s Commentaries were to constitutional law what Webster’s 
Second Reply was to nationalist politics.  The treatise surveyed dozens of authors and 
cases.  It carefully treated the original argument for the education of the reader before 
giving Story’s own view.  Story drew extensively upon the leading theoreticians of his 
day: Locke, Montesquieu, Burlamaqui, Wooddeson, Vattel, Burke, and Blackstone, while 
relating them to the American Constitution and preceding commentators.  The genius of 
the work is in its careful, logical treatment of the issues and not in its novel approach to 
the law.  Most significantly, Story sought to secure the American Constitution against the 
instability of revolutionary compact theory by recourse to a Burkean defense of tradition 
and liberal natural rights theory. Rather than offer a systematic refutation of the dominant 
state rights view, Story aimed to set up a system of jurisprudence on “liberal principles of 
national and constitutional law.”60 
His contemporaries understood the Commentaries to be written in direct 
opposition to the Jeffersonian, compact-centered reading of the Constitution.  Kent 
complimented the “bold and free defense of sound doctrine, against the insidious, 
mischievous, and malignant attacks of Jefferson.”61  Chief Justice Marshall praised it as 
“a comprehensive and an accurate commentary on the Constitution, formed in the spirit 
of the original text.”  He saw it as a reasoned challenge to the “political metaphysics” of 
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the South.62  Many others turned to Story to counter what they perceived as dangerous 
rights claims of the Jeffersonians. 
Story treated Jefferson and Tucker more directly than any other previous 
nationalist had.  According to Story, Tucker at least had the virtue of asking the right sort 
of questions about the “true nature and import of the instrument”—the Constitution.63  
According to the state rights view, the Constitution was an “original, written, federal, and 
social compact, freely voluntarily, and solemnly entered into by the several states.”  The 
states had ratified it, and now it mutually bound the people, the states, and the general 
government.64  Story took strong exception to this Jeffersonian model of constitutional 
construction.  Jefferson’s interpretation of the Constitution left the presumption in 
constitutional disputes in favor of the states.  The authority that this granted to the states 
to resolve doubtful cases led Story to fear that states would readily challenge federal law.  
It might result in the sort of instability and fear of rebellion that characterized the 
Confederation period (1781-1787).  Jefferson himself suggested “the tree of liberty must 
be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots & tyrants;” St. George Tucker 
had made revolution the core of his treatment of sovereignty.65  Such a specter threatened 
Story’s conservative sentiments.  Frequent assertions of right and liberty could quickly 
threaten the Union.  Undoubtedly, they resurrected fears of the revolutionary threat to 
both property and commerce.  Second, Story objected to Jeffersonian constitutional 
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interpretation because it was too focused on discerning intent from scattered documents 
of the Founding and not focused enough on the nature and text of the constitutional 
instrument.  “Is the sense of the Constitution to be ascertained, not by its own text, but by 
‘probable meaning’ to be gathered by conjectures from scattered documents, from private 
papers, from the table talk of some statesmen or the jealous exaggeration of others?”66   
Story believed that constitutional reasoning had gone astray because insufficient attention 
had been paid to the explicit textual provisions of the Constitution and its authoritative 
interpreters, the courts. 
Like Webster and Dane before him, Story sought to ground constitutional law in 
the original sovereignty of the people.  The state consisted in a body politic, “united 
together for promoting their mutual safety and advanced by their combined strength.”67  
He went further than his predecessors, though, by describing the Union as the product of 
one people, who, in 1774, formed a de facto government to meet the ends of Union.68  
This act, he suggested, was a revolutionary act, but Story did not focus on the act of 
revolution, but instead stressed that the Union was created for higher objects than 
revolutionary violence.  He did not forbid revolution altogether, but because the 
revolutionary violence was so costly to the social order, he would only countenance 
revolution if it was carefully directed towards the proper ends.  In the American example, 
the people had acted for their mutual safety and happiness, so that the government that 
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grew out of the revolutionary Congress was coextensive with the objects of union.69  
Unlike Webster, Story did not emphasize the fraternal shedding of blood as binding 
Boston together with Charlestown.  Instead he focused on the gradual formation of 
government and law out of the crisis.  Story stressed that while no governmental body 
had formally acknowledged Congress’ gradual increases in power, the people’s implicit 
consent to the act of Congress had actually created the nation.   
The Union, thus formed, grew out of the exigencies of the times; and from its nature and 
objects might be deemed temporary, extending only to the maintenance of common 
liberties and independence of the states, and to terminate with the return of peace with 
Great Britain, and the accomplishment of the ends of the revolutionary contest.  It was 
obvious to reflecting minds, that such a future separation of states into absolute, 
independent communities with no mutual ties, or controlling national government, would 
be fraught with the most imminent dangers to their common safety and peace.70 
 
The Union was not fashioned by a deliberate contract.  As events disclosed the nature and 
meaning of their constitutional union during the Revolution, Americans’ understanding 
of their union ‘grew.’  Story did not insist, however that the Constitution itself was 
organic.  Story could not have envisioned a “living Constitution” that evolved in a 
Hegelian or Darwinian fashion from one species of government (i.e. republican) into 
another (i.e. democratic) over the centuries.  The supreme law did not spring from the 
needs of the Revolution, but was the result of ‘reflecting minds’ who sought to secure 
their dearly purchased ‘common safety and peace.’  The Constitution was itself artificial.  
Because he was suspicious of revolution and popular tyranny, Story stressed that the 
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Constitution was formed to guard the liberal ends of society from the violent 
disintegration of the Union.71  
Story accepted the limited idea of a social compact that bound all people in a 
nation together. However, he defined it in very limited terms as “voluntary consent or 
submission.”  His chosen authorities on compact were the ancient and early modern 
defenders of customary natural right (Cicero, Coke, Burke, Vattel, Burlamaqui, 
Wooddeson and to some extent Locke) and not the radical contract theorists (Hobbes and 
Rousseau).  This strain of compact theory emphasized that the compact was rooted in 
aggregatio mentium (Coke).  Voluntarily, people compact with one another, “by a 
common interest, by common laws, to which they submit with one accord.” (Burlamaqui) 
These contracts are made on an everyday level through individual agreements to live 
together in society for their safety and happiness.  This might even be considered a re-
statement of Aristotle’s dictum that man is a political animal.  The difference lies in 
Story’s emphasis on the nation as the authoritative political unit; for Aristotle, it was the 
polis.72 
It is in this view of compact as consent that Story’s Burkean philosophy is most 
apparent.  In an extensive footnote, Story quotes Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in 
France to the effect that  
Society is indeed a compact.  Subordinate contracts for objects of more occasional 
interest may be deposited at pleasure.  But the state ought not to be considered as nothing 
better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco… to 
be taken up for a little temporary interest, to be dissolved at the fancy of the parties. 
 
This compact was not to be analyzed like a treaty or commercial contract.  Society and 
the state alike were bound in a partnership toward higher ends.   
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It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things, 
subservient only to the gross animal existence, of a temporary and perishable nature.  It is 
a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all 
perfection.  As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it 
becomes not only a partnership between those, who are living, but between those, who 
are living, those, who are dead, and those, who are to be born.73  
 
For Story, the American compact was perpetual. The Constitution bound not only the 
present community but also the nation past and present.  The ends pursued by the 
Constitution were timeless as well.  This was precisely what Webster invoked in his 
Plymouth Oration: a community of liberty with his forebears.  It was not an artificial 
agreement that people decided to join merely to protect their individual rights.  It was 
also a community of virtue; people joined together to direct themselves toward the liberal 
ends of the American Revolution: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.74 
 The means necessary to accomplish these liberal ends was particularly important 
for Story and the nationalists.  They were not content to assert that society was an historic 
partnership between all of the people.  Historically, organic theories of the state are 
usually associated with monarchical, totalitarian, or fascist regimes.  For Webster and 
Story, the government was a liberal constitutional regime.  It was not an organic living 
Constitution, but supreme ordinary law codified as positive law, with protections for 
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natural right from the customs of the community, which amounts to preserved natural 
law.  The good society and liberal ends could not be adequately preserved without the 
kind of normative constitutionalism central to Revolutionary constitutionalism.  While 
the nationalists were suspicious of revolutions, they maintained the need for 
constitutional guarantees of liberty, either through a constitution of customary rights (e.g. 
England) or through written fundamental law.  The nationalists did not turn to the state 
but to constitutions to protect their liberty.  Webster and Story’s philosophy embraced an 
organic view of society but not an organic view of the law. 
Story’s idea of compact is inimical to the Jeffersonian view.  It was not an 
original compact planted in a moment of time during the Founding.  Story sided with 
Blackstone in arguing that man’s need for social union kept society together.  “The 
community should guard the rights of each individual member, and in return for this 
protection, each individual should submit to the laws of the community.”75  The Union 
was only one compact by which Americans were bound together.  They were also bound 
by  
the great primeval compact of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, 
connecting the visible and invisible worlds, according to a fixed compact, sanctioned by 
an invisible oath, which holds all physical and all moral nations in their appointed 
place.76  
 
Thus, Story could not accept the idea of an original, written, revocable compact of the 
states as the foundation for society.  His vision of international society was founded on a 
permanent moral order.  It was not subject to the whim of state legislatures. 
As a practical example of how a compact might work, Story proudly pointed to in 
the constitution of Massachusetts.  The preamble stated that the body politic was formed 
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by a voluntary association of individuals.  But it was not a compact in a technical sense.  
The people were not absolved from their obligations by a breach of one of the parties (as 
in a business contract).  Neither could a secondary unit such as a town withdraw from the 
polity at will.  The counties of Massachusetts did not relate to one another by the law of 
nations but by their constitution.  In the same way, the states were governed by the 
federal Constitution. Story conceded that even if the Constitution was a compact, it was a 
compact rooted in a higher, social community.  The idea of a social compact, Story 
recommended, should be analyzed through the natural meaning of communities formed 
by mutual association.77 
While Story embraced the organic view of the nation detailed by Burke, his view 
of the Constitution was distinctly liberal.  Constitutions might be written with the 
protection of customary rights in mind; but people institute these protections through 
text-bound positive laws.  The language of constitution itself clearly states that the people 
“ordain and establish” the Constitution, not “contract and stipulate.”78  Although the 
Constitution was a compact of mutual obligations,79 it was decidedly more than a 
compact.  “The people, … in their sovereign capacity, meet and declare, what shall be the 
fundamental LAW for the government of themselves and their posterity.”80  The 
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Constitution, although partaking of the character of a contract, stood outside of history as 
positive law.  
Story recognized that the majoritarianism inherent in contract thinking required 
limits on what the majority could accomplish.  A frame of government could be duly 
constituted by a majority, but it might not serve the good of all citizens.  It might not even 
have the consent of a large minority of its members.81  A society created purely on 
revolutionary compact theory frequently acts for the good of the majority of the present 
time at the expense of the minority and principles of justice.  During the American 
Revolution, Story reminded his readers, Americans violated natural rights of property by 
punishing loyalty to the crown by “confiscation, forfeiture, and personal, and even capital 
punishment.”82  Yet Story defended majoritarian government as a necessary right of 
society to rule according to the fundamental laws. Lockean compact theory made the 
majority an “absolute and sovereign.”  The people were only limited by their own will.  
Story did not go this far.  He found the solution in the Declaration of Independence—that 
people consent to be governed to better protect their inalienable rights.  Because the law 
should be interpreted in light of objectives and the intentions of the framers, the law does 
not function solely as the will of the majority.  It also exists to protect the natural rights of 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  Fundamental law should act to preserve the 
natural rights enshrined in the Declaration of Independence.83  The Constitution, then, 
does not merely partake in the will of a majority, but in permanent and transcendent 
rights. 
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It would indeed be an extraordinary use of language to consider a declaration of rights in 
a constitution, and especially of rights which it proclaims to be ‘inalienable and 
indefeasible,’ to be a matter of contract and resting on such a basis rather than a solemn 
recognition and admission of those rights, arising from the law of nature, and the gift of 
Providence, and incapable of being transferred or surrendered.84  
 
Story stood with Webster in pairing liberty and natural right with the Constitution.  He 
favorably cited Adams’s 1831 oration that “Union was as vital as freedom and 
independence” to the American project.  Together, the nationalists focused the 
Constitution on its purpose: securing liberty under law through the Union.  If Webster 
focused more on the nature of Union, and Story more on the purpose of law, they both 
believed the security of natural rights to be the essential purpose of the Union. 
 The nationalists challenged the old Anti-Federalist theory of association.  Anti-
Federalists had insisted that liberty could not be secured without strong and independent 
state governments to protect liberty from a consolidated sovereign (see chapter two).  
Now the nationalists charged that the Union, more than the states, was essential to the 
project of liberty and natural rights.  Only a national constitution could unite the states 
and provide the normative guarantees of rights required by liberal constitutionalism.  
Thus Webster could argue that liberty without union was an absurdity. 
Webster and Story helped to diminish the Madisonian middle ground in 
constitutional thought.  They posed the conflict in an either/or logic of national union 
verses state sovereignty, rather than maintaining the ambiguous idea of a “partly national, 
and partly federal” Union. Story identified his approach with the cause of “nation” and 
the approach of Jefferson and Tucker with “compact.”  Both sides claimed to preserve 
liberty and love the Union.  However the either/or rhetoric distracted from theories that 
both renounced nullification and stressed that the Union was a federative compact.  
                                                 




Story’s erudition and attention to detail prevented him from neglecting these ideas 
altogether.  Pennsylvanian William Rawle’s distinct theory of compact and secession 
received a careful refutation,85 and Madison’s nuanced treatment of the people in the 
several states also merited Story’s attention.  But when Story raised the fundamental 
questions, there were only two options. 
In what light is the Constitution of the United States to be regarded?  Is it a mere 
compact, treaty, or confederation of the states composing the union, or the people thereof, 
whereby each of the several states and the people thereof, have respectively bound 
themselves to each other?  Or is it a form of government, which, having been ratified by a 
majority of the people in all states, is obligatory upon them, as the prescribed rule of 
conduct of the sovereign power to the extent of its provisions?86  
 
Natural Right and American Nationalism 
While repudiating compact theory as the means by which natural rights were 
secured under law to society, American nationalists sought to explain natural right 
through the work of Edmund Burke. The nationalists had already adapted to the new 
patterns of thought in ways that Burke would have found objectionable.  Webster’s 
emphasis on popular sovereignty and Story’s stress on the Constitution as written positive 
law were more definitely nineteenth century innovations.  But in their treatment of the 
nature and ends of society, the nationalists shared much in common with the English 
Whig.  Like Burke, Webster believed that civil society was the “true state of nature;” it 
was the default condition of man.  Instead of being an artificial agreement, society 
reflected the natural order of the cosmos.  “The great primeval contract of eternal 
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society” that Story cited was a partnership between all things.87  It could not be broken.  
Returning to natural right, Burke’s approach had much to offer conservatives like 
Webster and Story, in the midst of tumultuous democratic times.  They took duties as 
obligations created by natural right.  In the words of Burke, the foundation of government 
was not in “imaginary right of men,” but “in a provision for our wants and in a 
conformity to our duties.”88   
 Story and Webster found Burke’s appreciation for the voice of the past appealing.  
Because of their own intrinsic conservatism and innate respect for the Anglo-American 
legal legacy, the nationalists used tradition to support property and the social order 
against an excess of revolutionary-contractarian philosophy.  Legitimate political 
authority arose from ancient sources, from the “beneficent working through many 
generations or from its fruits.”  Webster’s filial piety toward the Pilgrims and Story’s 
history of the Union both fit this mold of political analysis.  In particular Story’s 
Commentary employs a “historical view of the actual and slow progress toward 
independence,”89 by which the union as a political society of the people was formed and 
limited by the needs of the American Revolution.  It was created by popular acquiescence 
in Congressional authority, and not by positive action.  “The Union, thus formed, grew 
out of the exigencies of the times, extending only to the maintenance of common liberties 
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and … the accomplishment of the ends of the revolutionary contest.”90  Webster stretched 
this history back two centuries to the landing at Plymouth.  History offered the 
nationalists a prudential guide to their Union.  Liberty was not justified solely by the 
logic of revolution but by centuries of the American experience.   
 However, their connection with the liberal ends of the American Revolution 
meant that the nationalists did not abolish reason in favor of history as a guide.  Reason 
and tradition could operate in tandem.  While Story was critical of Jefferson’s 
“metaphysical” style, he complimented Madison as an “enlightened statesmen” and 
praised the “reflecting minds” of the Founding for seizing upon the opportunities of the 
Revolution to cement the Union in a permanent government.  In contrast, Burke opposed 
the rationalism of modernity (Locke and the Enlightenment) almost because it preferred 
reason to the past.  He chose the “collected reason of ages” over the immediate reason of 
the present.91 
According to political philosopher Leo Strauss, Burke “rejects the idea that 
constitutions can be ‘made,’ in favor of the view that they must ‘grow.’ Therefore, he 
especially repudiates the idea that the best social order can or ought to be the work of an 
individual, or a wise ‘legislator’ or founder.”92  For Strauss, three key elements in the 
American tradition prevented a complete synthesis of American conservatives with 
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Burke.  First, claims of inalienable natural rights, outside of tradition and time, were 
made on behalf of all men in the Declaration of Independence.  These rights were known 
to the framers through right reason as well as by recourse to English customary rights.  
Second, these rights were believed to limit the growth of government in an anti-
republican direction and guide legislators in the pursuit of liberty.  Finally, the American 
tradition placed these limitations in written, fixed constitutions to ensure their 
permanence.  These elements distinguished American nationalism from Burkean 
conservatism.   
While deeply admiring Burke’s attempt to return politics to a foundation of 
natural right, Strauss argued that Burke ultimately undermined his own attempt because 
he was unwilling to choose philosophy over history.  “Burke denies the possibility of an 
absolute moment; man can never become the seeing master of his fate; what the wisest 
individual can think out for himself is always inferior to what has been produced, in a 
length of time and by a great variety of accidents.”  According to Strauss, what Burke 
wanted was “not ‘metaphysical jurisprudence,’ but ‘historical jurisprudence.’”  But in 
choosing history over philosophy, Burke unwittingly embraced the revolutionary 
repudiation of natural right that he sought so desperately to avert.  Strauss faulted Burke 
as “oblivious to the nobility of last ditch resistance” to the march of modernity.   
He does not consider this because he is too certain that man can know whether a cause 
lost now is lost forever or that man can understand sufficiently the meaning of 
providential dispensation, as distinguished from the moral law.  It is only a short step 
from this thought of Burke to the supersession of the distinction between good and 
bad by the distinction between progressive and retrograde, or between what is and 
what is not in harmony with the historical process. 
 
Reliance on historical tradition would lead Burke to find truth wherever the march of 




with the ancestral is, in fact, a preparation for Hegel.”93  Strauss feared that if historical 
events turned against natural rights, then Burke would choose history over liberty. 
While not immune from the lure of history, romanticism, or proto-Hegelianism, 
Webster and Story escaped the worst perils of Burke because of their fidelity to their own 
historical tradition of liberal constitutionalism.  Taking a “last stand” against the rising 
tide of popular democracy, revolutionary theory, and (for Story) legal positivism, they 
attempted to re- found American law on the principles of natural right.  Until the Civil 
War, they were largely successful.  Ultimately, the Northern nationalist legal tradition 
would succumb to the pressures of historicism and legal realism. 
While the American nationalists shared Burke’s love of the past and his suspicion 
of revolutionary regimes, they recognized that the creation of the American Constitution, 
as opposed to the development of society, was the work of a moment.  In many ways, 
they were inspired by Burke.  They emphasized that the Constitution was the creation of 
the whole people rather than a compact between independent, sovereign states.  It 
certainly drew upon the wisdom of customary right.  Webster and Story even downplayed 
the revolutionary implications of both the Declaration and the Constitution.  Yet in all 
these things, the nationalists maintained that the Constitution was a legal artifice. 
Like many European Romantics, the nationalists viewed state and society as an 
organism of sorts, “where the integral parts, classes and orders are so balanced, or so 
interdependent as to constitute, more or less, a moral unit, an absolute whole.”94  Yet in 
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the final analysis, the nationalists’ sentimental view of their society did not translate into 
a full- fledged European statism.  They knew that the Constitution, at its essence, was a 
law, which could only be changed through a legal process.  It did not evolve.  The 
American nationalists thus broke decisively with European traditionalist romantics 
(Burke) and rationalist romantics (Hegel) who emphasized history as the primary moral 
force, over reason and classical natural law.  The American project of liberty under law 
separated the Constitution from politics as a way of protecting natural rights from the 
majority.  The European theorists would insist that “The constitutions of states cannot be 
invented, the cleverest calculation in this matter is as futile as total ignorance.  There is 
no substitute for the spirit of the people, and the strength and order arising thereform, and 
it is not to be found even in the brightest minds or in the greatest geniuses.”95  In contrast, 
Webster and Story knew that the American Constitution was created by “enlightened 
statesmen” whose “reflecting minds” sought to preserve Union and liberty under 
fundamental law.  If the spirit of the people spoke, it was through the Constitutional 
Convention.  Historians tend to view the march of nationalism as toward organic, statist 
ends. In fact, Webster and Story espoused an American nationalism of a classical (natural 
rights) liberal variety.  By the Civil War, their expression of American Union would 
become the dominant one.   
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The Madisonian Middle Ground 
Despite Story’s influence, during the 1830s the dominant Northern perspective on 
Union was still the Madisonian middle ground of “partly national and partly federal.”  
Most held that the Union was a social compact, not an organic community.  While 
Northerners rejected the theories of nullification and secession, they still believed that 
their states possessed considerable sovereignty and power. Yet the nationalist doctrine 
made a pervasive impact upon the treatises and textbooks of subsequent Northern writers.  
Lesser commentators than Story and Webster disseminated the arguments of the more 
sophisticated constitutional theorists into a wide reading public.  Few spoke to a 
specifically legal audience.96  Many of these authors held on to the tenants of social 
compact theory and limited state sovereignty long after they ceased to be taught by 
leading nationalists.  Of the nationalist ideas, the important argument was the insistence 
(dating back to Wilson) that the Constitution was the work of the people.  Joseph 
Burleigh’s American Manual (1848) contended that “it is a contract binding alike each 
and every citizen within the United States, to establish and maintain a government for the 
benefit of the whole people.”97  Edward Mansfield’s Political Grammar (1834) carefully 
defined the constitution as “fundamental law; the regulation that determines the manner 
                                                 
96 James Bayard explained:  “Although several works have been written … by men of great learning and 
ability … nothing has been attempted in the way of a short and simple exposition of the principles of the 
constitution, for the use of young persons, and such as may not have the time for more extended research.”  
(James Bayard, A Brief Exposition of the Constitution of the United States (Philadelphia: 1833), 5).  Edwin 
Williams’ Book of the Constitution (1833) billed itself as a “useful depositary of information to both 
parties.”  It contained synopses of state constitutions, resolutions from the Hartford Convention, the South 
Carolina Ordinances, and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.  However it also presented the leading 
challenges to radical state sovereignty: Jackson’s proclamation of 1832, the Webster-Hayne Debate, and 
Madison’s Letter to Edward Everett on Nullification (1830).  As William’s work suggests, many authors 
were primarily editors of documentary collections.  (Williams, The Book of the Constitution…, (New York: 
1833)). 
 




in which the authority vested in government is to be executed.  It is delineated by the 
hand of the people.”98  Sovereign power was vested “in the hands of the whole people.”99  
Mansfield also devoted a chapter to the history and origins of the Union to establish the 
growth of the government from colonial origins through the Revolution into the 
Founding.  For most of the nationalists, the people remained the focus.100 
Story’s arguments dominated subsequent treatise writers, both nationalists and 
particularists.  R. K. Moulton is a good example. Like many popular works, his 
Constitutional Guide was directed at the specific issue of the national bank, the tariff, and 
the constitutionality of nullification. The bulk of his text consists of commentaries on the 
Constitution, culled from the works of Kent, Story, and Madison.  He, too, recognized the 
people as the “only legitimate authority, their happiness and prosperity, as far as good 
argument is concerned, depends entirely upon themselves.”101  Other commentators 
mentioned the nationalist ideas only in scorn.  Henry Baldwin (1837) held the doctrine 
that the nation was a “body politic … formed by the people within certain boundaries,” 
but he held the nationalist doctrine of a community of the people in aggregate to be a 
“perversion.”  Instead, he emphasized that the constituent parts of the Union were the 
states.  With the ratification conventions, the people of the several states affirmed this 
status.  Attacking McCulloch v. Maryland directly, he stressed that the people should be 
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considered as residing in the states, not as a “compound mass” and not as “the organic 
power.”102  
Many authors disagreed with Story on the nature of the Union, but they used his 
arguments to direct their attacks on nullification and secession.  Edwin William’s Book of 
the Constitution (1833) offered a collection of documents designed to buttress the Union.  
William argued that even if the United States was created by the several states, acting as 
sovereigns, “a common umpire has been appointed by the instrument of confederation, to 
whose whole decision all questions arising as to its construction would be freed, [and] the 
right of disunion by a single state would be entirely excluded.”103  Like Webster, he 
believed that the fundamental law of Union provided for the adjudication of 
constitutional disputes. 
Story’s law students also contributed to the spread of nationalist ideas.  Timothy 
Walker proceeded from a roughly Lockean understanding of the state of nature and 
natural right, but when reasoning about the law, he followed Story’s analysis.  The 
purpose of the Union was consolidation: “to unite the people of the several states into one 
nation for national purposes.”104  Respecting federal power, the state governments had no 
function at all.  But, regarding municipal authority, the states had real power.  Ultimately, 
however, their power was limited, and nullification and secession had no constitutional 
basis.105   
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 Some ardent nationalists alive in the 1830s still remembered the events of the 
Revolution and Founding.  Although they appreciated the rhetorical power of Webster 
and Story, they defended the Madisonian middle ground against the newer nationalist 
perspective ideas.  Nathaniel Chipman reacted directly to Webster’s “Second Reply” in 
his Principles of Government (1833).  Chipman had observed the New York ratification 
convention personally in 1788, and had served as a Federalist Senator in the 1790s.  He 
had long contended that the meaning of the Constitution was not to be understood from 
history, but exegeted from the text.  The long debate about who formed the Union, and 
who was sovereign at the beginning, he considered to be irrelevant.   
The great point, however, is not so much what precise character the states sustained at 
that time, as whether the compact was executed by a power in each state competent to 
bind the community and all its members and, in concurrence with the same power in all 
states, to bind the whole in a national union under a national government.106 
 
Yet Chipman immediately asserted, based on the logic of revolution, that “this point 
cannot be successfully controverted, nor that such power resides in the sovereign people 
only, without sapping the very foundations of all our civil institutions.”107  The people 
established the Constitution as law to protect their natural rights.  Chipman used this 
argument to challenge theorists on both sides.  He opposed Jefferson’s Kentucky 
Resolution because it asserted that the states were the parties to the compact.  The states, 
while independent, could not be accurately described as co-ordinate departments of an 
integral union (Jefferson’s argument) because the federal government was not required to 
coordinate with the states.  If the states, or even branches of government, could set limits 
                                                 






on their own power, that would create a government of wills and not the government of 
law created by the people.108 
 Chipman also felt bound to challenge the nationalists on their weak use of 
compact theory.   
 The constitution of the state, has for centuries been denominated by all political 
writers and publicists, … a compact and by way of distinction, the civil compact.  I have 
always considered the constitution of the United States as a compact, to which the people 
of the United States were the only efficient parties.  Every constitution of government is a 
compact sui generis.  One thing that distinguishes it from ordinary compact is, that in and 
by it is instituted a power to make laws and rules for the conduct of the citizens, and a 
power to enforce the obedience to those laws;--essential powers of government.109  
 
Popular ratification strengthened the authority of a constitutional compact.  When the 
nationalists argued that the states were not party to the Constitution, because it was not a 
compact, Chipman feared that the nationalists would remove the role of the people in 
consenting to the Union as well.   
 John Quincy Adams’s 1831 Independence Day Oration was favorably cited by the 
nationalists, especially Story, for his stress on the popular basis of the Constitution.  
Adams himself, however, held none of the later nationalists’ tendencies to abandon the 
compact theory.  He held that the Declaration of Independence, in terms of diplomacy, 
transformed the colonies into “united, free, and independent states.”  In social terms, 
though, the people “bound themselves, before God, to a primitive social compact of 
Union, freedom and independence.”110  However, he resisted the idea that the people 
were sovereign.  The revolution itself arose from Parliament’s assertion (in the 
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Declaratory Acts) that it held sovereign power to bind the colonies.  American statesmen 
wisely resisted the temptation to consolidate sovereignty and did not mention the concept 
itself in the original compact.  Adams himself asserted that sovereignty was incompatible 
with natural rights.  Liberty and not sovereignty was the true focus of the Union.   
Webster’s main theme of Union, however, was warmly adopted by Adams.  
Building on the rhetorical theme of the Second Reply, Adams made “Independence and 
Union” his own refrain.   
To this compact, Union was as vital as freedom or independence…. [N]o one of the states 
whose people were parties to it, could, without violation of the primitive compact, secede 
or separate from the rest.  Each was pledged to all, and all were pledged by a consent of 
souls, without limitation of time, in the presence of Almighty God, and proclaimed to all 
mankind.  
     They are united, free and independent states.  Each of these propositions is equally 
essential to their existence.  Without Union, the covenant contains no pledge of freedom 
or independence; without freedom, none of independence or Union; without 
independence, none of Union or freedom.111 
 
Like Webster, Adams believed that these last three objects of association were quite 
inseparable.   
Linking the liberal ends of society with the cause of Union, through the 
Declaration of Independence, would become the most forceful argument of the 
nationalists.  By the Civil War, Lincoln would rededicate the Union to precisely this task: 
that the nation was “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal;” that this 
“government of the people, by the people, and for the people might not perish from the 
earth.”112 
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